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This dissertation addresses the following research question.
Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits of

entering into interagency agreements vary by city?
Employing data obtained from 183 human service agencies in six
western cities, organizational emphases on two classes of goals as
they relate to the decision to interact with other agencies are
assessed as functions of six organizational variables and city.
organizational variables include organizational goal, reliance on

The

federal sources for funding, and a range of environmental uncertainty
measures.

The two classes of organizational goals studied are: first,

those which directly accrue to the agency itself, and second, those
which accrue directly to entities outside the organization.
Findings suggest that while emphases on intraorganizational
goals are invariant between cities, those pertaining to extraorganizational entities may well vary between locales.

These findings

bear theoretical implications for the future study of organizations,
and practical implications for entities seeking to develop programs or
regulations for application across broadly defined jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Daniel Bell (1973) and numerous others have noted that in many
important ways, the United states is entering into an age of organizations.

The escalation of governments' roles in citizens' lives, the

expansion of large firms' roles in the economy, the steady expansion
of influence among politically-oriented organizations, and a host of
other developments all support Bell's position.
Perhaps nowhere is this point more poignantly apparent than in
the human service industry.

By anyone's standards, the role of this

industry has expanded considerably during recent years.

Federal ex-

penditures on aging services, for example, increased by over 930% in
the 13 years culminating in 1978 (Estes, 1979, p. 50).

Organizations--

non-profit organizations, primarily--have constituted the primary means
by which these resources have been transformed into programs at the
local level.
The nature of the human services industry is in many ways unique
in the American economy.

A number of characteristics contribute to

this singularity.
Perhaps most readily apparent is the limited geographic scope
within which most human services agencies operate.

While funding

sources tend to be concentrated at the federal and state echelons of
government, the actual delivery of services is typically undertaken by
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organizations serving a single locale.

Frequently, though not always,

limited by charter to given jurisdictions, service delivery is most
often limited in practice by the distance which can reasonably be
traveled by

q~ients

or service delivery personnel.

The ultimate

result of this limitation of geographic scope in service provision is
the independent existence of similar service delivery systems in
different locales.

In short, virtually all cities and towns exceeding

certain critical population thresholds have service delivery systems
which are quite similar in many respects to those of other cities and
towns of similar size.
A second key characteristic of the human services industry is
the non-profit nature of many of its organizations.

While profit-

oriented organizations are not unknown (particularly in health-related
fields), the modal organization in the delivery of social services
cannot, by charter, orient toward the accumulation of profit in its
operations.
A third characteristic of agencies in the human services industry
lies in the independent origination of organizations.

While notable

exceptions to the more general case exist, most service agencies are
founded by local individuals or groups reacting to local problems.
Once formed, outside funding is generally attained to allow actual
service delivery, but the creation of the organizations is typically
local.
A fourth and more recent development in the human services
industry is the creation by federal agencies of local coordinating
organizations with the mandated function of integrating local services
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into service networks designed to meet the needs of a targeted class
of clients (O'Brien et al., 1975).

In this horizontal integration of

service agencies, the emphasis rests on the ordering of agencies and
of their services.

This allows identification of potential duplica-

tion and also of "gaps" in service, with potentially beneficial impacts
on system-wide costs and effectiveness.
Horizontal integration also allows for another, more clientoriented benefit.

For the most part, service agencies are founded on

a problem orientation.

As examples, Legal Aid provides legal assis-

tance, health agencies treat their clients' medical maladies, and
family counseling addresses problems of a familial type.

While excep-

tions exist to the general condition, in the end result lie two
potential problems.

First, multi-problem clients may encounter

difficulties in having all their various maladies treated.

Second,

and not entirely unrelated to the first, specific classes within an
overall client population may not find their particular needs met at
all.
One way to remedy these problems lies in the coordination of
problem-oriented service agencies so as to create an identifiable
pattern of services capable of meeting the needs characteristic of an
identifiable client group.

This can be accomplished through the

addition to the local service industry of organizations oriented to
the focal classes of client, and which have as their mandate the
creation of such service networks.
In essence this strategy promotes the development of a human
service "supermarket" with a "complete stock" of services.

The range
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of services is geared to the focal client group, and clients use those
elements of the system which are consistent with their needs.

Each

service is available to other classes of clients as well as that under
consideration, so that eacr. agency may participate in as many networks
as there are defined client groups.

While not performing services in

the normal sense of the word, the coordinating agency can serve a
viable function on a relatively small budget in three ways:

(1) by

coordinating a system out of a less organized group of service
providers; (2) by making known the needs and interests of its particular class of clients; and (3) by advocating with other, more functionoriented Community Decision Organizations (Warren, 1967).
Area Agencies on Aging represent this type of organization
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1975).

Operating under the provisions of the 1973

amendments to the 1965 Older Americans' Act, Area Agencies on Aging
(AAAs)

operate in jurisdictions serving virtually the entirety of

America's population.

While predominantly operational at the city or

county level, a number of states have also implemented these offices
at the state echelon.

Their job, in short, lies in the development

and coordination of services available to the elderly:

stated dif-

ferently, AAAs' function lies in systematizing local service provision
and thereby in improving system-wide service delivery to the locale's
aged clientele.
The efficient application of integrating strategies among
previously existing organizations demands that coordinating agencies
be able to identify coordinative strategies which "fit" the organizations to be integrated.

Stated alternatively, the strategies employed
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by AAAs must alter the behavior of needed service agencies in such a
way as to induce their cooperation in serving aging clients in concert
with the activities of other agencies.

To do so demands an under-

standing of organizational behavior.
To date, however, much of the foundation upon which organizational theory is based simply does not apply well to the field of
human services provision.
The standard microeconomic model of rational behavior by firms
has been under attack for a considerable period of time.

In a succes-

sion of considerable duration, critics have joined one another in
pointing out that various weaknesses in the model itself and in the
assumptions which accompany the model make it unsuitable for analyzing
the activities and decisions of individual organizations.

While the

rationales for critiquing the microeconomic approach vary, the conclusion

reached by most authors is a decision making model in which

profit is a factor, but not the sole factor in determining organizational behavior.

Firms under these models act to maximize utility to

the greatest extent possible, and they accomplish this end by pursuing
multiple l often competing goals.
Most microeconomic analyses are confined to organizations within
the private sector.

In this context, where profit is ultimately a

prerequisite to continued operation, the utility function employed by
firms invariably contains a profit-related goal, although it is often
couched in terms which at best serve to proxy the actual measure.
Few attempts have been made to incorporate these utility functions with the findings of a burgeoning literature on organizational
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theory, which has its roots in psychology and sociology.

While based

in the parallel orientation of social exchange theory, the specification of commodities of exchange and of organizational goals presented
by this approach have the potential not only for enriching the narrower
products of economic inquiry, but additionally offer the promise of
extending the basic concepts of utility theory to areas where profits
per se are inappropriate--non-profit organizations.

It further

provides explicit mechanisms through which to relate organizational
behavior to characteristics of the organization's environment.
In the context of human service organizations, the role of the
environment in the determination of organizational behavior is likely
to be great.

As noted earlier, organizations in this industry are

typically linked directly to their environments through a range of
operational processes and historical associations.

In conjunction

with the limited geographic scale of most such organizations' operational territories, these linkages can combine to promote high degrees
of responsiveness to local inputs among organizations in this industry.
Subject to differences borne of scale and other differentiating
characteristics, this responsiveness can reasonably be expected to
influence organizationn in other industries as well.
This dissertation has as its goal the assessment of inter-local
differences in the operational goals of human service organizations.
Analysis will be heavily based on the Primitive Economy Model of
organizational operation (O'Brien, 1976b), which relates organizational
activity both to intraorganizational goals and to goals identified
primarily with beneficiaries outside the organization. Operationalized
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through a modified utility function, this model permits the comparison
of goal orientations between agencies in different cities.
The dissertation's analyses are based on a sample of 183 human
service agencies located in six western cities.

Assessments of inter-

city differences in goal orientation are based on analysis of variance
and analysis of co-variance models.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter is devoted to illustrating the theoretical foundations upon which the Primitive Economy Model is based.

Accordingly,

the theoretical bases for the PEM will be explored and interrelated
in order to create a conceptual backdrop against which the PEM's
contributions may be presented.
The model's development will begin with a brief explication of
the microeconomic theory of the firm.

This description will concen-

trate on the behavioral characteristics ascribed to the firm by
microeconomists, and will pursue these observations to the point of
developing a simple model of organizational decision making behavior.
Next, the chapter will catalog a number of the objections to the
"Classical Theory of the Firm"l (Simon, 1959) which have been registered by organizational analysts.

Suggestions for alternative models

of organizational behavior will be developed into a general formulation
based upon that which was cited in the microeconomic context.
The chapter's third section will explore the contributions of
lFollowing the lead of Dr. Simon (1959), the term "Classical
Theory of the Firm" will be employed in this dissertation to denote
the microeconomic model of the firm, and not to provide specific
reference to a "classical" period or body of thought within economics.
Based on the work of Smith (1909) and Marshall (1948) r the classical
theory of the firm posits organizational behavior in sole pursuit of
profit, perfect competition, atomistic competitors, and market transactions. Throughout this dissertation, classical theory of the firm
and "the microeconomic model" will be employed interchangeably, and
will be synonymous.
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exchange theorists to the field of organizational analysis, again
ultimately including these observations in a general formulation of
organizational behavior based upon that which was developed earlier.
The Primitive Economy Model of organizational behavior will be
introduced in Chapter III.

Itsties to the work of earlier theorists

will be illustrated, and its further contributions discussed.

As with

the other approaches addressed earlier, the PEM will be re-stated in
a general formulation based upon the earlier sections of the chapter.
This model will constitute the foundation upon which the dissertation's
analytical endeavors will be based.
THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM
The 1776 publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations
(Smith, 1909) constituted not only an initial description of competitive commerce, but also a prescription for England's commercial
policies.

Still in process of turning its back on the unsuccessful

mercantile policies which had dominated the country's commerce for
many years, England's legal fabric produced an intricate network of
barriers to free trade and, inextricably, personal freedom.

Smith's

book provided an economic rationale to accompany the political and
social forces which stood in opposition to continued mercantilism.
At the heart of Smith's system was the much-cited "invisible
hand."

The general statement addressed by this metaphor was the

inclination of rational men to apply themselves singularly to the
pursuit of singular goals when unfettered by restraints; if acting
only to achieve profits, the rational person was posited to engage in
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affairs in such a way as to maximize profits.

While probably not

aware of the inter-relations which exist between the myriad of decisions and activities undertaken, rationality would dictate that the
individual maintain certain patterns of resource acquisition which
would tend to reflect in the activities of the firm.

Because all

commercial concerns react to these influences through the common
motivation of all owners/managers, basic relationships between
different types of resources and outputs were posited to remain
relatively constant between businesses which themselves might be
quite different.
Smith's model was elaborated most advantageously in the late
19th century by Alfred Marshall (1948) in his Principles of Economics.
A lengthy volume comprised primarily of verbal exposition, this work
systematically expanded on the ideas first enunciated by Smith, and
additionally specified a number of basic functions and relationships
in the Mathematical Appendix which borrowed heavily from Marshall's
contemporaries.
The contributions of both authors have been widely discussed and
extended by a host of later authors.

Nonetheless, the discipline of

microeconomics exists now much as a product of these two germinal,
early works.

Accordingly, the Classical Theory of the Firm, alterna-

tively termed the microeconomic theory of the firm, can be traced
directly back to their works.
It is important to recognize that both authors saw their models
as "ideal typical" (Weber, 1947).

While the absolute incarnation of

their work would rarely if ever be found in reality, the associations
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they described would nonetheless portray general inclinations and
directions of association as encountered in reality.

Marshall makes

this point in the Preface to the First Edition as follows:

"Economic

laws and reasonings in fact are merely part of the material which
Conscience and Common-sense have to turn to account in solving
practical problems, and in laying down rules which may be a guide in
life" (Marshall, 1948, p. iv).
Microeconomics, generally, is a discipline oriented to studying
how resources are employed in the conduct of individual and organizational affairs.

At the heart of the discipline are certain assump-

tions about what compels the various entities to behave as they do.
It is assumed in this regard that economic beings will engage in
activities so as to maximize their well-being;

given two courses of

action, the economic entity will engage in that alternative which
provides the greatest return to the costs incurred in support of
activity undertaken in its pursuit.
Exactly how the entity perceives its interest best served rests
on how the entity itself is defined.

Two alternatives are recognized;

the consumer and the firm.
Consumers:

Utility Maximization

Consumers are envisioned as multifaceted individuals who in the
process of pursuing their affairs seek to enhance their personal
welfare to the greatest extent possible, subject to budgetary constraints.

Among decisions faced by individuals in this pursuit are

those which relate to work and countless others which relate to their
consumption of goods and services, each of which provides unique
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satisfactions.
The very variety of the returns by which consumers derive satisfaction creates a situation within which the modeling of decision
making behavior must be very general.

Thus, when referring to the

benefits accruing from consumer activity, economists employ a generic
term for satisfaction, "utility."

people seek to achieve the highest

level of welfare available to them, a goal orientation referred to as
utility-maximizing behavior.

Koplin summarizes the concept as follows.

Utility or satisfaction is the capacity of a good to satisfy
a human want. The rational individual will choose among the
alternatives open to him those that maximize his utility.
Economic theory assumes that each individual attempts to
maximize his utility (Koplin, 1971, p. 29).
The general relation between the individual's well-being and the
commodities actually consumed can be stated in terms of the "utility
function."

Utility functions describe the contributions of each good

or service consumed to the overall satisfaction of the consumer.

A

typical representation of a utility function is presented in (1),
below (Jevons, as cited in Samuelson, 1976; Marshall, 1948).
(1)

• +

V. (X.)
1

1

+ ••. +

V (X )

n

n

Here, U denotes utility, while Vi represents the satisfaction
associated by the consumer with the ith good or service, Xi 2

Total

utility in this formulation is equal to the sum of the utilities
derived separately from each of the consumed goods and services.
The rational consumer, then, tailors consumption of the various
2 In t h'1S context, t h e va1 ue 0 f V 1S
. re 1 ate d to t h e quant1ty
.
of
the commodity consumed, such that V. (X.)' > 0, and V. (X.)" < o.
1 1
1 1
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commodities so that overall utility is maximized.

Since the indivi-

dual's budget is fixed, the enhancement of total utility can be
achieved only through tailoring the consumption of all items so that
balance is achieved between the benefit received from each and its
3
price •
tion.

In this context, the consumer faces a problem of optimizaBecause greater consumption of one good necessarily entails

the reduction of other goods' consumptions (owing to the fixed budget),
and since each good contributes independently to total utility, the
rational consumer tailors expenditures on each so that overall
utility is the highest possible.
Firms:
o

Profit Maximization
The firm constitutes an economic entity which is definitionally

distinct from the consumer.

Koplin addresses the firm as follows.

The business firm is an organizational device, an economic
and legal institution. It incurs costs in acquiring inputs,
which are factors of production such as labor, land, and
capital, or intermediate goods purchased from other firms.
The inputs are converted into output through a production
process. The firm receives revenues by selling its outputs
to individuals, other firms, or government and nonprofit
agencies (Koplin, 1971, p. 81).
Principal among the differences between firms and consumers are
the goals they pursue.

As an instrumentality formed by individuals,

the firm's role lies in the unique contribution it makes to the utility
function of its owner or operator--income in the form of profit.
3This balance is achieved when the ratios relating the marginal
utilities of each good pr service are equal to the ratios of their
prices. The interested reader is referred to any microeconomic text,
of which Samuelson (1964) and Koplin (197l) are representative.
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The firm as such is not human. It has no utility function
and no preference maps. The firm is a tool designed to
further the interests of individuals. It is difficult but
essential to distinguish between the interests and objectives
of individuals, who are assumed to be utility maximizers, and
the objectives of the firm.... The standard assumption of
microeconornic theory is that a firm attempts to maximize its
profits (Koplin, 1971, p. 81).4
In the classical microeconomic theory of the firm, then, the
goal of the firm is singular--profit maximization.

As such, the

problem facing the firm differs fundamentally from that of the
individual: where the consumer optimizes, the firm maximizes.
Profit constitutes the difference between the costs of engaging
in business, and the revenues derived, as below (Samuelson, 1976).
(2)

P

=R

- C

where P denotes profit, R represents revenue, and C signifies costs.
The firm maximizing profits, then, faces the following problem.
(3)

Max

P

=R

- C.

S

4It should be noted that the firm may also contribute to the
owner's well-being in other, non-monetary ways. For example, the
personal preference for being "one's own boss" may compel a firm's
owner to accept a lower income than would be realized in a salaried
role for another employer. Where this is the case, this personal
freedom represents a form of return to the owner which can be valued
monetarily, and equated conceptually with profit. The interested
reader is referred to Koplin (1971, pp. 82-83).
S

Samuelson's formulation (1976), like others, goes on to note
that the firm will realize the point of profit maximization when the
profit realized from the production of the last unit of output is zero,
or P = R - C = O. This point is achieved through the alteration of
output quantities, which directly affects revenues (which are constant
or decreasing with increases in output) and costs (which are increasing
with increases in output) associated with the last unit of output. The
interested reader is referred to any microeconomic text, including
Samuelson (1964) or Koplin (1971). Samuelson (1976) provides a more
sophisticated presentation.
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Profit, in the context in which it is employed here, constitutes
a univariate counterpart to the multivariate concept of consumer
utility.

It is within the definitions of both concepts to envision a

firm's profit as a synonymous term for its utility, as follows.
(4)

P

=U

Envisioned in this light, the firm's welfare is maximized when the
firm maximizes its total net revenue, as signified by the reformulation of (5), as follows.
(5)

Max

U

=R-

C

In sum, the principal distinction separating firm and consumer
in microeconomic theory lies not in different behavioral orientations,
for each is oriented to the maximization of its own position.

Rather,

firm and consumer are distinguished in terms of the criteria by which
their success is measured.

Consumers relate to a multi-dimensional

concept of welfare, reflecting the benefits associated with a range of
goods, services, and activities.

Firms, being instrumentalities

created to serve owners through the generation of net revenues, are
oriented to a uni-dimensional goal--profit--and therefore behave so as
to maximize.
There are those, however, who would suggest that the distinctions
between consumers and corporate welfare are less distinct than those
proposed by microeconomic theory.

As explained in the pages which

follow f these authors challenge the Classical Theory of the Firm as
excessively over-simplified and, accordingly, offer modifications to
the Classical Theory which posit organizational utility functions
similar to those described above as pertaining to consumers alone.
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CHALLENGES TO THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM
Dissatisfaction with the prosaic neoclassical profit
maximization rationale has led many economists to search for
a more viable alternative (Kania and McKean, 1979).
The profit maximization assumption has long been under
attack, chiefly on the grounds that it lacks realism
(Koplin, 1963).
For a long time, there has been dissatisfaction with the
traditional theory of the firm and its basic axiom that firms
maximize profits (Monsen and Downs, 1965).
Since dissatisfaction with the classical theory began
vigorously being registered in the 1920's and 1930's,
theories of the firm have been increased abundantly
(Schramm and Sherman, 1974).
The theory of the firm as it exists in present economic
literature is a deductive system based on assumptions of
human motivation that appear doubtful in light of present day
psychology, and on assumptions of organizational behavior that
are implausible (C. Bernard, 1950).
These introductions to relatively recent works in the analysis
of organizational behavior constitute a representative sampling of
introductions employed in a new branch of the economic literature.
Having noted that the microeconomic model fails to satisfactorily
account for organizational behavior as empirically observed, authors
typically challenge the profit maximization assumptions which underlie
the classical model of the firm.

In its stead, authors suggest

alternative goals which, in conjunction with or instead of profit
attainment, could better explain the observed behavior of commercial
enterprises.
If profit maximization is the sole motivation in the operation
of firms, behaviors which are oriented to the achievement of other,
incompatible goals are by definition irrational.

Yet it is empirically
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apparent that considerable reason is frequently applied to the applicaton of organizational resources to other ends, and this general
departure from the assumptions of microeconomic theory is cited as
undermining the model's credibility.
Chester Bernard (1950) launched what was perhaps the most
influential, modern attack on the Classical Theory of the Firm.

In

his discussion of executive functions within the organization, he noted
two Ubiquitous processes which accompany processes of organizational
development:
survival.

(1) a tendency to growth, and (2) an orientation to

Neither is consistent in and of itself with the maximization

of profit, and so Bernard's remarks suggest an element to organizational behavior which reflects ends and processes other than profit.
Cyert and March (1955) take Bernard's work a step further by suggesting
a consciousness in the multiplicity of goals established by organizations:

this, too, is inconsistent with the microeconomic model of

organizational behavior.

As will be further substantiated later, the

list of authors contributing to these and other sources of challenge
has become legion.
Herbert A. Simon (l959) has addressed the apparent failure of the
Classical Theory of the Firm.

His remarks draw attention to the

different ends to which such a model can be applied, and to the
different requirements which must be met in each of the applications
if a behavioral model is to vindicate itself.
Simon points out that microeconomists have typically been
interested in the impacts of policy and other exogenous variables on
the economy as a whole.

At this level of aggregation, a decision
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making model based solely on profit maximization has allowed findings
of sufficient accuracy to vindicate the analytical framework employed
in their derivation; individual differences in the decision making
criteria of firms tend to be lost at this level of generality.

Where

the unit of analysis is the individual firm, however, variations from
the profit maximizing principle are likely to be both dramatic and
important:

at this level of specificity, a model of greater precision

may well be necessary for a number of analytical purposes.

In support

of this observation, he presents the following metaphor.
Supposing we were pouring some viscous liquid--molasses-into a bowl of very irregular shape. What would we need in
order to make a theory of the form the molasses would take
in the bowl? How much would we have to know about the
properties of molasses to predict its behavior under the
circumstances? If the bowl were held motionless, and if we
wanted only to predict behavior in equilibrium, we would have
to know little, indeed, about molasses. The single essential
assumption would be that the molasses, under the force of
gravity, would minimize the height of its center of gravity.
with this assumption, which would apply as well to any other
liquid, and a complete knowledge of the environment--in this
case the shape of the bowl--the equilibrium is completely
determined. Just so, the equilibrium behavior of a perfectly
adapting organism depends only on its goal and its environment; it is otherwise completely independent of the internal
properties of the organism (Simon, 1959, p. 255).
In this, Simon points out the value of the microeconomic theory
of the firm.

By predicting differences in equilibrium states prompted

by a broad range of disturbances, the model provides a sound basis for
the prediction of general patterns of response.
Simon continues his metaphor as follows.
If the bowl into which we were pouring the molasses were
jiggled rapidly, or if we wanted to know about the behavior
before equilibrium was reached, prediction would require much
more information. It would require, in particular, more
information about the properties of molasses: its viscosity,
the rapidity with which it 'adapted' itself to the containing
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vessel and moved towards its 'goal' of lowering its center of
gravity. Likewise, to predict the short-run behavior of an
adaptive organism, or its behavior in a complex and rapidly
changing environment, it is not enough to know its goals. We
must know also a great deal about its internal structure and
particularly its mechanisms of adaptation (p. 255).
In short, the microeconomic theory of the firm simply is not
suited to analyzing the more specific behaviors of firms in activities
neither oriented nor related to the attainment of equilibrium states.
To the extent that analysis is oriented to such foci, the strength of
the microeconomic model's generality is diluted by its .weakness of
imprecision.
In another article, Simon summarized the challenges to the
Classical Theory in terms of five general classes.

Two (the distinc-

tions which separate long-term from short-term profits, and the role
of psychic, non-monetary income in the calculation of profit) are
largely semantic and not germane to this context.

Three other

classes of objection, however, are central to the further development
of the microeconomic model.
1.

These are as follow.

Satisficing behavior.

Borrowing from the literature in

psychology, Simon identifies profit-satisficing behavior as that which
is willing to settle for profit levels less than the maximum possible
so long as minimal thresholds are surpassed.

Satisficing behavior is

clearly inconsistent with the maximizing behavior upon which the
classicial theory of the firm is based, and plays an important role in
the modifications to the classical theory of the firm which arise out
of the field of economics.
2.

OWner/Manager separation.

The Classical Theory of the Firm

defines organizations as instrumentalities serving the purposes of its
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owners.

Since the interests of owners are served solely through

profit attainment, profit maximization is the only rational motivation
for the firm.

Implicit in this reasoning is a direct and unbroken

association between the owners and the operations of the organization.
An

important source of challenge to the basic model lies in the

observation that in modern corporations--which dominate the economy-owners typically do not manage their firms; rather, they typically own
a relatively small proportion of the company and, with other owners,
hire managers to oversee the company's operations.

To the extent that

managers orient to goals other than those of the owners, the classical
theory of the firm will not accurately predict the organization's
operations.

This point--that managers may pursue their own ends

through company operations--is a very important source of

ch~llenge

to

the classical theory.
3.

Imperfect Competition.

Baumol (1967)1 Niskanen (1968), and

most other authors challenging the microeconomic theory of organizational behavior phrase their remarks in the context of the large
organization which exists in a market context other than the perfectly
competitive.

This is an important distinction.

In microeconomic

theory, profit maximization as an organizational pursuit is of paramount importance if organizations are to survive the competitive
pressures of the market place.

In monopolistic and oligopolistic

industries, however, the relation between marginal costs and marginal
revenues at equilibrium levels of demand and supply allow the firm to
price its output higher than would be possible under perfectly
competitive conditions.

In short, the continued viability of the firm
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need not hinge solely on its profit maximization; rather, the firm
enjoys by virtue of the structure of its market an excess of revenues
over and above those necessary to pay for the cost of doing business.
The disposition of this organizational slack is the central focus of
most economists' challenges to the microeconomic theory of the firm.
Profit satisficing behavior is perhaps the most important of the
three points cited above, and is consequently widely cited by authors
addressing this general subject area (Cyert and March, 1956; Monsen
and Downs, 1965; Cohen and Cyert, 1965; Simon, 1959; Baumo1, 1967;
Niskanen, 1968; Hannan and Freeman, 1977).

While explicit distinctions

are rare, authors tend to identify two general classes of excess
resources which ultimately derive from satisficing behavior.
"Organizational slack," a term introduced by Cohen and Cyert (1965),
is a body of unallocated resources which develop through the interaction of conservative orientations by managers with respect to revenueproducing endeavors and with respect to costs:

the first leads to

higher revenues than planned, while the latter produces costs which are
less than foreseen.

While posited by many (such as Cyert and March,

1956; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) as providing stability to organizational operations, the existence of these resources by definition
detracts from profit maximization.

A second group of authors suggest

that managerial attentions tend to orient to goals other than profitmaximization, and so create conditions under which excess resources
may be generated.
In either case, two derivative issues arise out of profitsatisficing behavior.

First, in being willing to settle for less than
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maximal profit levels, owners are likely to exert less influence than
might otherwise be the case in their control over the firm's operation
and, second, in settling for less than maximal profits, owners permit
the pursuit of other standards of success which, in their attainment,
free organizational resources which otherwise would be reflected in
profit.

Each of these derivative points carried great significance in

the suggestions tendered in the literature for modification of the
classical theory.
The least radical suggestions for changing the classical theory
simply suggest that goals other than profit maximization seem to guide
organizational behavior.

A broad range of possible goals has been

suggested, including revenue per se (Baumel, 1967), dividend payout
(Kania and McKean, 1979), security (Schramm and Sherman, 1974), and
growth (Niskanen, 1968).

That these goals coexist with profit in

firms' programs of operations is the more noteworthy inasmuch as it
has been shown that only in rare cases will the maximization of any of
these performance standards occur concurrently with profitmaximizationi
in most cases they are incompatible and cannot be simultaneously
served (Herendeen, 1974; Baumol, 1967; J. Williamson, 1966).

The

recognition of any of these alternative goals, then, connotes the prior
existence of profit-satisficing behavior by owners.
The separation of ownership and management in the modern corporation is a second important source of suggestions for modification to
the Classical Theory of the Firm, and one which has generated considerable attention.

It is not, however, a new topic of discussion.

Speaking to the removal of private firms from freely competitive
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markets, Adam Smith wrote of a tendency toward "negligence, profusion,
and malversion of [the company's] own servants, whose disorderly
conduct seldom allows the company to exceed the ordinary rate of profit
in trades which are altogether free" (1909, p. 481).

Alfred Marshall

(1948) similarly, though less colorfully, noted that among large
corporations managers tend to be insulated from owners' control and
safe from criticism.
A number of authors have carried these observations into the
more recent context by noting the continued insulation of corporate
management from the control of owners.

While Smith and Marshall

recognized problems associated with this pattern of management, it was
generally thought that competitive forces would mitigate the potential
effects of such a separation on organizational performance.

A number

of more recent authors, however, note that no such control is apparent
in the context of modern, large business firms (Monsen and Downs,
1965; Gordon, 1962; Koplin, 1963).

Rather, it is posited that mana-

gerial freedom from control has led to a high degree of latitude in
the fulfillment of managerial responsibilities, and that this latitude
can be manifested in any number of ways.
Some maintain that this latitude is important to organizational
efficiency in the absence of the competitive forces which framed Smith
and Marshall's analyses (Cyert and March, 1956; Crew et al., 1971;
Leibenstein, 1960, 1966).

Where this is the case, the organization's

response to market forces would parallel those predicted by the
microeconomic model, but would do so for different reasons.

Where

competitive market forces influence organizational responses in the
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microeconomic model, in the context of the large corporation, organizational response is occasioned by astute management operating in lieu
of market influences.
Other authors maintain that the owner/manager split invariably
impacts the relatiop between organizational operations and owners'
goals.

The exact nature of the impacts, however, is subject to a

number of interpretations.
Most conservatively, it is posited that management in this
context will pursue more conservative policies than would ownermanagers in similar operational situations.
likely to take a number of forms.

This conservatism is

First, in order to avoid estab-

lishing performance standards which may not be achievable insubsequent
time frames, managers will endeavor to minimize variations in organizational earnings from year to year (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Kania and
McKean, 1979; Galbraith, 1967).

Second, managers will seek to avoid

risk (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Schramm and Sherman, 1974; Kania and
McKean, 1979). with derivative implications of reduced profit, reduced
growth, and reduced likelihood of bankruptcy.
A second class of more direct impacts have been posited, including
including a heightened tendency to orient toward revenue maximization
(Baumol, 1967; Galbraith, 1967), hastened organizational growth
(Galbraith, 1967; J. Williamson, 1966; Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964;
C. Bernard, 1950), and higher rates of return on corporate assets
(Herendeen, 1974).

Common among these writings, however, is a general

tendency to associate managerial orientations in controlling firms'
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operations with the interests of owners, which become more broadly
defined as a result of the split.
A third class of effects have been associated with the divergence of ownership and management.

Here it is suggested that managers

can and do exercise the latitude availed them by pursuing their own
ends through the operation of the firm.

So long as owners' interests

are served through the realization of minimum profit and any other
goals explicitly or implicitly recognized, managers are free to pursue
their own ends with the company.

Herendeen (1974) succinctly states

the point that lithe relevant question is not whether profits are
maximized, but whose profits are maximized" (p. 60).
In this context, it is appropriate to assess organizational
performance not only with respect to the interests of owners, but also
those of managers.

Cited as important considerations with respect to

the latter are a number of motivators, among which are:

security

(Marris, 1964), lifetime income (Monsen and Downs, 1965; Niskanen,
1968), organizational growth for its direct effects on income (Marris,
1964:

o.

Williamson, 1964), luxurious emoluments (0. Williamson, 1964;

Niskanen, 1968), and such non-monetary rewards as leisure, and power
(Monsen and Downs, 1965; Niskanen, 1968; Azariadis et al., 1972).
In summary, a large group of authors have sought to expand the
Classical Theory of the Firm to include goal orientations other than
strict profit maximization.

Suggested modifications include goals

which are identified with owners as well as a number which pertain to
managers.
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APPLICATION TO THE MICROECONOMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM
It will be recalled that the principal differentiation between
consumers and firms as posited by microeconomic theory centers on the
differences between their respective motivations.
Consumers, as noted by Samuelson (1964) and Koplin (1971), are
oriented toward the maximization of their personal welfare--their
utility--through optimization of their consumption mix.

They tailor

their purchases so as to maximize the total utility realized from
their overall purchases, as follows.
(1)

U

= Vl(Xl)

+ V2(X2) + . • • + Vi(Xi) + • • • + Vn(X n )

Firms, however, are singular in purpose and so orient toward
maximizing behavior.

Since their orientation involves profit, profit-

maximizing behavior follows.

Samuelson, it will be recalled,

formulated this relation as follows.
(3)

Max

P

=R- C

The authors cited in the preceding pages have suggested that the
microeconomic approach oversimplifies the actual case.

It is more

appropriate, they note, to envision firms as orienting to a range of
simultaneous goals, which include profit as well as other motivations.
In this situation, firms do not maximize, they optimize.

One such

case is presented as follows (Kania and McKean, 1979, p. 29).
(6)

U

= f(Sl,

S2, 53)

where utility (U)--the generalized term used earlier to refer to
consumer satisfaction, but now applied to organizational well-being-accruing to a firm is a product of its profits (51)' its capital
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growth (S2>' and its dividend payout (S3).
Two characteristics of this formulation merit comment for their
relevance to preceding discussions:

the first deals with satisficing

behavior applied directly to profit, and the second addresses which
motivating factors are represented in firms' behavior.
Satisficing behavior, as mentioned earlier, may be represented
in this conceptualization in one of two ways.

First, firms' owners

may orient toward a multitude of goals and so seek to optimize the
firms' overall utility as represented by utility function.

If so,

owners do not satisfice in the classic sense of the term; rather, they
settle for less than maximal profit in order to devote resources to
other ends.

This allows them to maximize utility by optimizing the

attainment of profit and other ends included in the organization's
utility function.

Second, owners may in fact satisfice with respect

to the utility function as a whole, and therefore allow the discretionary use of organizational slack by managers.

This would make

possible the use of organizational resources by managers in pursuit of
their own ends.
In both cases, the firm responds to a utility function and so
pursues an optimal welfare position.

In the first case, the following

formulation, which essentially re-states the Kania and McKean model,
applies.
(7)

U

= f(VflXfl

+ Vf2 Xf2 + • • • VfiXfi + • • • VfnX fn )

where U again represents the firm's utility, Vfi constitutes the value
to the firm of the firm's ith measure of success, Xfi.

This formula-

tion represents the utility-maximizing case where owners of the firm
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orient to a number of goals.

The absence of organizational slack

prohibits the incorporation of managers' goals into the utility
function of the firm.
The second case, where owners pursue mUltiple goals but where
they satisfice with respect to utility, may be summarized as follows.
(8) U = f(LVfiXfi + VmlXml + Vm2Xm2 + ••• VmiXmi + ... + VmnXmn}
Here, tVfiX fi represents the influence on the firm's welfare position
attributable to the identified interests of the firm's owners; in
terms of formula (3), this term constitutes the aggregated value of
the individual terms.

vmi is the value attached to the ith managerial

goal, which is represented by the term Xmi.

The sum of the utility

values attributable to the various managerial goals constitutes the
difference between available organizational resources and those
resources identified by owners as minimally acceptable returns on
their investment; in short, the sum of the VmiXmi terms represents
the organizational slack introduced by Cyert and March (1963).
It is, then, possible to summarize the recent contributions of
economists to the Classical Theory of the Firm through the summary
formulation which follows.
(9)

U = f(tvfixfi + tVmiXmi)

This formulation is nothing more than a concise specification that
organizational utility and, therefore, behavior, is explainable in
terms of the rewards accruing first to the firm's owners and second
to its managers.
In general, this fundamental specification of organizational
goals is not entirely inconsistent with those of the early
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microeconomists.

The orientation to utility maximization, as suggested

earlier, in reality constitutes a more general case of the maximization
model specified for profit.

The addition of managers' interests to

those of owners constitutes a fundamental variation from the classical
model, but so long as managers maximize the utility derived from their
employment of organizational resources, the utility maximization
premise remains intact.

The firm (and its management) in this context

remains a rational, economic entity, and still orients its operations
to the achievement of a finite range of ends.
marizes the relation as follows:

Koplin (1963) sum-

"The dominance of utility maximiza-

tion more simply but more fundamentally suggests that the proper
definition of profit maximization is consistent with utility
maximization" (p. 131).
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY
To borrow once again from Simon's metaphor, the revisions to the
Classical Theory of the Firm described to this point allow for the
further "fleshing out" of the microeconomic model.

In so doing, the

model's applicability is extended from the comparative analysis of
equilibrium states to the less easily addressed realities of day-today operation.

The basic mode of analysis is, however, unchanged.

1.

The unit of analysis remains the profit-oriented firm.

2.

The firm retains its identity as an economic entity, seeking
to enhance its position, however defined, to the greatest
possible extent.

3.

The firm's relationship to the remainder of the world remains
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limited to that series of associations which are mediated
through any of a variety of market contexts.
4.

Organizational well-being remains an absolute value:
welfare is not measured with specific reference to other
firms, nor is it compared with any other extra-organizational
entities.

Change over time in the firm's welfare position

constitutes the only relevant point of reference.
As such, the model as developed to now bears a number of

important limitations.
First, it cannot be readily applied to organizations which do
not operate for profit, or for which output is unrelated in a direct,
causal sense to revenue.
Second, it cannot be readily applied to organizations which
operate as distinctly identifiable sub-units of larger organizations
which themselves bear an integral identity.
Third, the model does not accomodate organizational associations
with extra-organizational entities which exist for reasons other than
purely transactional interactions in market contexts.
Of these, the necessity of a price/revenue component in the
profit-based model, even as revised, is perhaps the greatest impediment to its applicability in areas where profit per se is not an
applicable reality.

Price

p~rforms

two critical functions in the

classical model of the firm.
First, price is the principal allocative device on the demand
side of a market economy.
scarce resources.

Economic theory deals with the treatment of

To the extent that a commodity or service is
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unpriced, it is in the strictest sense not a scarce good.
important limitation.

This is an

It is true that price alone is an incomplete

index of the cost of a good or service, for it only very indirectly
reflects non-market impediments to the good's attainment:

time, acces-

sability, and numerous other variables may enter on the demand side
of the transaction to limit clients' quests for the product.

Nonethe-

less, the market price mechanism does largely determine a good or
service's ultimate cost to the consumer, and it does interact with the
prices of other goods and services to establish cost ratios between
different goods and services which may well share relatively equal nonprice-related cost figures.

That unpriced accessability may well be

a desirable element of a program is a non-economic consideration, and
as such it seriously violates the basic postulates of the economic
mOdel of the firm.
In a similar vein, the absence of a price mechanism as it pertains to organizational output precludes the use of revenue as a
component in the analysis of organizational activity.

Organizations

seeking to maximize profits (or, conversely, to minimize losses) will
consciously or unconsciously tailor their production to match incremental per-unit costs with per-unit revenues (see note 4, Chapter II).
The absence of a revenue component renders this relationship insoluble
and undermines standard microeconomic approaches to the assessment of
organizational activity.
In the absence of a price component, an alternative conceptualization is necessary to the analysis of organizational behavior.

Such

a perspective has been developed under the general classification of
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"organizational theory," based largely in the disciplines of
psychology, sociology, public and business administration.

The general

field of organizational theory addresses a broad range of interest
areas including intraorganizational issues, interorganizational
topics, and organizational-environmental interactions, of which the
last two are of most direct relevance to this dissertation's development.

The model developed will constitute one which is amenable to

integration with the Classical Theory of the Firm, as originally
formulated and as modified by subsequent writers, and indeed will in
its greater generality be one of which the profit-maximizing case
might be termed a specific application.
The discussion of organizational theory will begin with a
discussion of organizational definitions, a brief treatment of
organizational environments, a discussion of organizational goal
setting and, finally, a description of social exchange theory as it
has been applied to organizational analysis.

The section will conclude

with the incorporation of these observations in a reformulation of the
organizational utility function.
Organizations
The defining criterion of a formal organization--or an
organization, for short--is the existence of procedures for
mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of various, usually
specialized, subgroups in the pursuit of joint objectives
(Blau, 1968, p. 304).
Stated alternatively, organizations are social entities designed
to accomplish stated goals through group action (Katz and Kahn, 1972;
Parsons, 1956; Lyden, 1975) •.

33

Formal organizations are deliberately established by the whole
or part of a social aggregate to serve a goal identified as important
and untreated.
Organizations must serve a purpose of importance to entities
outside the organization.

Because scarce resources are necessary to

organizational development, maintenance, and operation, the creation
of a product which is of importance to some extraorganizational entity
is essential if requisite resources are to continue in availability
and, indirectly, if the organization is to survive.

This observation

connotes an open-system conceptualization within which organizations
constitute a sub-unit of successively larger systems, each incorporating smaller systems as sub-components.
In this sense, organizations as entities are quite consistent
with those defined earlier in the Classical Theory of the Firm.

In

the microeconomic context, organizations perform a service (such as
selling hardware or repairing shoes) in the pursuit of a higher, more
prevalent motivation--the attainment of profit.
The processes cited earlier by Koplin (input acquisition, the
processing of resources, and ultimate dissemination of output) have
been applied in organizational theory as well.

Parsons (1956) noted

that primary among the functions of organizations is goal attainment,
the fulfillment of the functional necessity for which the organization
was created.

Perrow (1961) similarly but in more discrete fashion

noted that organizations must secure inputs, marshal a technology, and
coordinate members' activities in fulfilling the organizational
function.

Katz and Kahn (1972) suggest a seven-step description of
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the means by which organizations serve their prescribed function.
Less distinctly identified in organizational theory are the
ultimate motivations which compel organizations to engage in prevalent
behavioral modes, the equivalent to profit in the microeconomic
model.

Of considerable importance in this assessment is the relation

of the organization to other components of the larger system in which
it operates.

Together, these extraorganizational entities are

collectively referred to as the "environment," and they constitute
the focus of the ensuing section.
Environments
Organizational analysts in the 1950's and 1960's increasingly
recognized that while organizations bear a number of system-like
characteristics themselves, seldom do they exist, or operate, in a
vacuum.

Rather, while organizations exist as systems in their own

right, they are also components in larger systems representing their
communities, their organizational networks, and others.

These larger

entities, and important components within each, are referred to as
environments (Levine and White, 1972).

Hawley (1968) notes that:

"Environment includes all that is external to and potentially or
actually influential upon an object of investigation" (p. 1).
Organizational environments have been more narrowly defined as
well.

Dill (1962) defined the term as only those features of the

organization's field which are capable of affecting, or being affected
by, the organization.

Dill, in noting that different roles within the

organization involve interaction with different elements of the
environment, coined the term "task environment" in order to denote the
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multiplicity of environmental components which can bear upon organizational operations.

Waldman (1972) noted that the organization may be

most profitably modeled in terms of two general environmental
components.

The first, the "input component," is that group of people

and organizations from which the organization receives resources and
suppor t, while the second, the "ou tput component," is that environmental component which relies on the organization for needed resources.
From the perspective of the organization, the environment serves
two general functions:

it provides key resources, and it employs the

organization's output.

These two functions are closely related

(Thompson and McEwen, 1972).

The organization, it will be recalled,

serves a function perceived by the environment as necessary; to the
extent that it does in fact serve this function, the environment will
avail requisite resources (Gawthrop, 1969) in the form of either
revenue (in the commercial context) or other types of support.
Of importance is the set of causal relations which link the
organization and its environment.
A sizable group of authors have noted that the environment is
capable of generating change within organizations.

Gawthrop (1969)

notes that the organizations must continually react to changing
environmental conditions if it is to survive, a general orientation
shared by Gross (1969).

The ability of constantly changing environ-

mental components to constantly alter the demands placed on the
organization, and to enforce those demands through control of
resources, supports the contention that organizational change is
generally a product of environmental forces (Terreberry, 1968;
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Khandwalla,1972).

In parallel observations, other authors point out

that organizational survival in the long run is largely determined by
the organization's ability to adapt to altered operational demands and
conditions (Gross, 1969; Rickson and Simpkins, 1972; Schein, 1970;
Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Gawthrop, 1969; Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
Others note that through such strategies as competition and
cooperation (Thompson and McEwen, 1972), power (Rickson and Simpkins,
1972), cooptation (Katz and Kahn, 1972), manipulation and environmental
selection (Child, 1972) organizations are frequently in positions to
influence their environments.
The general picture developed by these authors is one of mutual
influence whereby organizations and the environment are each subject
to change induced by the other.
At the risk of belaboring a point inferred above, it is pertinent
to note that the environment associated with any given organization
will in many respects be unique to that organization.

As noted

earlier, the entities comprising a relevant environment are in large
measure determined by the functions which the organizational unit
serves (Dill, 1962).

Not only will these functions determine the

nature of the organization's output component, but they will dictate
the types and sources of necessary input resources as well (Katz and
Kahn, 1972).

As a result, organizations operating in proximal physical

locations, in similar functional pursuits, or in otherwise like
conditions are nonetheless likely to experience environmental contexts
which are quite different.
Overall, it is clear that the organization and the environment
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exist in a state of continual interaction, and that changes in each
are likely to be reflected through changes in the other.

It is

further appropriate to note that the organization's mandated goals
constitute a pivotal focus in this interaction.

The section which

follows investigates the derivation of mandated organizational goals.
Organizational Goals
Etzioni (1975) describes organizational goals as desired states
of affairs which the organization attempts to realize.

Left un-

addressed in this definition, however, are whose goals constitute the
driving force behind organizational activity.

It was noted in the

preceding discussion that environmental forces playa large role in
determining the mandated goals of organizations.

Implicit, however,

in the concepts of organizational flexibility and reactions to changing
environmental expectations is a recognition that organizations harbor
goals which exist separately and distinctly from those functions
mandated for them.

This section will explore the literature pertaining

to mandated goal setting and to organization-specific goals, and will
culminate with the incorporation of each type of goal into a general
utility function based on that developed earlier.
Goal Setting:

The Environment

Organizations are founded when five conditions exist simultaneously (Stinchcombe, 1972).
1.

A group finds better ways to achieve ends which are not
easily served within existing social arrangements.

2.

The future reflects a reasonable probability that the
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organization will pay for the trouble of founding it.
3.

Either the founders or some other desired group will
realize the benefits returned by the organization.

4.

The founding group can obtain the necessary key resources
to develop the organization.

5.

The founding group can avoid defeat by opponents.

Central to the first condition is the concept of goal derivation.
Organizations are founded with an eye to achieving a desired state, and
through their achievement of those states to attain both the necessary
resources and the legitimization necessary to continued operation
(Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Gross, 1969).
To the extent that the environment is of critical importance in
the evaluation of the stated goal's worth, in assessing the organization's performance in pursuing it, and in maintaining the flow of key
resources, the environment plays a key role in organizational survival
(Thompson and McEwen, 1972).

To the extent that the environment is a

dynamic entity in its own right, however, its concepts of what constitutes an appropriate goal can be somewhat fluid.

As a result, a

number of authors have noted that organizations must constantly reappraise their goals in light of the changing expectations of important
environmental entities (Thompson and McEwen, 1972; Maniha and Perrow,
1965; Magid, 1969).
The linkage between the organization and its environment with
respect to mandated goals is well documented.

As

noted earlier,

however, there is reason to suspect that organizations respond to
goals other than those for which they were expressly founded.
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Goal Setting:

The Organization

Acknowledgement of the fact that organizations retain goal
flexibility necessarily entails the parallel acknowledgement that
organizations orient to goals other than those for which they were
founded.

If, per Gross (1969), organizational survival is contingent

upon the organization's ability to maintain flexibility in its formal
goals, then some motivational factor other than pursuit of its formal
goals must compel the organization to embrace flexibility.

It is

additionally reasonable to anticipate that organizations which are
protected from challenge might well orient to goals other than those
for which they were founded.
In both cases a process of "goal displacement" has been noted.
Goal displacement is a phenomenon in which organizations replace the
environmentally-derived goals for which they were founded with others
which more directly serve the organization itself.

As reflected in

the two cases cited above, goal displacement has been addressed from
two perspectives.
In large, protected organizations, it has been noted that stated
goals tend over time to be re-defined in terms of the finite steps
required for their achievement.

Catrice-Lorey (1973), in her study

of the French social security administration, noted that organizational members had, over time, ceased to respond to client service as
their primary responsibility.

Instead, they oriented primarily to

the regulations and processes which their individual jobs served.
this context, goal displacement refers to the replacement of
organization-wide goals with the procedural requirements originally

In

40

developed to support the mandated goal.

Catrice-Lorey identified this

process as a pathological phenomenon associated with bureaucratization.
Goal displacement has also been noted in a second context.
J. Kenneth Benson (1975) has suggested that once an organization

is established, organizational and managerial attentions turn to key
resource (authority and money) acquisition and protection, at the
expense of originally chartered organizational functions.

During the

displacement process, the latter come to be defined in terms of the
new emphasis on resource acquisition.

Benson notes that this process

tends to diminish the functional distinctions which might otherwise
differentiate organizations.

This observation derives from the fact

that stated goals, which are more or less unique to each organization,
are displaced by goals which are derivative of the means initially
employed in their achievement.

Because the emergent set of goals

arises out of activities--acquisition and protection of key resources-which prevail among organizations of all types, the emergent goals
themselves would tend to be relatively constant across organizations
in spite of their various stated purposes.
In each of these cases, the goals established by the environment
tend to diminish in their influence over organizational activity as
organization-specific goals emerge.
This general class of observation is consistent with the economic
models discussed earlier; indeed, the commercial enterprises addressed
earlier provide a familiar case which can be employed to illustrate
the goal displacement case acknowledged by Benson.

Grocery stores,

for example, are founded in order to respond to two sets of goals.
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On the one hand, their purpose lies in dispensing food products to
consumers.

Additionally, however, they orient to the pursuit of

profit, which is itself attained through the previously mentioned
sales activities.

In these terms, the observations above would

recognize grocery sales as the stated purpose of the organization,
displaced over time by the pursuit of profit.

In the economic model,

the two sets of goals are not only compatible but mutually necessary;
in the context of organizational theory, however, which is largely
based in public administration and non-profit operation, the two are
not compatible and may be mutually exclusive.
It is appropriate to note that both parties to the goal-setting
process--the organization and the environment--interact in order to
further their own interests.

Relevant environmental elements seek

through the organization to improve their own positions, while the
organization is serving the environment promotes its own well-being.
The two are associated in a mutually supportive association of benefit
to each party.

This association parallels that posited by economists

in conjunction with parties to market transactions, although it bypasses explicit reference to immediate reciprocity as employed by
economists.

Viewed in these terms, both profit-oriented and non-profit

organizations may be examined through a common behavioral model.
Social exchange theory is one such model.
Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory applied to organizations, particularly to
those in the non-profit sector, posits that organizations engage in
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exchange transactions in order to enhance survival and authority.

In

this context, the organization relates to key environmental elements
in hierarchic associations based on the ability of each party to the
interaction to provide needed resources to the other.
The organizational environment is important in exchange theory
to the extent that it can influence resource supplies to organizations,
and to the extent that it can influence interorganizational relations
by delegating authority for resource distribution (Benson, 1975).

The

most important element of the environment is typically the organizational network, as defined by interaction patterns which directly or
indirectly bear on the focal agency.

Mindlin and Aldrich (1975)

amplify this point by noting that " ••• organizations must be studied in
the context of the population of organizations with which they are
competing and sharing scarce resources" (p. 382).
In this context, organizations are seen as entering into
exchanges so as to improve their own position, either with respect to
goods and services or with respect to less tangible ends which specify
the nature of interorganizational hierarchic relations.
The former of these ends are easily envisioned.

Organizations

possessing sufficient stocks of one resource--say, supplies or staff-may exchange those resources either for other goods and services for
which they have a need--perhaps funding or cooperation--or for
reciprocal consideration at a later date which mayor may not involve
previously specified commodities.
O'Brien and Wetle (1975) developed a model of interorganizational
exchange entitled the Organizational Interaction Model which provides a
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concise elaboration of interorganizational exchange principles.

The

Organizational Exchange Model is comprised of three elements:
Commodities, Valuing Criteria, and Arenas (see Figure 1).
Commodities are the media of exchange and are of importance to
organizations for their contributions to organizational operation and
survival.

Included as a representative but not exhaustive listing of

exchange commodities are clients, funds, staff, technology, access to
influentials, and access to information.
Valuing Criteria are the standards by which the costs and
benefits associated with exchanges are appraised.

Thus, an organiza-

tion entering into a transaction with another agency would exchange
commodities, as described above, with an eye to maintaining or
improving its position in terms of one or more of the Valuing
Criteria.

Included among Valuing Criteria are autonomy, integration,

domain, power, status, and ideology (world view).

The valuing criteria

in this model are paralleled by profit in the microeconomic model and
more generally reflect goals by which organizational well-being is
assessed.
Arenas of Exchange are the transactional situations within
which exchanges take place; they are the activities within which
interorganizational exchanges occur.
are:

Those enumerated in Figure 1

planning, hearings and meetings, contracts and letters of

agreement, evaluation and monitoring, and client transfers.
OVerall, transactions are seen as encompassing exchanges
of commodities, each of which is appraised in accordance with
each agency's valuing criteria, in the operational setting of

Conunodities:

Valuing Criteria:

l.

Clients

1.

Autonomy

2.

FUnds

2.

Integration

3.

Staff

3.

Domain

4.

Technology

4.

Power

5.

Access to influentials

5.

Status

6.

Access to information

6.

Ideology

Arenas:

Source:

1.

Planning

2.

Hearings and Meetings

3.

Contracts and Letters
of Agreement

4.

Evaluation and Monitoring

5.

Client Transfers

O'Brien and Wetle, 1975
Figure 1.

Diagram of the Organizational Interaction Model

"'"'""
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an arena of exchange.

In this context, a number of qualities can

influence the determination of what constitutes "reciprocity" in
exchange.
The valuing criteria together constitute one source of interorganizational valuation, which reflects the valuing hierarchies of
each party to the transaction.

The relative values evident in trans-

actions reflect the valuing hierarchies of each party to the transaction.

The valuing criteria correspond to goals pursued through the

organization's operations, and so correspond to the Xi terms employed
in the various formulations developed earlier.

The relative values

associated with goals may additionally reflect such other variables as
the organizations' positions in the interorganizational hierarchy, and
in characteristics of the commodities and their distribution processes:
in the minds of many authors, these two sources of variation are
closely related (Blau and Homans, as cited in Waldman, 1972; Benson,
1975; Emerson, 1962).
Differential power positions among parties to a transaction
allow the more powerful of the parties to influence the terms of
exchange.

Power in this sense is best described as the ability of one

party to unilaterally affect another party's actions, with degrees of
power envisioned as the degree of resistance which can be overcome in
affecting such changes (Emerson, 1962).

Benson (1975) notes that

power can be achieved through two general strategies:
may

ach~eve

organizations

power through control of centralized functions in the

network, or they may gain power through linkages to environmental
elements.
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The control of critical network functions is generally seen as
entailing control over focal commodities, such as funding, information,
or clients.

By granting or withholding to other agencies supplies of

critical commodities, organizations can influence those agencies'
chances of survival and thereby achieve power.
The development of linkages to the environment is an alternative
strategy for amassing power.

By being able to mobilize environmental

support, the agency can gain leverage against other, competing
organizations (Benson, 1975).
The degree of leverage attainable through environmental linkages
has been tied to the size of the group providing support, to the
degree of mobilization possible, and to the social rank of the elements
comprising the supportive body.
In general, social exchange theory as applied to organizations
by the organizational interaction model can be related closely to the
Classicial and modified Classical Theories of the Firm.

To the extent

that the valuing criteria constitute a set of appraisal indexes which
operate concurrently, organizations may be said to be utility maximizing, as was the case in the modified Classical model.

Exchanges,

designed to enhance participating organizations' positions with
respect to these referents, correspond closely to the transactions
of microeconomics.
Differentiating social exchange theory from the microeconomic
model are two points, summarized by Blau (1974).
1.

Social exchange may involve unspecified obligations,
differentiating it from the precise, contractual exchanges
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of economic transactions.
2.

Social exchange may engender relationships which extend
beyond the actual transaction through "feelings of personal
obligation, gratitude, and trust."

These points of distinction, however, do not impede the reformulations presented earlier, the exchange model described above may be
presented as follows.
(10)

U

= f(VelX el

+ Ve2 Xe2 + • • • + VeiXei + • • • + VenXen)

In this formulation U connotes utility, as it has in past
formulas.

Vei connotes the value ascribed to the ith goal, Xei,

labeled Valuing Criteria in the Organizational Interaction Model.
To now, three general classes of goals have been identified as
contributing to organizational well-being.
1.

Organization-specific goals of an absolute variety.

Profit,

return on investment, and dividend payout are examples
(these were identified in (7) as Xfi)'
2.

Managerial goals.

Lifetime income, power, and emoluments

are examples (these were identified in (8) as Xmi).
3.

Organization-specific goals of a relative variety.

Power,

autonomy, and domain are examples (there were identified
in (10) as Xei).
These may be simultaneously stated in a grand organizational
utility function as follows.
(11)

U

= f(~VfiXfi

+

~VmiXmi

+

~VeiXei)

This formulation, based on terms identified earlier, can be employed
as a general statement of organizational goals and, indirectly, of
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organizational behavior.

Simply stated, it stipulates that organiza-

tional well-being is based upon the organization's position with
respect to commercial indicators, its position as identified through
managerial aspirations, and its position with respect to other
elements in its environment.

Different organizations' overall

positions can be expected to reflect different weightings with
respect to each of the various criteria and, indeed, it is probable
that certain organizations may evidence no success measures of one or
more of the classes.

By incorporating pertinent measures within each

of the broad classes of goals, however, the decision making processes
and the behavior influenced by those processes may be stated.
Three points must be made by way of summary.
First, organizations select from a multitude of goals in their
specification of organizational strategies.

Contingent upon the type

of organization under study, upon the environmental setting within
which the organization operates, and upon the internal structure of
the organization, organizations can pursue a range of goals.
Second, it is not realistic to assume that all desired states
identified by the organization are of equal importance to it; it is
more realistic to acknowledge an organization's pursuits as being of
varying importance as reflected in an ordered hierarchy.

That an

organization pursues profit does not preclude the simultaneous pursuit
of autonomy or market share.

Moreover, that it pursues all three

goals simultaneously does not connote that the three are of equal
importance in the identification of appropriate strategies, or in the
assessment of organizational well-being.
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Finally, all of these goals are directly associated with the
organization itself:
organization.

none relate directly to entities outside the

In part, outside entities' welfare may be reflected

indirectly through organization-specific measures, such as profit.
Numerous organizational contexts exist, however, where profit is not
an applicable referent, and where organizational functions and
attention relate primarily to entities outside the organization:
human services industry constitutes such a context.

the

This model does

not address that class of goal.
The following chapter is devoted to creating a conceptual
setting within which this model may be applied to human service
organizations.

In this, the chapter will review the literature on

community theory in order to identify potential influences on organizational behavior which might be unique to locality.

Employing both the

organizational and community discussions as foundations, the
Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 197Gb) will be presented as a
method for analyzing organizational behavior.

CHAPTER III
LOCAL MARKETS AND THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL
It was noted early in this dissertation that locale in many ways
constitutes the major operational setting for organizations in the
human services industry.

In the terms set forth in the preceding

chapter, locale defines the scope of many environmental elements of
importance to the organization, and in most cases defines the geographic scope in which it operates.

To borrow from economic jargon,

locale defines the market within which service agencies operate.

For

these reasons it is reasonable to anticipate that organizational
operations in this industry may well be influenced by forces which
are indigenous, and unique, to the local area.
This chapter addresses local influences on organizational
operation.

It is comprised of three general sections.

The first

briefly synopsizes the literature treating community, with emphasis
placed on community uniqueness.

The second section introduces the

Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976b), which relates organizational activity to the environments within which the organization
operates.

Finally, the third section specifies the model of organiza-

tional goals, based on the utility function developed in the first
chapter, which will provide the foundation for the dissertation's
analyses.
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COMMUNITY:

THE MARKET CONTEXT

As noted elsewhere in this dissertation, a primary characteristic of the human service industry is its operational concentration
in relatively small geographic areas.

As such, the spatial extent of

relevant markets in this industry are largely defined by geographic
area and by the social aggregate--the community--which lends significance to its geographic area.

In order to address organizational

linkages to their markets--their environments--in this context, it is
necessary to gain some understanding of community.
Community is a phenomenon which has been widely addressed, and
an extensive literature exists treating the topic.

The wide attention

leant to community has, however, led to little standardization of the
definitions used in the field.

Perhaps nowhere is this lack of

unanimity more apparent than in the definition of "community."

In one

summary of the literature (Hillery, 1968), 94 definitions of the term
were reviewed, with no two found to be identical in content.

The

greatest degree of consensus was found to encompass three elements of
the definition:

territoriality, social interaction, and a degree of

identity which is unique to the community.

These elements were found

to be present in the writings of 69 of the 94 authors, of which the
following are representative.
Robert MacIver (1970) addressed the topic as follows.
By community I mean any area of common life, village or town,
or district or county, or even wider area. To serve the name
community, the area must be somehow distinguised from further
areas, the common life may have some characteristic of its own
such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning. All
the laws of the cosmos, physical, biological, and psychological, conspire to bring it about that beings who live together
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shall resemble one another •••• These are the signs and
consequences of an effective common life" (p. 30).
A second conceptualization of the phenomenon, developed with
specific respect to the American reality, is generally consistent with
that included above.
A human community is a functionally related aggregate of
people who live in a particular geographic community at a
particular time, share a common culture, are arranged in a
social structure, and exhibit an awareness of their uniqueness
and separate identity as a group (Mercer, 1956, p. 65).

Territoriality, as noted earlier, is of direct relevance to the
focus of this dissertation.

Unfortunately, while the value of terri-

toriality is widely acknowledged, the parallel issue of territorial
boundaries has proven difficult to address.
The importance of spatial propinquity to community is acknowledged primarily for its facilitation of personal interaction between
residents (J. Bernard, 1962; Warren, 1963; Stacey, 1969; Suttles,
1972; Polsby, 1968; Coleman, 1957).

One author writes,

[i]t is the inescapable fact that people's clustering
together in space has important influences on their daily
activities which gives us perhaps our best clue to a definition of the community as a social entity (Warren, 1963, p. 9).
Per Coleman (1957), interaction between inhabitants gains its
importance not only from the cornmon identities it breeds, but also
for the similarities in attitude and value that it promotes and for
the enhancement of unanimity in perception (MacIver, 1970; Dewey,
1954) •
Boundaries, however, are generally conceded to be problematic
(J. Bernard, 1962; Warren, 1963; Polsby, 1968; Suttles, 1972; Grimes

et al., 1976).

Po1sby (1968) provides a representative discussion of
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community boundaries as follows.
The problem of setting boundaries on the community is,
perhaps, ultimately insoluble except by arbitrary means,
because it is freely conceded that externally made decisions
may have a significant impact on the allocation of values and
on important private and public decisions within the
community, however defined (p. 158).
Virtually all authors ultimately dismiss the concept of
boundaries as being inappropriate to the concept of community,
although Suttles (1972) discusses a number of conditions which can
promote the clarification of boundaries under certain circumstances.
Jessie Bernard (1962) suggests that the concept of boundaries
might well be replaced by that of margins.

Noting that one element of

community rests in the common interests of residents, she suggests
that given communities might be identified as extending only to those
points where common interests are defined differently.

Because these

interests are more likely to be gradually supplanted in a population
than to be abruptly altered, the idea of marginal community areas
where this process of supplanting can be identified gains some
credibility.
A more common approach to dealing with the problem of community
boundaries lies in the concept of scale.

Rather than addressing

community as a discrete phenomenon, these authors address community
identity as a variable subject to continuous gradations of strength.
In this context, strength of community identity is related inversely
to geographic scale (MacIver, 1970; Suttles, 1972).

This approach is

additionally recommended by its capacity for encompassing multiple
community identities which may simultaneously exist for residents.
Suttles (1972), for example, cites the face-block, the defended
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neighborhood, the community of limited liability (a term borrowed from
Janowitz, 1952), and the expanded community of limited liability as
successively larger territorial entities each of which may be a source
of identification for the individual.

The same logic may be applied

to cities, regions, states, or even nations.
The subject of territoriality, then, while of critical importance
to the study of communities, is a topic which has not been fully
resolved.

The predominant orientation to community parallels the

"open system" concept, where individual community entities exist as
components of larger systems.

Each provides a source of identity to

inhabitants, and each is capable to some degree of influencing
activities and orientations in the others.

Strength of community

identity in this schema is inversely related to geographic scale.
Uniqueness is a second widely-cited element of community, and
one which has generated interest among a wide range of disciplines.
Indeed, the typing of communities may constitute the most widely
pursued aspect of community study.
While communities tend to be identified by external entities in
terms of such society-wide referents as racial composition, economic
measures, and income (Suttles, 1972; Timms, 1971), there are additionally a number of identificational sources which are unique to the
community itself.

Among these are the community's relation to its

inanimate environment (Rickson and Simkins, 1972), its history (Aiken
and Mott, 1970; Thernstrorn, 1970), its traditions (Thernstrom, 1970;
Lowry, 1968), its economic structures (Logan, 1976; Miernyk, 1965),
its political structures (Coleman, 1957), and its policies toward
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growth and development (Logan, 1976).
Of critical importance in the community's evolution is the fact
that once established, these characteristics tend to influence subsequent development; community identification, in short, gains stability
in part through the influences it exerts oveL the local development
which leads to future conditions.
In large measure, this influence is felt through selective demographic shifts.

While conscious policies may be undertaken by locali-

ties to influence demographic turnover (Logan, 1976; Hunter, 1975), a
considerable body of literature suggests that migrants self-select
into locales within which they have social contacts (Craven and
Wellman, 1973) or which they perceive as being most consistent with
their needs and desires.
The following citation is highly representative of those
addressing self-selection in residential migration.
The residential movement of individuals and groups is highly
systematic. As a result of the existing structure of the
residential system and of the positive feed-back induced by
the patterns of information flow, residential mobility is
channeled in particular directions. The principal spatial
effect of the complex of individual aspirations, mental maps,
capabilities and decisions, information flows, the structure
of the market and the activities of a wide range of housing,
financial and planning institutions, is to sift and sort the
population into distinct residential clusters, organized in
terms of the basic social differential considered important
at the time and place concerned (Timms, 1971, p. 122).
While other authors tend to address more narrowly these processes of
selective residential movements, the dynamics cited by Timms have been
broadly reported (Srole, 1972; Suttles, 1972; Fischer, 1975; Rees,
1971; Logan, 1976; Bish and Ostram, 1973; Ostram, Tiebout and Warren,
1961) .
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The observations of these authors have been verified through the
limited number of empirical analyses of community consistency.

Logan

(1976) found that population characteristics in a number of American
cities remained quite constant between 1940 and 1960 in spite of
intervening population turnover and growth.

This finding is paralleled

by those of Schnore and Alford (1963) comparing 1940 and 1960 populations, and Farley (1964) comparing SES characteristics of 1920 and
1960 populations in selected cities.

Suttles (1972) returned to the

Chicago neighborhoods studied by Park and Burgess, finding that many
had retained their identities even after having lost their ethnic
populations.

In another, similar analysis, J. Bernard (1962) found

considerable stability in the identity of a community, in spite of
population turnover.

She summarizes her study as follows.

The people ebbed and flowed; but the community of Springdale
itself remained as an entity in its own right. In a similar
way people come and go in New York, Chicago, San Francisco,
but the communities themselves, whether loved or hated,
continue with identities of their own (p. 10).
Consistency in community identity bears implications for the
values shared by community members, and for the mechanisms through
which those values are applied to common pursuits undertaken by community members acting in concert.
Values have been defined as desired states of affairs (Williams,
1967; George and Wilding, 1972).

Values bear not only on the identi-

fication of goals but also on the means undertaken in their realization
(Williams, 1967), it is reasonable to anticipate that communities
would be to some extent identifiable through their value systems.
Indeed, a number of authors have suggested that this is the case
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(Angell, 1974; Laumann et al., 1977; stacey, 1969; J. Bernard, 1968).
Writing with respect to communities, J. Bernard (1968) writes:
(a) normative structure is either inherited from the past or
self-consciously instituted in each subsystem, and conformity
to its demands is usually sufficient to guarantee that the
[necessary] functions will be performed (p. 163).
Addressing the same topic, Angel (1974) writes that "moral integration
involves a mutually consistentsetof norms derived from common values,
norms which members of the group, community, or society have internalized as guides to their behavior" (p. 610).
While many of the values operant in local settings are derived
from larger societal units (Angell, 1974; Warren, 1963), a number of
studies have demonstrated that differing local values concerning
various focal topics can have demonstrable effects on local activity
as well.

Addressing anti-black sentiment at the regional level,

Middleton (1976) found significant differences between the south and
non-south.

Flinn (1970) found that differences between localities in

residents' adoptions of innovative truck farming practices were
mirrored in local orientations toward innovation in general; this
finding has been found in other settings and on other scales by Marsh
and Coleman (1954), Young and Coleman (1961), and Rogers and Burge
(1962) .
In the context of this dissertation, community-specific values
derive their primary importance through their influences on the
operations of organizations serving the resident population.

Kroll

(1962) makes perhaps the most direct linkage between values and

collective action through his suggestion that values represent patterns
of belief which set social priorities in the relations which link
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government and society.

Other authors address this linkage with a

greater eye to the processes through which the linkage is made.
Dewey (1954) posits that people join together to form a Public
when they find themselves commonly and indirectly affected by activities over which they have no control.

With organization, Publics can

create governments in order to serve their interests, staffed by
officials serving as "factors doing the business of others in securing
and obviating consequences that concern them" (p. 19).

Dahl (1961),

addressing the relations between established governments and their
constituencies, sees in electoral activities a similar communication
of value orientations between constituents and elected officials.
Not so widely documented is the degree to which local organizational endeavors are influenced by values and conditions which are
unique to their locales.

Schimpeler and GrecO (1972) explicitly

relate the goals of the community to the process of transportation
planning, while Kaplan (1973) suggests that value orientations among
a resident population must be considered as focal determinants in the
process of social planning.

Saltzstein (1977) is one of few to test

such associations empirically, finding that local applications for
federal grants reflect primarily the values and orientations of local
officials, and bear no significant associations with various measures
of need.
While empirical support for linkages between local conditions
and organizational endeavor are yet scarce, there does exist considerable theoretical justification for such an expectation.
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First, at least among human service organizations, the relevant
market is locally defined.

When organizational well-being, however

defined, is contingent upon organizational appeasement of demand as
manifested in the context of a relevant market, there exists a direct
tie between organizational success and those forces which underlie
demand.

Where those forces are determined primarily through local

processes, it is reasonable to anticipate a direct relation between
locale and organizational behavior.

In one, well-documented sense,

this association is likely to be ramified in the types of organizations serving locales (Winsborough, 1962; Logan, 1976), which tend to
differ with the economic bases supporting local commerce.
In a less strictly economical sense, the degree to which locale
constitutes the organization's relevant environment can be expected to
reflect itself in the operations of locally-located organizations
(Warren, 1963).

For agencies which are operationally related exclu-

sively to a single locale, the impacts of local values and conditions
are likely to be great.
The Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976b) provides a model
capable of assessing linkages between locale and organization, and
constitutes the subject of the remainder of this chapter.
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL
The theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter II constitute
widely endorsed foundations employed in the analysis of organizational behavior.

As is summarized in that chapter's concluding pages,

the many similarities apparent between the Classical Theory of the
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Firm and the various other analytical approaches allow for their
combination in a general statement of organizational behavior.

The

final utility function of the chapter, (11), shows how such a function
might be phrased in its most general form.

As noted, the utility

function is comprised of three general classes of goals:

profit and

other absolute indexes, managerial goals, and non-commercial organizational goals of a more relative nature.

The values attached to each

component in the model, the V terms, serve the general purpose of
indicating the relative valuations assigned to each of the various
goals.

This model serves as the conceptual point of departure for

the Primitive Economy Model (PEM) (O'Brien, 1976b) which specifies
that organizational behavior is best understood in terms of both intraand extraorganizational goals.
The PEM adds to the basic exchange-based conceptualization an
extraorganizational class of goals derived largely from the field of
economic anthropology.

Through this, the model ties transactions not

only to the concept of specific reciprocity entailed in the market
context, but also to the values and societal orientations which exist
in the larger social context within which the transactions take place.
Transactions conforming to the former case are those serving intraorganizational goals of the type discussed in the preceding

chapter,

while those consistent with the latter type are oriented to impacts
and beneficiaries outside the organization.
Distinguishing the two transactional contexts are the spheres of
intended consequences associated with the transactions, and a number
of characteristics by which the transactions may be distinguished.
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Because the former class of transactions--those serving various intraorganizational goals--were covered in the preceding chapter, these will
not be discussed further here.

What does call for elaboration, however,

is the derivation of extraorganizational goals and beneficiaries as a
class of motivations for organizations.
The Primitive Economy Model relates organizational behavior in
part to the societal context in which the organization operates.
Organizations in this model are envisioned as instruments of the
environment.

They are consciously originated by a cognizant social

body to complement the facilities already available to it.

As such,

the defining characteristics of organizations are reflective of the
qualitative features of the society in which they were inspired.

In

essence, the traditional, historical, and integrative qualities
characteristic of the society, as well as its goals, become critical
characteristics of the organizations developed by that society.
At the most fundamental level, this orientation suggests that
the exchange-based models of behavior discussed in the preceding
chapter constitute only one segment of a wider range of exchangerelated transactions typically taking place in modern societal bodies.
While most individuals and organizations can, and must, pursue desired
ends in the market context, other ends exist which the social body as
a whole (or in significant part) can most appropriately pursue through
the development of organizational intermediaries.

Human service

organizations constitute one such type of organizational intermediary
which, in their founding and operations, embody the initial goals and
the underlying motivations which compelled the founding society to
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take action.
There is support for this conceptualization in a number of
literatures, perhaps the most fertile of which is economic anthropology.
Karl Polanyi, for example, noted in The Great Transformation that
economic transactions in underdeveloped and archaic cultures are
reflective of and, indeed, components of larger social institutions
(Dalton, 1968).

The transactions themselves are not the appropriate

units of analysis in these societal contexts, but rather serve to
illustrate operational mechanisms derived from more fundamental social
relationships which establish norms governing the economic functions
of resource extraction, production, and distribution.

Polanyi noted

that only with the advent of capitalism did the concept of an autonomous market emerge to replace the social function of resource distribution with the economic function of resource allocation.

In later

efforts to collectively control certain market functions, Polanyi saw
a re-imposition of social values over the valueless market mechanism
(Polanyi, 1944).

In short, the values which lead to the manifestation

of local concern in the development of human service agencies are
potentially of critical importance in the operations of those agencies
as they respond to the collective demands of a mobilized constituency.
John Dewey (1954) provides a conceptual framework within which
societal orientations and motivations could be integrated into the
organizations founded by a collective to serve its interests and
purposes.

As noted earlier, Dewey suggests that when members of a

group are similarly affected by an event or process beyond their
control, they can organize into a recognizable organization in order to
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gain a measure of influence over their problem.

Under supportive

conditions, this class of organization can be elevated to a governmental role in response to the identified needs, orientations, and
mandates of its constituency.

In short, the government, and other

organizations similarly founded, are closely tied to their founding
constituencies.

This process is consistent with the Polanyi thesis

described above.
In this context, organizations--particularly publicorg3nizations-could well be expected to mirror the expectations of constituents in
their operations as well as those specific to the organizations
themselves.

6

Thus, organizations are, in effect, the instrumentalities through
which a public undertakes to advance ends perceived to be in the
public's benefit, but which are for a range of reasons not as attainable
through other mechanisms.

This interpretacion is fully consistent with

those described in the preceding chapter in conjunction with
6

An important distinction separates the common interest goals
identified in the PEM from the external costs and benefits (more
generically termed "externalities") of microeconomic theory. Externalities have been defined as "unpriced effects produced jointly with other
priced goods and services" (Koplin, 1971, p. 249). While recognizing
that impacts derivative of the focal transaction or process accrue to
parties outside the organization as well as within it, the concept of
externalities is differentiated from the PEM's common-interest criteria
by intent. In the case of externalities, costs and benefits accruing
to extraorganizational entities are not considered in the organizational
decision leading to the initiation or continuation of the externalityproducing activity. In the PEM, however, those extraorganizational
benefits and costs associated with an organizational activity ~
incorporated or, alternatively stated, internalized, into the decision
making process. The purposeful identification, valuation, and internalization of extraorganizational benefits and costs into the decision
making process distinguishes the PEM's common-interest criteria from the
externalities of microeconomics.
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organizational initiation in a more general context (for example,
Stinchcombe,1972).
While the characteristics of transactions undertaken in each of
the two modes reflect differentiating distinctions,7 the two classes
of goals themselves are of greatest importance to this dissertation
and will constitute the focus of the remaining pages in this chapter.
The basic differences in intended consequences distinguishing
the Primitive Economy Model from those of microeconomics and social
exchange theories are summarized in Figure 2, on the following page.
Organizational behavior in the human service industry constitutes
one focus of analysis where the Primitive Economy Model promises
particular rewards.

Three qualities of the industry contribute to

this applicability.

First, the preponderance of non-profit

7o 'Brien (1976b) suggests six distinctions which differentiate
transactions envisioned in the Primitive Economy Model from those
addressed in microeconomic and social exchange theories. These distinctions are summarized in the following manner.

rrransactional
k:haracteristic
~de

of Transaction

Complexity of Exchange

Microeconomic
and Social
Exchange Theories
Direct, Simultaneous,
Specific
Dyadic

Determinants of Exchange Transactants' needs
Benefactors of Exchange

Transactants

Commodities of Exchange
Valuing Criteria

Primarily tangible
Market forces

Primitive Economy Model
Direct and indirect,
Simultaneous and
Sequential, Specific
and Generalized
Dyadic and "multiple
unit-oriented" (p. 13)
Needs of transactants
and of other selected
interests
Transactants and other
selected parties
Tangible, intangible
Market forces plus
expressive and symbolic
criteria

Organizational
Effects on
Intraorganizational
Goals

Environmental
Effects on
Intraorganizational
Goals

Microeconomic Model

Yes

No

No

Social Exchange Model

Yes

Yes

No

Primitive Economy Model

Yes

Yes

Yes

Organizational
Effects on
Extraorganizational
Goals

Figure 2. Applicability of microeconomic, social exchange, and primitive economy models
to intra- and extraorganizational factors in organizational utility function
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organizations in this industry neutralizes the concentration on profit
per se.

Second, the extraorganizational orientation of agencies in

this industry promotes the inclusion of non-organizational impacts in
decision making.

Finally, the local scale of the markets within which

agencies in different locales operate suggests that the operational
realities facing agencies will be differentiated in terms of conditions
and characteristics which distinguish the communities themselves.
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL:

SPECIFICATION

As described above, the Primitive Economy Model constitutes a
modification of the behavioral models employed in social exchange
theory and in microeconomic theory.

Like these, it stipulates that

organizations maintain goals, the pursuit of which influence organizational operations, policies, and decision making.

The contribution of

the Primitive Economy Model lies in its addition of extraorganizational
goals to the intraorganizational orientations specified in the other
two perspectives.

The following pages will be devoted to the PEM's

explication and derivation.
The first chapter was oriented to a description and general
specification of a decision making model reflecting in the most general
of terms the simultaneous influence of three general classes of
motivators.

From the Classical Theory of the Firm was borrowed the

concept of profit, a critical measure of success in the private sector.
From economic modifications to the Classical theory came two classes
of motivators:

the first represented alternative motivators for firms'

owners and included such indexes as return on investment and growth,
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while the second specified goals which arose out of managerial aspirations, including such as lifetime income maximization and emoluments.
From organizational exchange theory came a third class of motivators
reflecting organizational relations to extraorganizational entities,
including power, autonomy, and domain.

As a group, these three classes

of motivators were specified in a grand model of organizational
behavior through formula (II), as follows.
(11)

U

=

f(~VfiXfi

+

~VmiXmi

+

~VeiXei)

While subject to meaningful distinctions which in many contexts
warrant or demand their separate identification, it is possible to
simplify the formula (11) in order to simply note that utility is
influenced by the simultaneous interaction of a range of goals which
are derived from sources within the organization.

Restated in this

manner, organizational behavior's linkage to intraorganizational goals
can be specified through the following formula.
(12)

U

= f ( ~VIi XIi)

where U, as always, denotes utility, VIi denotes the absolute value
ascribed to the ith intraorganizational, Xli.

While this specification

neutralizes any advantages which might accrue from the more precise
function which discretely recognizes each of the three classes of intraorganizational goals, it promises rewards through its brevity in
applications where greater precision is unwarranted.
As noted above, the Primitive Economy Model adds an extraorganizational component to the organization's utility function.

In

this, the PEM internalizes into the decision making process an extraorganizational element which in most other models is left untreated or
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else dismissed.
(13)

U

Such a model can be operationalized as in (13), below.

= f((EVIiXIi)

+ (EVEjXEj »

To the terms introduced earlier, this formulation adds VEj'
representing the value associated with the jth extraorganizational goal
which itself is represented by XEj.
The first element of (13), (VIiXli) is oriented to the inclusion
of intraorganizational criteria as reflected in (12), above; this class
of criteria can be referred to as self-interest criteria, for they
reflect the organization's own interests.

The second half of the

formulation, (VEjXEj)' is a parallel component addressing desired
states which exist primarily outside of the focal organization; this
class of criteria can be termed common-interest criteria, for they
refer to the interests of entities outside the organization.
In this formulation, organizational decision making and behavior
is a determinant both of direct benefits to the organization and of
benefits which are perceived by the organization as accruing to other
selected entities.

Three qualities recommend this conceptualization to

the study of organizational behavior.
First, the model retains the internal relationships which
constitute the foci of microeconomic and social exchange theories.
is important:

This

no organization operates to the exclusion of its own

needs, nor long can it.

Those who seek to stUdy organizations and fail

to address the survival orientation are likely to fall short of
complete success.
Second, the model addresses the external class of goals.

In the

introduction to this chapter, human service agencies were described as
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the creations of a cognizant public acting in order to facilitate its
achievement of some desired state.

At least in its inception, then,

the organization is solely oriented to external (to it) benefits.

Goal

displacement notwithstanding, an agency's survival in this light is
contingent at least in part on the degree to which it satisfies its
sponsors' expectations, and it is these that are reflected in the
organization's extraorganizational goals.
The third element of the model which extends its usefulness lies
in the weighting coefficients, shown earlier as Vi and Vj.

Exclusive

of these coefficients, the model would lend equal weight to the ·various
internal and external goals.

Since this is likely to seldom be the

case, the weighting coefficients allow for adjustment of the criteria's
relative importance to the organization in the specification of its
utility function.
THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY MODEL:

ANALYTICAL APPLICATION

The general specification of the PEM as reflected in (13)
indicates that organizational well-being constitutes the sum of its
position with respect to various indicators of intraorganizational and
extraorganizational success, weighted to reflect differential valuation
by the organization, as follows.
(13)

U = f ( (~VI i XIi) + (EVEj XEj»

The actual operationalization of this conceptualization, however,
is hindered by all of the various impediments which have been recognized
in the cost-benefit analysis literature as hindering the valuation of
non-economic conditions (Clawson and Knetsch, 1966).

The full
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utilization of this formulation will ultimately hinge upon the treatment
of the problems identified in that literature.
However, it is possible to provide initial testing of the formulation through assessment of variance in the basic components of the
model, and this constitutes the focus of this dissertation's research
question.

By learning from respondents how they perceive the potential

benefits associated with given courses of action in response to a hypothetical phenomenon, prevailing patterns of organizational goals and
their respective valuations may be identified.

The instruments from

which the dependent variables for this dissertation were taken constitute such an attempt (see Chapter IV).
Necessarily missing from this approach to testing is any measure
of cost, except as implicitly recognized by respondents.

This general

absenting of the cost component of organizational activity leads to a
simplification of the decision making process, but not necessarily one
which neutralizes the value of the exercise.

To the extent that

informants are asked to identify the benefits associated with given
responses to a specified event, the influences of differential costs
are negated:

cost considerations are held constant through the specifi-

cation of a single mode of response.
A further simplification has been made in this particular
application.

Because little is known of the extraorganizational

component of the utility function, and because profit as a motivator is
not directly applicable to non-profit organizations, the goals potentially identified by respondents as being important to their firms were
limited by the items included in the interview instrument.

Rather than
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being free to specify which goals prevail in their decision making
processes, respondents were free only to specify the degree of importance attached to each of 24 criteria as specified by the research team.
Thus, the formulation actually tested in this particular application of
the Primitive Economy Model is as follows.
(14)

U

= f( O:VIiX) + O':VEjXEj»

Here, X connotes the fact that the benefit terms were exogenously fixed,
so that respondents were free only to indicate degrees of importance
attached to each.
In all, then, the valuation terms, VIi and VEj, are the only
components of the formulation which can reflect variance, and it is
through these that the Primitive Economy Model will be initially tested
in this dissertation.

The operational premise through which testing

will take place is a derivative of the Primitive Economy Model, termed
the Differential Mix Hypothesis.
The Differential Mix Hypothesis posits that organizations of a
given type will tend to reflect in their operations patterns of goals
which are different from those pursued by organizations of another type.
Drawing both on intraorganizational and extraorganizational goals, this
premise simply notes that the operational orientations of firms constitutes one means of classifying firms and, inversely, represents a means
of verifying classification systems derived through other approaches.
Thus, one might anticipate finding systematic differences in patterns of
goal valuation among profit-oriented organizations than would be found
among non-profit agencies, for example.

Similarly, one could expect

different goals to be represented in the utility functions of
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organizations in the extractive industries than would pertain to firms
manufacturing consumer goods.

Educational institutions would likely

pursue different goals than would health-care institutions.

Finally,

and of primary interest in this dissertation, human service agencies in
one locale might be expected to pursue a mix of goals which are different from those pursued in a different community.

For the purposes of

this dissertation, the differential mix hypothesis will be implemented
by classifying organizations according to the cities within which they
operate.
The analytical application of the differential mix hypothesis
involves the assessment of variance associated with the valuing terms
(VIi and VEj in (15». By identifying organizations in terms of whatever
classificational device is selected (as here, by community), analysis of
variance and covariance techniques can be employed to assess the value
of the classifying scheme in explaining variance.

To the extent that

these analyses reveal meaningful contributions to variance, the value
of the classificational scheme as an appropriate means of identifying
organizations is substantiated.

Alternatively, where analysis reveals

no meaningful contributions to variance, the value of the classifying
scheme in that particular application can be called into question.
The differential mix hypothesis will be applied in this dissertation to test for the contributions of locale in explaining variance
encountered in the valuation terms.

By identifying organizations in

terms of the cities within which they operate l differences in valuation
between cities may be identified.
fully in the ensuing chapter.

This approach will be described more

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

The dissertation research presented in the following two chapters
addresses the application of the Primitive Economy Model to organizational decision making among agencies in the aging services industries
of six western cities.
question:

Do

The analysis is guided by a single research

the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits

of entering into interagency agreements vary by city?

If they do, the

general underpinnings of the Primitive Economy Model--that organizations
pursue goals other than those directly impacting the organization
itself--are supported.

If organizations are found to systematically

respond to different patterns of extra-organizational "goals" from city
to city, then a pattern of goal development will have been identified
through microeconomic and organizational theories.

The presence of

different operational orientations is testable through the analysis
of organizations' confrontations with identical situations in different
locales, and this strategy constitutes the heart of the dissertation
research being reported.
The dissertation is based on data obtained from personal interviews with human service agency personnel in six western cities.
Interviews were completed during June and July, 1977, as part of a
research project, entitled Testing a Community Intervention Model
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1978), funded through Grant Number 90-A-I020/01 by
the Administration on Aging, DHEW.
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The six cities selected for study were chosen in conjunction with
a set of criteria including population, relation to neighboring cities,
and the existence of Area Agencies on Aging.

They are located in six

states and range throughout the western region of the country.
Within each of the cities, approximately 30 organizations were
contacted for interviews, as determined through a two-staged sampling
technique termed "snowball sampling" (Griffith et al., 1973; Roistacher,
1974).

In each city the directors of human service coordinating

agencies provided a list of agencies with which their own organizations
maintained most frequent contact.

The agencies named by these infor-

mants became the sample from which data for the study was obtained.
Each city's sample included five or six "broker agencies," agencies
which arrange for other agencies to provide services, and approximately
25 "direct service agencies," those agencies which actually provide the
service to the client.
The interview schedule was created employing insights gained both
through extensive literature review, and through analysis of organizational data obtained in a prior study by O'Brien and Wetle (1975).

The

instrument was pre-tested in the Portland, Oregon area and modified as
necessary prior to its use in actual data collection.

Designed for use

with informants in administrative roles, the instrument was administered through personal interviews with 183 informants, holding the
positions of local agency director, assistant director, or department
head.
The author of this dissertation served as a Research Assistant in
the study described above, and was involved in the project from its
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inception through its completion.

Job responsibilities included

participation in the conduct of background research, questionnaire
development, data analysis, and report writing.
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES
As noted earlier, the research reported in this dissertation
addresses the following research question.
Do

the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits

of entering into interagency agreements vary by city?
This question will be addressed through the Differential Mix
Hypothesis, a corollary of the Primitive Economy Model.

As described

in the previous chapter, the Differential Mix Hypothesis is a nondirectional statement which suggests that different classes of organizations will pursue different mixes of goals in their utility functions,
as determined by systematic distinctions in their mandated functions,
their relevant environments, and other factors.

Since an important

element of the social service industry is the local scope of its
relevant environment, it is realistic to anticipate systematic differences in the goals pursued by service agencies as one moves between
different local markets.

These differences are reflected in formula

(14) through the valuing coefficients, Vli and VEj.

Since two classes

of criteria are under study, the differential mix hypothesis is pursued
in two predictive statements.
1.

It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in

the intraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements.
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2.

It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in

the extraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements.
There is reason to suspect, however, that the effects of interlocal differences will not be uniformly reflected in both classes of
decision making criteria.

It is realistic to anticipate that organiza-

tional orientation to the self-interest criteria will reflect a degree
of continuity as one moves from city to city, regardless of the values
and orientations of the local community.

Further contributing to a

potentially diminished reflection of local variation in the selfinterest criteria are the federal guidelines and requirements which
accompany the funding of many of these organizations, the professional
orientations of many of the practitioners, and the influences of widelyaccepted business procedures.

The Common Interest criteria, however,

are expected to be quite reflective of local conditions.

Because these

organizations are posited as being fundamentally oriented to the social
ecology within which they are operated, and because they are expected
to reflect a continued dynamic interaction with the communities through
which their markets are defined, it is realistic to anticipate considerable differences between organizational orientations to these criteria
as one moves between locales.

Accordingly, local variation in the

operational procedures and orientations attached to the intraorganizational criteria is predicted to be less than among the extraorganizational criteria, which are seen as arising to a greater extent out of
local conditions.
3.

This observation leads to a third hypothesis.

It is hypothesized that the differences found to exist between
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cities with respect to the

~organizational

criteria will exceed

those associated with the intraorganizational criteria.
The effects of locational differences in the values attached to
the decision making criteria will be examined both before and after
parceling out the effects of selected organizational variables.
DESIGN
Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the dissertation's
design.

The dependent variable, "Interaction Decision Criteria," is

depicted as reflecting a set of organizational variables as well as
characteristics of the community context within which the organization
operates.

In practice, the associations of the organizational variables

with the dependent variable are parceled out prior to the introduction
of the community "contextual" variable in an analytical technique
termed "contextual analysis" (Farkas, 1974; Meyer, 1970; Wright, 1977).
It is hypothesized that this series of analyses will disclose associations between organizational goal orientations and the communities
within which the organizations operate.

To the extent that this

finding is realized, its application to local service strategies will
contribute to more effective service provision.
SAMPLE
The sampling strategy employed in the selection of organizations
to be included in the stUdy was comprised of a two-step process:

the

first stage involved the selection of cities to be addressed, and the
second involved identifying organizations within those cities.

Each

Covariates
(Organizational
Variables)

Independent Variable
(Locational
Variable)

Dependent Variables

Organizational
Resources
(Defined on Pp. 113-114)

Organizational Uncertainty
(Defined on Pages 114 through 120)

>, Conununity

~ (Defined on Pp. 110-113)

Interaction Decision
Criteria (Defined on
Pages 90 through 107)

Organizational Goal
(Defined on Page 120-121)

Figure 3.

Research design

....J
OJ
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step will be addressed individually.
Cities
Six cities were studied during the course of the project.
1.

San Bernardino, California

2.

Tacoma, Washington

3.

Las Vegas, Nevada

4.

Tucson, Arizona

5.

Boulder, Colorado

6.

Salt Lake City, Utah

The cities were purposively selected according to a number of
criteria which are listed below in approximately their order of
importance.

It should be noted that no widely accepted guide exists

for the selection of cities for use in surveys of this type.

While

locale-related theoretical bases exist in a wide range of disciplines,
the concise application of this broad body of thought to the actual
selection processes appropriate to survey research does not exist.

The

selection criteria described below constitute the factors identified by
the research team as being most important to the theoretical underpinnings of the research being undertaken, and additionally reflect
considerations born of cost and manageability.

Key characteristics of

the cities are summarized in Table I.
1.

Independence.

It was hoped that the cities included in the

study would be independent of other, larger cities with respect to the
delivery and direction of human services.

It will be noted from Table I

that two cities included in the study are quite close to the nearest
city of equal or greater size, these being Boulder and Tacoma.

In each

TABLE I
CITIES:

SELECTED FACTS

Population

Distance From
Nearest City
of Equal or
Greater Size

Percentage
of Population
Non-White

AM in City?

San Bernardino,
California

104,394

48

37.9

Yes

28

Tacoma,
Washington

154,555

12

10.7

Yes

32

Las Vegas,
Nevada

125,641

178

17.1

No

Tucson,
Arizona

262,933

96

29.1

Yes

31

Boulder,
Colorado

66,870

20

7.0

Yes

30

175,813

340

9.7

Yes

31

City

Salt Lake City,
Utah
Source:

*

Number of
Organizations

31

1972 City and County Data Book (1970 Census), International City Management Assn., 1977.
-

~

implemented at the state level.

-

-----

ex>

a
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case, informants in those cities were contacted prior to the implementation of the study in order to ascertain the degree of independence
evidenced in the focal city's human services networks.

In each case,

assurances were given that these functions were, in fact, independent.
2.

General Location.

the western states.

The study was limited by two factors to

First, by limiting the study to a general region

of the country, potential cultural differences attributable to wide
regional separations could be to some extent avoided.

Budgetary

parameters limited the total number of cities which could be included
in the study, and therefore limited the extent to which macro-regional
distinctions of various types could be controlled.

The second rationale

in limiting the study to the west was more directly budgetary in nature.
The western location of the research agency conducting the study meant
that travel costs to western destinations would be more economical than
would travel to more distant points.
3.

Size.

The study sought to study organizational relationships

as encountered in different local contexts, and for this reason mid-size
cities were

selected as study sites.

Large cities were avoided since

the multiplicity of their district identities could introduce local
heterogeneity to AAA service areas.

Small cities were avoided for fear

that their service sectors would not be independent of outside
influeneces.

The cities ultimately selected ranged in size from just

over 66,000 to approximately 262,000.
4.

State.

It was decided that in order to achieve the goal of

the stUdy it was necessary to select cities so that no two were located
in the same state.

This precaution insured both widespread regional
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representation, and greater differentiation between locales.
4.

Area Agency on Aging.

It was desired that each city have an

Area Agency on Aging, and this goal was realized in every city but one.
Las Vegas is located in a state where the Area Agency on Aging was
implemented at the state level, and was purposively included in the
sample to provide a contrasting case.
5.

Ethnicity.

source of variance.

Ethnic composition of the cities was a desired
Two sources of non-white ethnic composition were

predominant, these being Black and Spanish-surnamed.

While distribu-

tions between cities do not approach continuity to as great a degree
as might be hoped, a considerable range was included with respect to
each minority group.
6.

Cooperation.

A final consideration which resulted in the

elimination of one city from the sample was the degree of cooperation
encountered in the early stages of the selection process.

Because

considerable distances were involved, it was important that some
measure of receptivity be offered.
Organizations
Within the cities, organizations were selected through a "snowball
sampling" technique (Griffith et al., 1973; Roistacher, 1974).
Generally, this approach involves contacting a party displaying desired
characteristics and requesting a listing of other parties with whom
contacts are maintained.
sources of data.

Named individuals are then used as the actual

This technique allows for the study of linkages

without the prior imposition of structure by the researcher.
With specific reference to the data gathering techniques
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employed in this study, initial contacts were established with the
directors of six coordinating agencies in each city.

In the sense

employed here, coordinating agencies are organizations which fulfill
service mandates by enlisting and coordinating the service offerings of
other, direct service organizations.

In each locale, the directors of

the Area Agency on Aging, the local public health department, the
local United Way, the adult services agency serving the local jurisdiction, the local Title XX agency, and the local mental health coordinating
organization were requested to provide the names of agencies to which
the highest level of funding was provided.

The named agencies

constitute the sample from which data was obtained.

In each city

approximately 30 organizations were selected for the sample:

of the

30, it was desired that five or six be broker agencies, and approximately 25 be service organizations.
It is clear that this sampling strategy does not conform to the
random sampling mode.

While there is merit in this observation and in

the reservations which follow, other considerations contribute to the
desirability of this strategy for this particular study.
As was mentioned earlier, the cities employed in the study were
purposively selected to conform to a set of criteria.

It was explicitly

recognized that city size very likely confounds the relationships under
study.
nized

By limiting the sample to the range represented it is recog~hat

findings and implications will be tenuous when extended to

cities of other scales.
Within the cities, organizations were also selected by other than
random means, and the non-random method of sampling may well be seen as
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impacting on the generalizability of the study's findings to a universe
of other organizations.

While the strategy for selecting agencies for

study was designed to conform as closely as possible to the snowball
technique described earlier, the responses of contacted respondents
undoubtedly reflect an operational component:

to the extent that this

is the case, network embeddedness may well have been supplanted by
characteristics more reflective of the agency's service or administrative style.

To the extent, however, that sampling strategies within

each of the six cities are identical, there is no
that intercity comparisons will be affected.

reason to believe

In essence, the portion

of each service community included in the sample was obtained through
identical methods and therefore should be considered comparable.
~breover,

there is every reason to believe that similar techniques in

other cities would produce similar agency samples, so that generalization across cities of this scale is reasonable.
Finally, this method of sampling guarantees that contacted
organizations will have had prior interorganizational experience of
the type being studied, so that information gained through interview
and questionnaire is more likely to accurately portray organizational
concerns than might be the case were random sampling methods employed.
In all, the sampling strategy employed here allows for the
identification and contacting of agencies of the desired type at least
possible cost while not adversely affecting generalizability within
the scope envisioned by the researcher.

85

Respondent Selection
The sample developed for the earlier study drew from a total of
183 organizations.

Table 2 shows how these organizations were distrib-

uted among the six cities.
TABLE II
ORGANIZATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN CITIES
San
Bernardino
28

Tacoma
32

Las
Vegas
31

Tucson
31

Boulder
30

Salt Lake
City
31

The sample employed in the dissertation analysis is based upon the
original study's sample, but differs from it by virtue of three additional selection criteria which will be explained below.

These include

Interview Type, Respondent Position, and Missing Information.
Interview Type
Of the 183 personal interviews, 20 were eliminated from the sample
for one of two reasons relating to circumstances surrounding the interview.

Thirteen of these interviews were undertaken during the early

phases of the study and were designed primarily to identify other
agencies in the various communities which might be employed in the
actual gathering of data.

While these agencies provided sufficient

information of various types to be included in the data set for the
original study, their contribution of information needed for this
dissertation was insufficient to justify their inclusion.

Additionally,

seven agencies were eliminated from the sample in accordance with the
recommendation of interviewers.

Among these were agencies where the
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contacted person appeared to be ill-informed in operational topics of
importance to the study, and other organizations where there was reason
to suspect either the veracity of the informant or the operational
status of the agency.
Organizational position
Administrators included in the dissertation's sample are of three
job types.
1.

Agency Directors

2.

Assistant Directors

3.

Department Heads

This limitation is an extension of the principles recognized in
the sample selection processes of the original study.

Because respon-

dents in each organization were to be tapped for information on the
organization and not as units of observation in their own right, it was
acknowledged that they should be in a position to report authoritatively
on the actions of their agency and on the processes by which decisions
were undertakeni those in managerial and administrative roles were
identified as best suiting this criterion.

The limitation of data

sources to these three positions carries the original logic one step
further by eliminating regional directors (who must respond to other
than local influences) and other, less authoritative informants from
the sample.
The limitation of data sources to these three positions additionally serves the end of improving comparability between organizations,
eliminating potential variance arising out of differences in
arising out of differences in responsibilities.

pe~spective
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Deleted from the sample were 19 respondents with job responsibilities extending beyond the local service area, or with nonadministrative positions such as direct service workers and support
staff.

These included 13 Regional Directors, three city or county

employees in other than administrative positions, two direct service
workers, and one volunteer.

Represented are four broker agencies, 12

direct service agencies, and three advocate organizations.
Missing Information
Not all of those contacted provided responses to all of the items.
Missing information here, as in social research generally, constitutes a
dilemma to the researcher.

While the absence of pertinent data makes

difficult the assessment of interrelationships between bodies of data,
the elimination of all data given by a respondent because of non-response
to one or a limited number of items constitutes a potentially large loss
of valuable information.
In an effort to address both of these considerations, the following
strategy was developed for dealing with missing information among the
items used in developing the study's dependent variables.
Informants were retained in the sample if in their responses to
items on the dependent variable instruments they left no more than three
items unanswered per instrument, of the 12 included on each.

This

mechanism is designed to optimize the extent to which respondents could
be operationalized in terms of the dependent variables employed in the
analysis.

Missing information as encountered with respect to the

independent variables was not addressed, except through standard
deletion techniques.
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The inclusion of respondents in spite of their non-response to
various items was accomplished as follows.

If a respondent answered

nine or more of the 12 items, a value was attached to missing items
equal to the local mean value for that item.
This solution addresses both considerations cited above.

First,

it means that in addressing individual respondents, no less than 75% of
t'he data describing each will in fact be attributable to information
provided by each.

Second, respondents may be retained in the investi-

gation who otherwise would have been lost.
Final sample size, then, constitutes the number of informants who
hold the position of agency director, assistant director, or department
head, and who provided sufficient information to allow reasonable
treatment of the dependent variables.

In all, 78.3% of all organiza-

tions contacted during the study are reflected in data employed in this
dissertation. Table III summarizes the sample by city, including
the number and proportion of each city's informants employed in the
development of each class of dependent variables.
TABLE III

FINAL SAMPLE BY CITY

Number / Percent of Total Interviews
Total
Tacoma L.V. Tucson Boulder SLC
21
24
145
23
28
21
71.0
66.7
74.2 76.5
84.4
64.5

Intraorganizational
Criteria

S.B.
28
100.0

Extraorganizational
Criteria

28
100.0

28
87.5

23
74.2

23
74.2

21
70.0

24
77.4

147
80.3

28

32

31

31

30

31

183

Total Interviews
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The interview schedule employed in the larger study on which this
dissertation is based was 24 pages in length and required from 45 to 90
minutes to administer.

All interviews were completed by trained

personnel.
Two data-gathering techniques were employed in the interview
schedule.

The first involved structured questions presented orally by

the interviewer, while the second format employed multi-measure
instruments (henceforth referred to as checklists) which the informants
completed independently in the presence of the interviewer.

The entire

instrument was extensively pre-tested in the Portland, Oregon area
prior to its use in data collection •.
The items which formed the interview instrument were selected in
order to plumb both the commodities around which organizations interact, and those organizational and environmental characteristics which
might influence interorganizational interactions.
The data for this dissertation were derived from selected
structured questions and from a number of the checklists, as described
in the ensuing pages.
VARIABLES
Variables employed in this dissertation are of three general
types.

The first addresses the objectives of organizations in their

entry into interagency agreements:
model as dependent variables.

these are treated in the analytical

The second type of variable is

descriptive of organizations and of their interactions with various
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environmental elements:
variables.

these are treated generally as intervening

The third class of variable is the community identity of

responding organizations; this variable is employed as the dissertation's independent variable.
Dependent Variables
The comparative study of community behaviors demands the identification and employment of a stimulus which is capable of generating
reactions which themselves become the objects of study.
surface in this context.

Two problems

First, events which impact similarly and

sufficiently on numerous locales to produce comparable reactions in
each tend to be sporadic and unpredictable.

Second, the nature of the

event producing such reactions will frequently not be of a type which
is supportive of reactions consistent with the desired object of
study.
Researchers tend to fall into three patterns in their reactions
to this situation.

One group, including the political power analysts

(as exemplified by Dahl, 1961; Coleman, 1972; McClelland and Form,
1964) tend to operate without precipitating events per se, rather
seeking to describe relationships as evidenced in reactions to
recurrent events.

A second group, including the "disaster researchers"

(including B. Bell, 1978, and Kilijanek and Drabek, 1979), maintain
readiness to enter the field until such time as a satisfactory event
occurs.

A third approach to studying community behavior involves the

creation of hypothetical events and seeks to identify and measure how
respondents would react were such an event to actually occur.
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Where a precipitating event of some type is necessary, one of the
last two approaches is necessary.

There are predictable costs and

benefits attached to each, generally based upon the trade-off which
exists between gaining actual versus reported indications of behaviors
and upon manageability in the field segments of the research project.
The data analyzed in this dissertation were generated through
the "hypothetical event" approach.
Each respondent was asked to read a card describing a hypothetical
event which would present a context within which responses to two
instruments would be sought.

The hypothetical event was described as

follows.
Assume that legislat10n is passed enacting Human Services
Revenue Sharing. The program will be implemented by the
designation of a local government agency to broker and monitor
the pass through and use of the services funds. The actual
service monies will be awarded through contracts with various
local service agencies such as the one you work for.
Assume that your agency is approached to participate in the
program. To do so will result in certain modifications in
your program and in your funding picture. In order to participate, your agency must negotiate a contract setting down
the terms of this interagency agreement.
We are specifically interested in what factors you would
consid~r in attempting both to decide whether or not to seek
to participate in the program, and later, assuming you were
interested, in how you would set your priorities relative to
the specifics involved in the contract.
Upon having read the hypothetical problem statement, each respondent was handed two checklists, the first entitled "Interagency
Agreements," and the second entitled "Interagency Agreements and the
Community."

These instruments provide the basis for the study's

dependent variables.

Each instrument was comprised of 12 items, with

responses invited on a five-point scale ranging from "very important"
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with a value of one, to "not at all impol"tant," with a value of five.
Each of these checklists was designed to provide information on
one of the two distinct classes of organizational motivators posited by
the primitive economy model, intra- and extraorganizational goals.

The

first, entitled "Interagency Agreements" was designed to tap the
intraorganizational class of goals, while the second, "Interagency
Agreements and the Community," was designed to address extraorganizational motivators.

On both instruments, four measures each were

oriented to assessing market factors, community factors, and
organizational factors.
In sum, the two checklists represent instruments designed to tap
separate and conceptually independent dimensions in the organizational
decision making process.

The independence of the two checklists was

tested statistically, with analysis indicating that the two are
independent in statistical fact as well as in theory. 8
Intraorganizational Criteria
Addressed by Instrument 1, "Interagency Agreements," intraorganizational criteria are measures of those goals by which an
organization identifies its success in terms of its own needs and
desires.

These criteria pertain primarily to rewards to the agency

itself, and only secondarily if at all to entities outside the
BAn important preliminary investigation involved the testing of
items and aggregate measures from each of the two instruments for
degree of correlation between instruments, since relative independence
is critical to work to be reported later in the dissertation. Reported
more fully in Appendix I, entitled "Tests of Mutual Independence of
Instruments I and II," items on each of the instruments, and composite
variables operationalized through aggregation of those items, were
found to be relatively uncorrelated across instruments.
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organization.
Instrument 1 contains 12 items designed to measure various intraorganizational criteria, as follow.

Measures descriptive of the items

are presented in Table IV, while the instrument itself is included in
Appendix III.
In considering such agreements, it is important .••
1)

to use such opportunities to increase the range of
services your organization offers.

2)

to avoid entanglements that diminish your agency's
independence and self direction.

3)

to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since
future obligations may be hard to count on.

4)

to avoid making the terms of such arrangements a
public matter.

5)

to advance the professional interests of your staff
in any new programs.

6)

to avoid new activities that do not match your
agency goals.

7)

to concentrate on the bread and butter issues like
maximizing your share of the contract money.

8)

to use such opportunities to increase the size of
your agency staff and departments.

9)

to stress clear agreements which avoid long run
entanglements with other organizations.

10) to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain.
11) to further the wishes of your board.
12) to maximize the return from the agreement to your agency.
The intraorganizational criteria were operationalized through
three composite measures based on these 12 items.
Two were obtained through factor analysis.

Using the SPSS
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TABLE IV
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ITEMS FROM INSTRUMENT 1,
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS
Item
Instrument 1:

n

x

s

Interagency Agreements

1.

Increase range of services your
agency offers

145

1. 779

1.123

2.

Avoid entanglements that diminish
independency and self-direction

145

1.821

1.093

3.

Negotiate terms on here-and-now
basis

145

2.531

1.260

4.

Avoid making terms of arrangements
a public matter

144

4.194

1.049

5.

Advance professional interests
of staff

145

2.379

1.192

6.

Avoid new activities that do not
match agency goals

144

2.083

1. 305

7.

Concentrate on bread-and-butter
issues

141

2.660

1.077

8.

Increase size of staff and
departments

146

3.452

1. 261

9.

Stress clear agreements, avoiding
long run entanglements

145

1.959

1.144

10. Protect agency by driving a
hard bargain

141

2.979

1.176

11. Further the wishes of your board

141

2.454

1. 206

12. Maximize the return from the
agreement

140

2.107

1.080
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(Nie et al., 1975) package of statistical computer programs, the 12
items enumerated above were factor analyzed employing a principal
components procedure followed by a varimax rotation.

A pairwise

deletion option was used to generate the initial correlation matrix
to be factored.

Four factors were extracted, accounting for 55.9% of

total variance.
The four factors, including the individual items' loadings, are
shown in Table

v.

The first two factors, representing 37.5% of total variance and
73.8% of explained variance were selected for use in the analysis.
Throughout the study, variables were assigned to factors
according to the following criteria.
1.

Variables with factor loadings exceeding .30 were included

with that factor.
2.

Variables with loadings on two factors exceeding .30 were

assigned to the factor upon which they loaded most highly.

As no

variable loaded on both intraorganizational criteria factors, this
proved to be no problem here.
Factor 1 is comprised of the following six items.
1)

to avoid making the terms of such arrangements a
public matter.

2)

to advance the professional interests of your staff in
any new programs.

3)

to concentrate on the bread and butter issues like
maximizing your share of the contract money.

4)

to use such opportunities to increase the size of your
agency staff and departments.

5)

to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain.
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TABLE V
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA: ROTATED
FACTOR LOADINGS BY ITEM
Factor:
Item

Conceptual Label:

I

Agency
Enhancement

II

Autonomy

III

Not
Used

IV
Not
Used

1.

to use such opportunities to
increase the range of services
your organization offers.

.262

-.062

.123 -.050

2.

to avoid entanglements that
diminish your agency's independence and self direction.

.057

(.378)

.009

.437

3.

to negotiate terms on a hereand-now basis since future
obligations may be hard to
count on.

.179

(.410 )

.152

.186

4.

to avoid making the terms of
such arrangements a public
matter.

(.456)

.102

.016

.077

5.

to advance the professional
interests of your staff in
any new programs.

( • 434)

.031

.242

.193

6.

to avoid new activities that
do not match your agency
goals.

.048

.046

.001

.643

7.

to concentrate on the bread
and butter issues like
maximizing your share of
the contract money.

( • 656)

.221

-.094

.040

8.

to use such opportunities to
increase the size of your
agency staff and departments.

(.472)

-.021

.088 -.036

9.

to stress clear agreements
which avoid long run entanglements with other organizations.

.061

(.873)

.089

.039

( • 441)

.241

.370

.064

11. to further the wishes of your
board.

.100

.114

.768

.017

12. to maximize the return from
the agreement to your agency.

(.434)

.238

.327 -.111

10. to protect your agency by
driving a hard bargain
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6)

to maximize the return from the agreement to your
agency.

Generally, Factor I appears to represent a profit motivation in
organizational behavior, though its inclusion of staff advancement and
publicity avoidance broadens its scope somewhat.

These items notwith-

standing, the presence of three items pointedly emphasizing various
aspects of net benefit maximization and a fourth citing "driving a
hard bargain" clearly point to an orientation encompassing the concepts
of profit maximization as described in the first chapter.

Accordingly,

this factor is entitled "Agency Enhancement."
Agency Enhancement evidences a reliability coefficient of .688.

9

Factor II includes three items, as follows.
1)

to avoid entanglements that diminish your agency's
independence and self direction.

2)

to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since future
obligations may be hard to count on.

3)

to stress clear agreements which avoid long run
entanglements with other organizations.

Two related dimensions are apparent in this factor.

The first

addressed the ability of organizations to regulate their own internal
affairs as potentially affected by interorganizational agreements.
Organizational avoidance of "entanglements that diminish your agency's
independence and self direction," and of "long-run entanglements with
9Reliability coefficients were computed through the following
formula.
where,
rkk
-krij

= reliability coefficient
= number of items in scale

= mean

correlation between items
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other organizations" clearly reflect concerns over the preservation of
self-determination in organizational activity.

The second dimension

involves time, through orientation toward negotiations on a "here and
now basis," and avoidance of "long run entanglements."

Together,

these two dimensions clearly reflect the concept of autonomy, the
ability of the organization to pursue its own interests and responsibilities in the absence of extraorganizational direction.
The reliability coefficient of Autonomy is .588.
The two factors are operationalized through the aggregation of
scores associated with each of the component items.

A number of

methods exist for the creation of composite variables from individual
measures (Susmilch and Johnson, 1975; Alwin, 1973; Nie et al., 1975).
This study employs a method described by Susmilch and Weldon (1975)
involving the unweighted addition of scores to component items to
create a composite index, a process referred to as "linear combination"
(Nunnally, 1967).

While this procedure has been shown to be less

effective in meeting each of four important criteria (validity,
univocity, reliability, and correlatedness) than other methods, its
overall performance has been shown to be equivalent or better than
other methods tested (Susmilch and Johnson, 1975; Alwin, 1973).

It is

pertinent to multi-point scales, is widespread in its applicability, is
well adapted to the emphasis of complex measures over the simpler
variance associated with single-item measures (Nunnally, 1967), and is
economical in its operation.
The aggregation of items from this instrument and, subsequently,
from Instrument 2 yields an index which inversely measures the
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importance ascribed to each of the composite measures.

This quality

arises out of the scaling of responses through a "1" for "very
important" through "5" for "not at all important."

Summary statistics

for these measures, as presented in the tables, reflect this inverse
scaling.

In the reporting of the multiple regression analyses in the

next chapter, however, the signs representing the direction of the
association between independent and dependent variables will be
reversed, allowing direct interpretation of the relation between
reported importance of the criteria and the various dependent variables.
A third measure of

~ntraorganizational

criteria was created

through the simple addition of all items on the instrument.

This

aggregation is designed to provide a summary measure of organizational
interest in organization-specific goals of all the various types.
Because of its generality in addressing internal assessment criteria,
the measure is entitled "Internal Orientation."lO
Internal Orientation generates a reliability coefficient of .696.
Tables VI and VII summarize the three intraorganizational
dependent variables.
Extraorganizational Criteria
Extraorganizational criteria are measures of those goals by which
an organization identifies success in terms of its perceptions of the
lOItem-total correlations linking each of the individual measures
and the overall index, Internal Orientation, range from a low of .3195
to a high of .6176. All correlacions were generated from a sample of
145 respondents, and all reflect probability levels of p<.OOl. The
magnitude of these correlations and the fact that all are positive are
seen as supporting the inclusion of all individual items in the
aggregate index, Internal Orientation.

100
needs and desires of entities outside the organization.

Also to be

employed as dependent variables, these criteria pertain primarily to
entities outside the organization and only secondarily, if at all, to
the agency itself.
Addressed by Instrument 2,

"Interagency Agreements and the

Corranunity," the extraorganizational criteria are addressed through 12
items, as follow.
in Table VIII.

Statistics descriptive of the items are presented

A copy of the Instrument is included in Appendix III.

In considering such agreements, it is important •••
1)

to use the opportunity to link many community agencies
for close coordination.

2)

to avoid allowing the program to become a competitive
struggle among many organizations.

3)

to exclude agencies which have been uncooperative with
past community efforts.

4)

to promote a sense of cooperation among agencies in
the corranunity.

5)

to minimize the share of the resources which go for
agency building and administration.

6)

to avoid participation if the distribution process is
likely to be dominated by a few self-serving agencies.

7)

to set an example of fair play in conducting the
negotiations.

8)

to seek consultation with community leaders before
settling on specific terms.

9)

to increase the positive regard of agencies for one
another.

10) to discourage the award of funds to agencies with a reputation of not following through with their agreements.
11) to use the funds for strengthening the capacity for
human services delivery in the community.
12) to assure open input from client representatives.
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY MEASURES OF INTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

n

VARIABLE

11

X

s

Actual
Range

Possible
Range

Agency Enhancement
(Factor 1)

145

17.781

4.250

6 - 27

6 - 30

Autonomy
(Factor 2)

145

6.280

2.564

3 - 15

3 - 15

Internal Orientation
(Overall Aggregate
Measure)

145

30.354

6.602

12 - 44

5 - 60

TABLE VII
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

A
Agency
Enhancement
(A)

r
p
n

=
=
=

Autonomy
(B)

r
p
n

=
=
=

.2734
.001
145

Internal
Or ienta tion
(C) 12

r
p
n

=
=
=

.8569
.001
145

B

C

.6347
.001
145

llAfter adjustment for up to three missing items (see pp. 87-88).
12Internal Orientation shares items with Agency Enhancement and
Autonomy, and so is not considered to be independent.
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TABLE VIII
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ITEMS FROM INSTRUMENT 2,
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS AND THE COMMUNITY

Item

n

x

s

1.

link many agencies for close
coordination

147

1.354

.717

2.

avoid allowing program to become
a competitive struggle

147

1.517

.972

3.

exclude agencies which have been
uncooperative

145

3.455

1. 220

4.

promote a sense of cooperation
among agencies

147

1. 245

.579

5.

minimize share of resources for
agency building, administration

147

2.000

1.1.40

6.

avoid participation if dominated
by self-serving agencies

145

2.241

1.272

7.

set an example of fair play in
negotia tion

147

1. 537

.851

8.

seek consultation with community
leaders

147

1.918

1.046

9.

increase positive regard of
agencies for one another

147

1.510

.882

10. discourage funds to agencies who
do not follow through

145

1. 903

1.026

11. use funds for strengthening human
services capacity

147

1.156

.463

12. assure open input from client
representatives

146

1.377

.795
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Five measures of extraorganizational criteria were employed in
the analysis.

Four paralleled those measures derived for the intra-

organizational criteria, while one was developed through nonmethodological approaches.
Using the techniques described earlier, three measures were
derived through factor analysis of the 12 items in Instrument 2,
Interagency Agreements and the Community.

This analysis produced

three factors, whose rotated loadings are presented in Table IX.
three factors were selected for use in subsequent analysis.

All

Together,

they account for 50.6% of total and 100% of explained variance.
The first factor is comprised of five items, as follow.
1)

to promote a sense of cooperation among agencies in
the community.

2)

to set an example of fair play in conducting the
negotiations.

3)

to increase the positive regard of agencies for one
another.

4)

to use the funds for strengthening the capacity for
human services delivery in the community.

5)

to assure open input from client representatives.

This factor contains items which are oriented to the more
figurative aspects of strengthening interorganizational linkages.

Four

of the five items reflect this theme, including the promotion of "a
sense of cooperation," establishing "an example of fair play,"
improving the mutual "positive regard of agencies," and the general
strengthening of services I "capacity for human services deli very."

Not

so readily related is the fifth item, relating to "open input from
client representatives."

Possibly explaining the tie which links this
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TABLE IX
EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA:
Factor:
Item

Conceptual Label:

ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS BY ITEM
I

Expressive
Coordination

II

III

Coordination

Exclusion

1.

to use the opportunity to link
many community agencies for
close coordination.

.272

( • 508)

-.197

2.

to avoid allowing the program
to become a competitive struggle among many organizations.

.097

(.566 )

.214

3.

to exclude agencies which have
been uncooperative with past
community efforts.

-.013

.013

.409

4.

to promote a sense of cooperation among agencies in the
community.

(.601)

.538

-.074

5.

to minimize the share of the
resources which go for agency
building and administration.

.110

(.403)

.238

6.

to avoid participation if the
distribution process is likely
to be dominated by a few selfserving agencies.

.126

.130

.480

7.

to set an example of fair play
in conducting the negotiations.

(.579)

.293

.130

8.

to seek consultation with
community leaders before
settling on specific terms.

.216

( . 312)

.077

9.

to increase the positive regard (.539)
of agencies for one another.

.359

.087

10. to discourage the award of
.132
funds to agencies with a reputation of not following through
with their agreements.

.076

.704

11. to use the funds for strengthening the capacity for human
services delivery in the commu
community.

(.511)

.045

.094

12. to assure open input from
client representatives.

(.527)

.127

.062
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item to the other four is the recognition of clients--at least in the
figurative terms which prevail in this factor--as a contributing
component in the service industry.

Because of the degree of abstrac-

tion evidenced in these items, and because of their general orientation
to improving system-wide relations and processes, the factor is
entitled "Expressive Coordination."
Expressive Coordination evidences a reliability coefficient of
.731.

The second factor is represented by four items.
1)

to use the opportunity to link many agencies for close
coordination.

2)

to avoid allowing the program to become a competitive
struggle among many organizations.

3)

to minimize the share of the resources which go for
agency building and administration.

4)

to seek consultation with community leaders before
settling on specific terms.

This factor describes more active components in the strengthening
of interorganizational ties.

Where the factor described above was

comprised of the symbolic elements of improving intra-industry ties,
this factor is oriented more to the choreographing of active organizational efforts to improve the system's operation, and possibly its
linkages to the broader locale.

The linking of "agencies for close

coordination," the avoidance of "competitive struggle[s]," and the
minimization of "agency building" all relate to interagency goals of
improving service delivery through improved performance.

The fourth

item, involving "consultation with community leaders," would also fit
this general pattern, perhaps extending it to the larger context of the
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overall community.

Reflecting the" action orientation" of the four

items of which it is composed, and in keeping with the coordinative
focus of the items, this factor is entitled "Instrumental Coordination."
Instrumental Coordination generates a reliability coefficient of
.526.
The third factor is comprised of three items.
1)

to exclude agencies which have been uncooperative tvi th
past community efforts.

2)

to avoid participation if the distribution process is
likely to be dominated by a few self-serving agencies.

3)

to discourage the award of funds to agencies with a
reputation of not following through with their
agreements.

The contents of this factor had been identified prior to the
factor analysis as a composite measure to be used in data analysis,
designed to assess a specific component of organizational orientation.
Its surfacing as a viable factor was thus not a complete surprise as
such, but was rather a confirmation of prior work.

The measure was

originally constructed to index the degree to which organizations
mobilize to exclude other agencies from interorganizational endeavors,
and was entitled "Exclusion."
The reliability coefficient of Exclusion is .568.
An additional composite measure was developed as an index of
functional contact with community elements outside the service
industry.

While not surfacing as a factor in the factor analysis

described above, the theoretical ties linking interorganizational
networks with their community environments in the Primitive Economy
Model suggest that community distinctions will likely evidence
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themselves with respect to this variable.

Labeled "Outside Input,"

this index was operationalized through the addition of responses to
the following two items.
Outside Input generates a reliability coefficient of but .208,
reflecting both the small number of items employed in the variable's
derivation, and their low (r

= .114)

intercorrelation:

1)

to seek consultation with community leaders before
settling on specific terms.

2)

to assure open input from client representatives.

As with the intraorganizational criteria, an overall composite
score was also developed in order to gain a general measure of
organizational attention to extraorganizational measures of success.
Entitled "External Orientation," this measure constitutes the sum of
.
.
13
responses to a11 ltems
on t h e lnstrument.

External Orientation reflects a reliability coefficient of .744.
The extraorganizational dependent variables are summarized in
Tables X and XI.
Independent Variables
The study will employ two general types of independent
variables.
one.

The first type is community-specific, of which there is

The second type involves organizational characteristics, selected

13Item-total correlations linking each of the individual
measures and the overall index, External Orientation, range from a low
of .3574 to a high of .6167. All correlations were generated from a
sample of 147 respondents, and all generate probability levels of
p<.OOl. The magnitude of these correlations, and the fact that all are
positive are seen as supporting the inclusion of all individual items
in the aggregate index, External Orientation.

TABLE X
SUMMARY MEASURES OF EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable

n14

X

s

Actual
Range

possible
Range

Instrumental Coordination
(Factor 1)

147

6.929

2.549

5 - 18

5 - 25

Expressive Coordination
(Factor 2)

147

8.401

3.069

4 - 17

4 - 20

Exclusion
(Factor 3)

147

7.601

2.568

3 - 15

3 - 15

Outside Input

147

3.296

1.388

2 -

8

2 - 10

External Orientation
(Overall Aggregate
Measure)

147

21. 319

5.581

12 - 46

5 - 60

14After adjustment for up to three missing items (see pp. 87- 88).
I-'

o

CD

TABLE XI
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

A

B

C

Expressive
Coordination
(A)

p

n

=
=
=

Instrumental
Coordination
(B)

r
p
n

=
=
=

.4815
.001
147

Exclusion
(C) 15

r
p
n

=
=
=

.1901
.011
147

.1909
.010
147

Outside
Input
(D)15

r
p
n

=
=
=

.6212
.001
147

.5776
.001
147

.1382
.048
147

External
Orientation
(E) 15

p

r

=
=
=

.7673
.001
147

.7711
.001
147

.6353
.001
147

r

n

D

E

.6149
.001
147

15EXclusion and Outside Input share items with Expressive Coordination and Instrumental
Coordination. External Orientation shares items with all other measures.
I-'

o

\0
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for their potential in impacting organization-environment interactions,
and for their ease in being identified by policy-makers and
implementers.

Six variables are of the latter type, including

organizational reliance on federal funding, four measures of environmental turbulence, and organizational goal.

The organizational goals

are employed in the analyses as covariates.
The independent variables are discussed in the following pages,
and are summarized in Tables XII and XIII.
Community
Community constitutes the study's independent variable and
represents the local service market.

As noted earlier, the literature

is not specific as to what exactly constitutes a community, except that
the social reality may well not conform to jurisdictional boundaries
(Suttles, 1972; Stacey, 1969; Janowitz, 1952).

This notwithstanding,

the question of geographic scale is addressed with authors generally
concluding that larger scale correlates with lesser community homogeneity (MacIver, 1970; Suttles, 1972).

Based upon the latter

conceptualization and mindful of the former, this dissertation analysis
will operationalize the construct of community by employing service
areas.

These approximate urban jurisdictional boundaries and are

dictated by the nature of the sample in use.

Thus when speaking of,

say, Tacoma, the service area centering upon Tacoma is the actual area
being studied, as defined by the spatial distribution of organizations
named by Tacoman service personnel as being components of the area's
service network.

The actual "community" under study is functional,
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TABLE XII
SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (BASED UPON SAMPLE
EMPLOYED IN INTRAORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSES)16

n

-X

s

Actual
Ranqe

Possible
Ranae

Orqanizational Variables
Organizational Resources

140

35.514

35.684

o-

100

0 - 100

Local Public Uncertainty

126

18.405

6.761

o-

28

o-

State and Federal Uncertainty

131

13.580

4.596

2 - 20

0 - 20

Clients Uncertainty

141

13.489

2.127

6 - 16

o-

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

129

4.736

1. 757

o-

0 - 8

21

-

-

-

-

103

-

-

-

-

21

-

-

-

-

8

28

16

Organizational Goal
Broker
Direct Service
Advocate
Community
San Bernardino

28

Tacoma

28

Las Vegas

21

Tucson

23

Boulder

21

Salt Lake City

24

16145 organizations were found suited for the intraorganizational
analyses by virtue of information on the dependent variables. Deviations between 145 and the numbers presented in this Table represent
missing information.

TABLE XIII
INTERCORRELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Organizational
Resources
1. Organizational
Resources

r =
p =
n =

2. Local Public
Uncertainty

r

3. State & Federal
Uncertainty

p

4. Client
Uncertainty

p =

5. InterOrganizational
Uncertainty
-

------

-----

-----

Local
Public
Uncertainty

State &
Federal
Uncertainty

Client
Uncertainty

~
~

p

=
=

-.0941
.142.
132

r

=

.3009
.001
132

.3148
.001
123

~

.1555
.030
146

.1618
.033
130

.1271
.072
134

~

.0508
.285
127

.0555
.278
115

.0620
.248
123

.0941
.144
130

n =

=

n =
r

=

n

=

r

=

p =

n

=

Interorganizational
Uncertainty •

I

------

~
.....
.....
N
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although it correlates closely with spatial boundaries.

In the course

of the study, "Community" will be employed as a classificatory device
of nominal order, with each of the cities being a class within the
larger variable.

While somewhat unusual in approach, this is in

keeping with commonly accepted techniques (Kerlinger, 1973; Blalock,
1972; Nunnally, 1967i Hays, 1973).

Table XII summarizes each city's

representation in the sample.
Organizational Variables
The organizational variables will be employed as control
variables allowing for the more accurate assessment of communityrelated differences.

As mentioned above, three types of organiza-

tional variables will be employed.
1.

Organizational Resources.

Organizational Resources will

represent organizational reliance upon federal sources for funding.
As such, it reflects organizational dependence on entities outside the
service market, and constitutes an inverse proxy for local autonomy
in organizational decision making.

Roland L. Warren (1967) notes

that one characteristic determining the degree to which communities
maintain autonomy and identity is the extent to which organizations
within the community have autonomy over their operations; organizational autonomy, he notes, varies inversely with the degree to which
the organization depends upon entities outside the local area for
support.

The funding patterns of many social service agencies is such

that a proxy for

extracommunity

funding and, potentially, control

is available through a measure of organizational reliance on federal
funding.

This variable will be operationalized through the use of

self-reported data obtained during the interview process which
reported the percent of budget obtained from federal sources.
Reported in percentages and therefore of ratio order, the information
was ascertained through a question presented in the earlier stages of
the interviews.

The question is presented in Appendix III, and

statistics descriptive of the responses are presented in Table XII.
2.

Organizational Uncertainty.

As was discussed earlier,

environmental turbulence is a descriptor not so much of the organization or the environment alone, but rather of the relationship which
links the organization with its environment.

For this reason, it is

reasonable to assume that organizations operating within a locale will
encounter different degrees of turbulence simply as a result of their
interactions with different environmental components.

While the four

turbulence measures are conceded to have a major environmental
component to their composition, they will be termed "organizational
variables" throughout the dissertation.

The measures employed here to

represent organizational uncertainty are based on those of the report,
as developed by another analyst.
The four measures were developed through the factor analysis of
three instruments included in the interview instrument, as reflected
in Table XIV.

The factor analytical work has done employing a

principal components procedure and varimax rotation.

These scales

were developed using all 335 respondents to the original study, and
not just the 183 who constitute the sample for this dissertation.
Each of the three instruments was designed to tap a distinct
aspect of organizational-environmental interaction.

Based largely on

115
TABLE XIV
FACTOR ANALYSIS:
ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS
IN DEVELOPMENT OF UNCERTAINTY MEASURES

Factor:
Conceptual Label:
Instrument Items

I
Local
Public
Uncertainty

II

State Ii
Federal
Uncertainty

III
Client
Uncertainty

IV
Interorganizational
Uncertainty

Community Orientation Checklist
1. Local Elected Officials

2. State Governmental Agencies
3. Federal Governmental

Agencies

4. Local Service Organizations
5. The Press and Other Media
6. Professional Associations

7. Advocate Groups for Clients
8. Regulatory Bodies
9. Clients

.5619
.4501

.5870
.6929

.6996
.6466
.7328
.7800
.5975
.7187

I

I

Pressures for Change Checklist
1. Meeting Requirements for

.4618

2.

.6116

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Funding Sources
Anticipating New Federal
Programs
Responding to Public
Opinion
Avoiding Organizational
Stagnation
Complying with Legal or
Legislative Requirements
Reducing Costs Per Unit of
Service
Replacing Outdated Practices

Community Change Checklist
1- The Number of Organizations
Competing with Your
Organiza tion
2. Public Demand for Your
Services
3. The Number of New Government
Regulations That Apply to
the Services You Provide
4. The Number of Elderly Clients
Your Organization Serves
5. The Kinds of Clients You Serve
6. General Public Belief in The
Urgency of Services for the
Elderly
7. Conflict with Other Organizations Over the Kinds of
Services You Provide

.4863

.4231
.4026
.6651
.4331
.4032

.3964
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findings developed in a prior study (O'Brien and Wetle, 1975), these
were oriented to identifying the environmental entities which directly
or indirectly influence organizational activity.

Together, the three

tap the degree to which the expectations and demands of various
environmental groups reflect in the agency's onging decision making
processes, the extent to which they have been influential in the past,
and the

degree to which organizations perceive their relevant environ-

ment as undergoing change.

In each case, input and output components

of the environment are identified, though the lack of specificity in
the theoretical bases offered by the literature made difficult the
further identification of specific environmental entities.

Accordingly,

the project's senior investigators based their selection of several of
the specific environmental components employed in the instruments on
conceptual grounds and on their own prior research.

The instruments

are included in Appendix III.
The first of the instruments addressing uncertainty, entitled
"Community Orientation," is comprised of nine items, each representing
an environmental entity potentially capable of influencing agency
operations, as follows.
For each sector listed below, please indicate the extent to
which their evaluation of your agency function is a major
cause of concern for your organization.
1)

Local Elected Officials

2)

State Governmental Agencies

3)

Federal Governmental Agencies

4)

Local Direct Service Organizations

5)

The Press and Other Media
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6)

Professional Associations

7)

Advocate Groups for Clients

8)

Regulatory Bodies (i.e., boards and commissions not
included in categories above)

9)

Clients

Respondents were asked to register the degree of concern they
register with respect to each.

A five-point scale was developed for

this purpose, where one pole registered "very much of concern," and
the other represented "of no concern whatsoever."
The second Instrument used in this analysis, entitled "Pressures
for Change," sought respondents' perceptions of seven influences
potentially capable of impacting organizational activities and
direction.

The questions presented in the instrument are as follow.

Thinking about changes you have made in the past, please
indicate the importance of each in influencing your organization's change decisions.
1)

Meeting requirements of funding sources

2)

Anticipating new federal programs

3)

Responding to public opinion

4)

Avoiding organizational stagnation

5)

Complying with legal or lesislative requirements

6)

Reducing costs per unit of service

7)

Replacing outdated programs.

As before, responses were taken on a five-point scale with "very
important" at one pole, and "not at all important" at the other.
The third instrument is entitled "Community Change" and is
designed to document respondents' perceptions of how their respective
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communities had changed over the past five years.
this instrument documents market change.

In a real sense,

Seven items comprised the

instrument, as follow.
Using the past five years as a frame of reference, please
indicate whether each of these factors has increased or
decreased in your organization.
1)

The number of organizations competing with your
organization.

2)

Public demand for your services.

3)

The number of new government regulations that apply to
the services you provide.

4)

The number of elderly clients your organization serves.

5)

The kinds of clients you serve.

6)

General public belief in the urgency of services for
the elderly.

7)

Conflicts with other organizations over the kinds of
services you provide.

Again, a five-point scale was used to document responses, with
"increased" at one pole, "remained the same" at the mid-point,
"decreased" at the other pole.
The factor analysis of the three checklists yielded the loadings
reflected in Table XIV.

It will be noted that, for the most part, the

integrity of the instruments was reaffirmed in the factor analysis.
This was anticipated.

Factor composition, however, does not perfectly

match the checklists.

LocaZ PubZic Unceptainty represents the degree of concern felt by
members of the organization about various local groups, or "publics,"
in the community.

Examples of these groups would include elements of

the media and various professional groups.
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The variable was operationalized through the procedures outlined
earlier, using the scores obtained from the following items.
a)

Local Elected Officials (as a source of concern to
the agency).

b)

Local Direct Service Organizations (as a source of
concern to the agency).

c)

The Press and Other Media (as a source of concern to
the agency).

d)

Advocate Groups for Clients (as a source of concern to
the agency) •

e)

Regulatory Bodies (as a source of concern to the
agency) •

f)

Clients (as a source of concern to the agency).

State and FederaL Uncertainty is defined as the degree of concern
felt by the organization over pressures exerted by state and federal
agencies.

Examples would include requirements exerted by funding

agencies, and legislative and legal restraints.
This variable was derived using the following items:
a)

State Governmental Agencies (as a source of concern
to the agency) •

b)

Federal Governmental Agencies (as a source of concern
to the agency).

c)

Meeting Requirements of Funding Sources (as an
influence in the organization's change decisions) •

d)

Anticipating New Federal Programs (as an influence in
the organization's change decisions).

e)

Complying with Legal or Legislative Requirements (as
an influence in the organization's change decisions).

CLients Uncertainty is the extent to which the diversity of
clients and their demand for the organization's services had increased
or decreased.
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The following items were used to develop a value for this
variable.
a)

Public Demand for Your Services (has increased or
decreased for your organization).

b)

The Number of New Government Regulations that Apply
to the Services You Provide (has increased or decreased
for your organization).

c)

The Number of Elderly Clients Your Organization Serves
(has increased or decreased for your organization).

d)

The Kinds of Clients You Serve (has increased or
decreased for your organization).

InterorganizationaZ Uncertainty constitutes the extent to which
there has been an increase or decrease in the number of organizations
competing with the focal organization, as well as conflict with other
organizations over types of service provision.
The variable was operationalized through the use of the following
items.
a)

The Number of Organizations Competing with Your
Organization (has increased or decreased for your
organization).

b)

Conflict with Other Organizations Over the Kinds of
Services You Provide (has increased or decreased for
your organization).

3.

Organizational Goal.

This variable describes the role of the

organization in the overall service system.

The limitation of the

dissertation's scope to human service agencies recommends a three-fold
classificatory variable describing organizational function which is
specifically designed for this industry (Burki, 1978), as follows.
Agencies were classified according to their own self-descriptions, as
confirmed by the judgements of the original research team.
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Service organizations are the agencies which actually supply the
service to a clientele.

These agencies' access to funding is based on

their provision of service.

The sample employed in this dissertation

includes 115 service agencies.

Broker organizations have as their primary function the development of service strategies, and the completion of arrangements leading
to service delivery by service organizations.
organizations provide services themselves.

Rarely do broker

This sample includes 27

broker organizations.

Advocate organizations have as their primary responsibility the
representation of a class of client in agitating for needed service
options, and the mobilization of members of the client group to act in
their own behalf.

Advocate organizations generally do not in them-

selves provide human services to clients; rather, they represent the
client in the larger service industry.

Twenty-one advocate organiza-

tions were included in the sample.
Summary of Independent Variables
Statistics descriptive of each of the independent variables are
presented in Table XII, for those firms included in the intraorganizational analyses.
Table XIII presents Pearson's product moment correlations between
the interval order independent variables.

with a highest correlation

of .3149, these variables were deemed generally consistent with
assumptions of independence accompanying the analytical methods
employed in the dissertation.

It should be additionally noted that
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with only one exception, the correlations of the four turbulence
measures generally reflect independence.

As such, the assumption that

they reflect different forms of organizational uncertainty is generally
supported.
Table XV provides descriptive statistics of those firms deleted
from the intraorganizational analyses in terms of the dissertation's
independent variables.

In no case are measures based on deleted firms

significantly different from those related to firms employed in the
analyses.
ANALYSIS
As will be developed more fully in the next chapter, three
methodological techniques are employed in the dissertation's analysis:
analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, and multiple regression
analysis.

Each will be undertaken through the SPSS package of computer

programs (Nie et al., 1975).

These techniques are consistent with the

properties of the variables described above.
It will be recalled that two general classes of dependent
variables were described:

intraorganizational criteria and extra-

organizational criteria.

Each measure employed within these general

classes is a product of summative scaling techniques, and therefore
generally consistent with the characteristics of interval scales.
The independent variables generally conform with the properties
of two scales of measurement.

Organizational Resources is a propor-

tional measure and therefore of ratio scale.

The four Organizational

Uncertainty indexes, like the criterion measures above, are summative
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TABLE XV
SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (BASED UPON SAMPLE
DELETED FROM INTRAORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSES) 17

-

X

n

s

Actual
Ranqe

possible
Ranqe

brganizational variables
Organizational Resources

13

39.846

45.911

a - 100

a - 100

Local Public Uncertainty

11

18.091

6.123

6 - 28

a - 28

7

12.143

5.786

4 - 17

a - 20

Clients Uncertainty

12

13.000

2.374

9 - 16

a - 16

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

5

4.200

1.304

3 - 6

o-

State and Federal Uncertainty

8

Organizational Goal
Broker
Direct Service
Advocate

6
11
1

Community
San Bernardino

0

Tacoma

0

Las Vegas

5

Tucson

2

Boulder

7

Salt Lake City

4

1718 organizations were deleted from the intraorganizational
analysis for reasons of missing information on the dependent variables.
Deviations between 18 and the numbers presented in the Table represent
missing information.
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indexes and therefore generally consistent with the properties of
interval scales.
Community and Organizational Goal are nominal measures.

The

application of these variables to regression analysis will be undertaken through the development of dummy variables, a technique which
has been widely employed and found to be appropriate for regression
analysis (Miller and Erickson, 1974; Nie et al, 1975).

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports the findings of the research, as developed
in pursuit of the research question and hypotheses presented in the
preceding chapter.
The reporting of analytical results will be undertaken in three
parts.
First, results will be very generally summarized in the section
which immediately follows.

The full reporting of results is a

lengthy undertaking, and in focusing on the details of analytical
findings, it can be difficult to maintain the context within which
analyses were planned and executed.

By summarizing the results prior

to their more complete reporting it is hoped that a context can be
established which will assist the reader in addressing the more
detailed reporting to follow.
The full textual discussion of results will immediately follow
the summary described above.

Textual discussion will address all

analytical results involving Community, and all involving organizational variables with probability levels of p<.lO. As

will be further

discussed in the dissertation's last chapter, this relatively generous
probability level reflects the exploratory nature of this research, and
a willingness to risk Type I error in exchange for reduced possibilities
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of committing Type II error.

The discussion of results will begin with

those analyses addressing the intraorganizational criteria as dependent
variables, and will conclude with those involving the extraorganizational decision making criteria.
Finally, the tabular presentation of all analytical results is
provided in Appendix II.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS:

SUMMARY

The data yield no support for the first hypothesis, calling for
inter ci ty

differences in the or ientations of organizations toward

intraorganizational measures of success.

Analyses employing three

measures of intraorganizational decision making criteria--Agency
Enhancement, Autonomy, and Internal Orientation--as dependent variables
demonstrated that no significant differences exist between organizations in the six cities in their respective valuations of this class
of goals.
The second hypothesis, suggesting intercity

differences in

organizational orientation to extraorganizational impacts, received
greater support from the data than did the first.
extraorganizational criteria were developed:

Five measures of

Expressive Coordination,

Instrumental Coordination, Exclusion, Outside Input, and External
Orientation.

Here, intercommunity differences were found to exist

with probabilities of p<.076 (External Orientation), p<.08l (Expressive
Coordination), p<.l27 (Instrumental Coordination), p<.13l (Outside
Input), p<.229 (Exclusion).

While none of these measures reflect

commonly accepted standards of statistical probability (p<.05), four
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of the five are generally consistent with other standards as they
relate to exploratory research (Hays, 1973).
The third hypothesis, calling for greater intercity differences
among the extraorganizational criteria than among the intraorganizational criteria was deemed fully supported by the analyses.
measures of intercity

All

differences among the extraorganizational

criteria were found to exceed all intercity

difference measures

among the intraorganizational criteria.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS:

TEXTUAL PRESENTATION

The pages which follow are devoted to discussion of the dissertation's analytical results.

Analysis is comprised of three steps.

First, each of the eight dependent variables is analyzed for
intercommunity

differences, without employing any of the organiza-

tional variables as controls.

One-way analysis of variance is employed

for this purpose with Community as the single independent variable.
This independent variable is comprised of six levels, each representing
one of the six cities.
Second, each dependent variable is analyzed through analysis of
covariance in order to assess

interco~~unity

differences, employing

each of the organizational variables individually as controls.
Third, each dependent variable is analyzed through multiple
regression analysis.

Here, all organizational variables are employed

as controls, with community-related contributions to variance assessed
only after parceling out that associated with organizational characteristics.

This is comparable to analysis of covariance with multiple
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covariates, the regression technique employed primarily to surmount
limitations on covariates encountered in the SPSS package (Nie et al.,
1975).

The second and third analytical phases conform to a methodological technique termed "contextual analysis."

In contextual analysis,

the contributions to variance attributable to a locational or environmental (contextual) variable are analyzed only after having controlled
for the contributions of variables which are explicitly related to
observational units within the various contexts.
The theoretical and conceptual significance of the analytical
results will be discussed following the presentation of findings from
each of the two sets of regression analysis.
Intraorganizational Criteria
Analysis of Variance
Analysis of variance relating community to the Intraorganizational Criteria produced no statistically significant results.

As

reflected in the small deviations from the grand mean and the
probability levels provided in Table XVI, in none of these analyses
was Community found to be a significant factor in explaining organizational emphasis on an intraorganizational decision making criterion.
As a result, the hypothesis predicting intercommunity

differences in

reported patterns of intraorganizational criteria was found to be
unsupported in this series of analyses.

TABLE XVI
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS
FROM GRAND MEAN BY INTRAORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Agency
Enhancement

Autonomy

Internal
Orientation

17.78

6.28

30.35

-.03

-.28

-.60

.50

-.35

.07

-1.43

.51

-1.03

Grand Mean
San Bernardino
Tacoma
Las Veqas

I

TucsOn
Boulder
Salt Lake City

P <
F

=

'----~_~ ~L==_

----

~-~

1.00

.59

1.18

.66

-.38

1. 23

-.84

.05

-.69

.365

.650

.787

1.096

.666

.485

5,139

5,139

5,139

I

~

N

\0
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Analysis of Covariance
The analysis of covariance employed in this stage of analysis
involves the testing of intercommunity differences with respect to
each of the three measures of intraorganizational decision criteria,
individually employing each of the six selected organizational
variables as covariates.

In all, 18 analyses of covariance are

represented in this pursuit.

Results of analyses are summarized in

Tables XVIII, XIX, and XX.
As reflected in deviations from the grand means and in the
probability levels summarized in the three tables, in no case was
Community found to be an effective variable for explaining variance
among the three independent variables.

In the analysis where

Community proved strongest in its association with a decision
criterion, the statistical significance of its relation was well
short of accepted probability levels (with Agency Enhancement as the
dependent variable and Organizational Goal as the covariate).

The

analyses of covariance, then, lend no support to the first hypothesis.
Two other observations are noteworthy with respect to these
analyses.
First, as reflected in Tables XVIII through XX, in no case is
the inclusion of an organizational variable as covariate in the
analysis of a dependent variable accompanied by an improvement in
Community's performance as a predictor to a probability level of
p<.lO.

In the most favorable case, with Agency Enhancement and

Organizational Goal as dependent variable and covariate respectively,
Community's contribution to variance reflects a probability level
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of p<.143.
Second, the results of a number of the analyses evidence that
the covariates themselves are to varying extents effective in
explaining variance in the dependent variables.

Summarized in

Table XX, each organizational variable will be briefly mentioned
though as elsewhere attention will be restricted to those covariates
with F values reflecting probability levels of p<.IO.
Organizational Resources is not an effective predictor with
respect to any of the three dependent variables.
Organizational Goal, as is evidenced in Table XVII, is an
effective predictor of all three internal decision making criteria
(with Agency Enhancement, F=5.645, df=2,137, p<.004; with Autonomy,
F=4.322, df=2,137, p<.OI5; with Internal Orientation, F=4.273,
d=1,137, p<.Ol6).

This pattern of distinctions is based primarily on

the differences in orientation which are evident between Advocate
Agencies and Broker Agencies.

These distinctions are evident in the

figures relating to Broker Agencies (with Agency Enhancement, F=8.426,
df=l,l37, p<.004; with Autonomy, F=3.829, df=l,l37, p<.052; with
Internal Orientation, F=5.237, df=l,137, p<.024).

The differences

evidenced between Advocate Agencies and Direct Service Agencies are
not statistically significant, indicating that these two types of
agencies are similar in their orientations to the intraorganizational
criteria.
Local Public Uncertainty does not reflect statistically significant associations with any of the three intraorganizational criterion
measures.

Its strongest relation involves Internal Orientation

TABLE XVII
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE: COVARIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING CRITERIA, p<.lO

Agency
Enhancement

I

Decision Making Criteria

Internal
Orientation

Autonomy

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

F=5.645, df=2,l37
p<.OO4

F=4.322, df=2,l37
p<.015

F=4.273, df=2,l37
p<.Ol6

F=8.426, df=l,l37
p<.OO4

F=3.829, df=l,l37
p<.052

F=5.237, df=l,l37
p<.024

F=.333, df=l,l37
p<.565

F=.l74,

F=.886, df=1,137
p<.492

-------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------- -------------------------Broker
-------------------------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------------,
Direct
Service

F=3.626, df=1,119
p<.059

Local Public
Uncertainty
State and
Federal
Uncertainty
Clients
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty

df=1,137
p<.677

F=7.08l, df=1,124
p<.009

F=3.606, df=1,124
p<.060

F=3.39l, df=1,l22
p<.068

F=4.848, df=1.122
p<.030

i
I
,
I

i
I

I
_._.

......
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TABLE XVIII
AGENCY ENHANCEMENT: GRAND MEAN AND
COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covariates
GRAND MEAN

17.78

Hith
Organizational
Resources
17.78

with
Organizational
Goal
17.78

with
Local
Public
Uncertainty

with
State &
Federal
Uncertainty

with
Client
Uncertainty

with
Interorganizational
Uncertaintv

17.60

17.79

17.80

17.79

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN
,

San Bernardino
Tacoma
Las Vegas

-.03

-.03

-.03

-.04

-.01

.08

.06

I
I

.50

.50

.50

.11

.67

.50

.80

I,

-1.43

-1. 31

-1.43

-1.47

-1.66

-1.45

-1.12

I
I
,

Tucson
Boulder
Salt Lake City

P <
F
df

=

=

1. 00

1.00

1.00

1. 30

1. 45

.97

1.17

.66

.67

.66

.35

-.25

.64

-.20

-.84

-.97

-.84

-.30

-.48

-.86

-.96

.365

.358

.143

.542

.350

.381

.429

1. 096

1.111

1.681

.814

1.126

1.069

.987

5,139

5,133

5,137

5JJ-2~t

5 !).34

5,122

_2,1~9_

.....
l.~
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TABLE XIX
AUTONOMY: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY
DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covariates

With
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizational
Goal

With
Local
Public
Uncertainty

6.28

6.28

6.28

6.19

San Bernardino

-.28

-.28

-.28

Tacoma

-.35

-.32

Las Vegas

.51

Tucson

GRAND MEAN

with
State &
Federal
Uncertaintv

With
Client
Uncertaintv

With
Interorganizational
Uncertaintv

6.32

6.33

6.41

-.15

-.21

-.25

-.30

-.35

-.19

-.32

-.25

-.21

.66

.51

.53

.66

.46

.47

.59

.59

.59

.71

.30

.54

.59

-.38

-.37

-.38

-.58

-.25

-.43

-.35

.05

-.15

.05

-.29

-.09

.00

-.11

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN

Boulder
Salt Lake City

P
F
df

<

=
=

.650

.743

.690

.669

.814

.795

.696

.666

.544

.613

.641

.448

.475

.605

5,139

5,133

5,137

5,119

5 ,]._24~~?_, 134

_~_5,121____

.....
w
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TABLE XX
INTERNAL ORIENTATION: GRAND MEAN AND
COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS BY COVARIATE
-

r-

With
State &
Federal
Uncertaintv

with
Client
Uncertaintv

With
Interorganizationa1
Uncertaintv

With
No
Covarl.ates

With
Organizational
Resources

30.35

30.33

30.35

30.33

30.45

30.43

30.44

-.60

-.58

-.60

-.59

-.52

-.43

-.55

.07

-.01

.07

-.07

.47

.11

.72

-1.03

-.74

-1. 03

-.82

-1.16

-1.10

-.62

Tucson

1.18

1. 20

1.18

1.48

1.46

1.10

1.44

Boulder

1. 23

1. 26

1.23

.70

.42

1.16

.26

Salt Lake City

-.69

-.98

-.69

-.51

-.54

-.76

-1.19

GRAND MEAN

With
Organizational
Goal

With
Local
Public
Uncertaintv

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN
San Bernardino
Tacoma
Las Vegas

-.

P <

.787

.726

.492

.883

.929

.840

.761

F

.485

.566

.886

.347

.270

.411

.519

5,139

5,133

5,137

5,119

5,124

5,134

5,122

df

=
=

I-'
W
\..'1
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(F=3.625, df=1,119, p<.059).
State and Federal Uncertainty reflects one statistically significant relation, with Agency Enhancement (F=7.081, df=1,124, p<.009).
This uncertainty measure also shares a statistically non-significant
relation with Internal Orientation (F=3.606, df=1,124, p<.060).
Interorganizational Uncertainty is involved in a single
statistically significant association, with Internal Orientation
(F-4.B4B; df=1,122; p<.030).

It additionally evidences a non-

significant rleation with Agency Enhancement (F=3.391; df=1,122;
pcOGB) •

In sum, Community is not indicated through these analyses of
covariance to be associated systematically with any of the Intraorganizational Decision Making Criteria, though certain of the
selected organizational variables do evidence associations.
Organizational Goal shares statistically significant associations with
all of the intraorganizational criterion measures, State and Federal
Uncertainty is related to Agency Enhancement, and Interorganizational
Uncertainty is associated with Internal Orientation.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The multiple regression analyses to be reported were implemented
using the step-wise option provided in the SPSS package (Nie et al.,
1972).

For the purposes of this series of analyses, all variables

were left in their original state (see Chapter 4) except for
Organizational Goal and Community.

These were "dummied" through

standard techniques {Miller and Erickson, 1974; Blalock, 1972;
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Nie et al., 1975).
As mentioned above, the stepwise

multiple regression feature

of the SPSS package was employed in the analysis.
entered into these analyses in two discrete steps.

Variables were
First, all

organizational variables (Organizational Resources, Organizational
Goal, and the four Organizational Uncertainty measures) were entered
as a bloc of covariate measures.

Within the group, the SPSS program

entered variables in the order of their contributions to variance.
When all organizational variables (covariates) had been entered or
deleted through the program's default option, the cities were entered
simultaneously as a group.
The SPSS program does not offer a statistic to measure the
aggregated contribution to variance of grouped, separate variables.
This is an important deletion for the purposes of this study, for
primary interest is focused on the performance of the cities as a
group, and not each individually.

In order to address this short-

coming, an F value was computed for the contribution of Community to
each formulation, as follows.
(SSRi2 - SSRil)/ (df i2 - df il )
(SSresi2 / df i2 )

F

=

F

=

F value

SSRi2

=

regression sum of squares immediately
after entering the Community variable.

SSRil

=

regression sum of squares immediately
prior to entering the Community variable.

=

degrees of freedom immediately after
entering the Community variable.

where

df

i2
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=

degrees of freedom immediately prior
to entering the Community variable.

=

residual sum of squares immediately
after entering the Community variable.

This statistic allows the treatment of all cities as a group,
and is further recommended through its

compatability with e3sily

accessible and understood F tables.
Employing these procedures, each of the Intraorganizational
Criterion measures was employed as dependent variable in one of a
series of three multiple regression analyses.

Results of these

analyses are reported in the following pages and in Appendix II in
terms of the dependent variables employed in each analysis.
1.

Agency Enhancement.

Tables XXI and XXII

summarize the

results of the multiple regression analysis employing Agency
Enhancement as a dependent variable.
Only two covariates evidence statistically significant associations.

The Broker Agency component of Organizational Goal reflects

the strongest association with Agency Enhancement, reflecting a
weaker orientation toward Agency Enhancement than is evidenced among
Advocate Agencies.
The second covariate found to be significantly related to
Agency Enhancement is state and Federal Uncertainty.

The relation is

direct, indicating that increased turbulence at those echelons is
accompanied by increased orientation among service agencies toward
organizational welfare maximization.
As reflected in Tables XXI and XXII, variation between communities contributes little to the explanation of variance in Agency
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TABLE XXI
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, AGENCY
ENHANCEMENT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE18

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker
------Direct
Service

Local Public
Uncertainty

.012
1
-.312
t--------------- ~---------------- ---------

2

.278

.008

State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
Independent Variable

------------~------Communityl

180nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included.
19community was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XXII
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN020
AGENCY ENHANCEMENT

Community

Beta

Tacoma

-.03

Las Vegas

-.12

Tucson

.03

Boulder

.05

Salt Lake City

-.08

p < .684

F
df

=

.621

= 12,102

20Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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Enhancement.
As noted above, Agency Enhancement was found in the multiple
regression analyses to share associations with Organizational Goal
and with State and Federal Uncertainty.
Organizational Goal was found in the analyses of covariance to
be significantly associated with all measures of the intraorganizational decision making criteria, although the multiple regression
analyses reflect associations only with Agency Enhancement and, as
will be reported later, IntraorganizationalOrientation.

This pattern

of association undoubtedly reflects the pervasive effects on organizational orientations and operations which separate the different
organizational classes represented by classes of this variable.
Perhaps nowhere are these differences more apparent than with
the types of issues subsumed within Agency Enhancement.

When viewed

in terms of Waldman's (1972) input and output components, Broker
Agencies must be viewed as among the input components of advocacy and
direct service agencies:
others.

Broker Agencies disperse funds to the

In the context of the service industry, then, it is realistic

to expect Broker Agencies to exhibit a different orientation to
funding and related issues thdn would the other organizational types.
The latter, in turn, might well be expected to share relatively
similar orientations toward this class of commodity.
tions are supported in the data.

Both expecta-

Broker Agencies reflect an orienta-

tion toward Agency Enhancement of significantly lesser strength than
is evidenced among the other two classes of agencies.

Advocate and

Direct Service Agencies, on the other hand, reflect very similar
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views with respect to this class of criterion.

While not of direct

relevance in this dissertation, Benson's (1975) explication of social
exchange theory would lead one to anticipate that intra-systemic
power associations would similarly reflect the patters of differentiation encountered in these analyses.
state and Federal Uncertainty is demonstrated to be directly
associated with organizational emphasis on Agency Enhancement.

As

was noted in the early phases of this dissertation, human service
agencies typically derive a considerable proportion of their resources
from agencies at the state and federal levels.

The mean proportion of

total agency funding derived from federal sources alone by agencies
in this sample, for example, is over 36%.

As such, this finding ties

concern over funding and related issues to the inability to predict
events among funding sources.

This finding is consistent with the

work of authors who note strong propensities among organizations to
achieve stability, and the work of Benson (1975), Mindlin and
Aldrich (1975), and O'Brien and Wetle (1975), who note the importance
of funding and related commodities to organizational well-being.
In another sense, the finding is consistent with Dill's (1962)
concept of task environments.

The ties between aging service

organizations and state and federal agencies are largely indirect.
While the funding derived from these sources is, as noted above, of
considerable importance, much of the federal money going to individual
agencies is actually dispensed by intermediary, broker agencies.

As

such, direct contact between service and governmental organizations
is likely to be infrequent.

That their indirect influence is
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sufficiently strong to be manifested in these analyses and not, as
will be noted, in those addressing Autonomy suggests a relatively
narrow sphere of influence.
2.

Autonomy.

As reflected in Tables XXIII

and XXIV, neither

organizational variables nor Community were found to share statistically significant associations with Autonomy.

One organizational

variable, Local Public Uncertainty, however, was found to evidence
a positive association with Autonomy reflecting a statistical
significance of p<.09.
As noted above, only Local Public Uncertainty evidences a
reportable association with Autonomy, reflecting a direct relation.
This result is noteworthy in several respects.
First, the associations between Autonomy and the organizational variables are quite different from those involving Agency
Enhancement.

This distinction suggests that at least to an extent

the two are functionally independent when assessed in terms of
environmental influences on the organization.

Where the organiza-

tion's emphasis on Agency Enhancement was found to be influenced by
the agency's function and by uncertainty at the state and federal
levels, orientation to Autonomy is associated with turbulence of a
local nature.

This bifurcation of influences is not entirely

consistent with Benson's (1975) description of power relationships,
which suggests that patterns of funding distribution will be reflected
in power relationships between organizations and, conversely,
potential loss of Autonomy.

Rather, this set of results suggests an

operational independence between the two commodities, as is posited
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TABLE XXIII
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,
AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE21

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker

-cIrect- ------------- ~----------------

-----------

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty

2

.179

.090

State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
Independent Variable
-------------22----Community

210nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included.
22community was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XXIV
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN023
AUTONOMY

Community

Beta

Tacoma

.00

Las Vegas

.14

Tucson

.12

Boulder

.04

Salt Lake City

.04

P < .789
F = .482

df = 12,102

23Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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by O'Brien and \'V'etle (1975).

This, in turn, suggests that the

operational realities facing human service agencies involve not only
the balancing of expenditures and acquisitions, as suggested by the
notion of utility functions, but that the "markets" within which the
transactions take place are distinct.

This is generally consistent

with the writings of Dill (1962) and Gawthrop (1969) through the
linkage of certain of the commodities with specific task environments.
A second source of significance in this finding lies in the
nature of the local entity with which autonomy is related.

Local

Public Uncertainty is associated generally with the local output
component, to borrow Waldman's term (1972).

That the local output

component, Client Uncertainty, is not represented in this body of
findings is supportive of Waldman's dichotomy of organizational
environments.

In this context, the association suggests that local

input into the operational endeavors of local service agencies can
exist in lieu of total control over monetary resources through,
presumably, threats to or enhancement of agency autonomy.

Again, the

independence of Autonomy is a valued resource in itself is supported.
3.

Internal Orientation.

As shown in Tables XXV and XXVI, the

overall aggregate of the intraorganizational measures, Internal
Orientation, was found to share statistically significant associations
with none of the independent variables, though it does evidence nonsignificant associations with three organizational variables.
The Broker Agency component of Organizational Goal was the first
variable entered into the equation, though it proved ultimately not to
be the strongest in its association, with a last-step beta significant
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TABLE XXV
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, INTERNAL
ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE24

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker

-5Irect

1
-.226
.080
------------------------ ----------------

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty
State & Federal
Uncertainty

2

.195

.064

3

-.174

.064

Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
Independent Variable

----CommunIty~5-----

240nly independent variables with last step p<.lO are included.
25

.
. b
.
Commun1ty was programmed to be the last var1a Ie entered 1nto

the analysis.
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TABLE XXVI
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN026
INTERNAL ORIENTATION

Community

Beta

26Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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at p<.080.
State and Federal Uncertainty is indicated to be directly
associated with Internal Orientation, with an alpha of .064.
Interorganizational Uncertainty also reflects a non-significant
(p<.064) association with Internal Orientation.

Indicated to be a

negative association, this relation would indicate that as stability
in the local service inudstry increases, agencies' proclivities
toward maximizing their own welfare decrease.
Patterns evidenced in the analytical results reported above
suggest that the first two of the three associations reflect in large
degree the construction of Internal Orientation.

As noted in

Chapter IV, Internal Orientation is a sumrnative scale comprised of
all items contained in Instrument 1.

As such, it includes the other

two intraorganizational criterion measures which are selectively
comprised of certain of the items from Instrument 1.

Accordingly,

Internal Orientation can be expected to evidence to a lesser extent
those associations primarily involving variance in the items
comprising the other two, more selectively constructed intraorgaizational measures.

This possibility appears to be the case with

associations involving Organizational Goal and Autonomy.

Both

independent variables were found more strongly associated with other
intraorganizational criteria than with Internal Orientation.
The association relating Internal Orientation and Interorganizational Uncertainty, however, is independent of associations with other
intraorganizational measures.

A negative association, it signifies

that greater Interorganizational Uncertainty is associated with lesser
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organizational emphasis on intraorganizational measures of success.
This result is largely inconsistent with writings in the field of
organizational analysis.

Benson (1975), for example, posits that

organizations in a system compete with one another for necessary
resources.

Under these circumstances one would anticipate greater

emphasis on intraorganizational well-being as the interorganizational
field becomes less predictable.
It is clear that some alternative explanation for this finding
is necessary.

First, it is appropriate to note again that the more

explicit measures of intraorganizational well-being, Agency Enhancement and Autonomy, were not similarly related to Intraorganizational
Uncertainty, although together they comprise a major component of
Internal Orientation.

Three additional measures from Instrument 1

contribute to Internal Orientation, addressing orientations to expand
the range of agency services offered, the avoidance of activities not
consistent with agency goals, and the furthering of the wishes of
agency directors.

From these, it would appear that the operational

conservatism evident in this association may well be associated with
organizational orientations toward alterations in domain as they
might be expected to relate to interorganizational stability.

To the

extent that domain comprises an organizational characteristic of
importance in associations with outside agencies as well as with other
environmental components, the advent of interorganizational
uncertainty might well be expected to generate an element of conservatism toward change of any type in domain.

In short, reduced

orientation toward Internal Orientation during times of heightened
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interorganizational uncertainty may well represent a compensatory
behavior by organizations in the pursuit of a more stable interorganizational field.
A Word About Community
In no analyses was Community found to be an effective predictor
of organizational emphasis on an

intraorganizational decision

making criterion.
These findings suggest that orientation to intraorganizational
measures of success is derived from sources other than local environments.

The fact that no meaningful

intercommunity differences were

found directs attention to levels of social aggregation larger than
the locale.

While regional factors could produce such a pattern of

results (all cities, it will be recalled, are situated in the American
west), there exist a number of theoretical bases for ascribing these
orientations to broader societal levels of national or larger scale.
Microeconomic theory constitutes one basis for this expectation.
The profit motivation as developed by Smith (1909) and Marshall (1948)
is a common drive associated with all profit-oriented organizations.
While no measures employed in these analyses directly reflect profit-indeed, very few organizations in the sample are profit-oriented--the
parallels developed by subsequent authors would support the generalization of profit-related behavior to other classes of organizational
goals.

O~ganizational

pursuits of growth (Niskanen, 1968; Galbraith,

1967), security (Schramm and Sherman, 1974), consistency (Monsen and
Downs, 1965), managerial benefits (0. Williamson, 1964), and revenue
maximization (Baumol, 1967) are all supported by reasoning which
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parallels those employed by earlier economists in support of profit
maximization.
The literature on Community also provides general support for
this pattern of results.

The nesting of areal objects of identifica-

tion suggested by MacIver (1970), Janowitz (1952), Hillery (1968),
and others draws attention to the potential for influences born of
higher levels of aggregation manifesting themselves throughout
smaller aggregates.

In this context, organizational motivations

emanating from sources of national or higher scale could be expected
to be reflected to greater or lesser degree among organizations
throughout the nation.

Warren (1963) and Coleman (1957) both suggest

that the influence of local conditions is in large part predicated on
the absence of competing extralocal
behavior.

influences on organizational

In the case of the intraorganizational decision making

criteria, it is apparent that extralocal

value orientations

predominate.
Extraorganizational Criteria
As was the case with the Intraorganizational Criteria discussed
in the preceding pages, all measures of Extraorganizational Criteria
were analyzed through three distinct analytical processes:

analysis

of variance with Community as independent variable, analysis of
covariance employing each of the Organizational Variables as
covariates with Community as independent variable, and multiple
regression analysis employing the Organizational Variables as a set
of independent variables and Community as the independent variable
entered last into the analysis.
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It will be recalled that where the Intraorganizational Criteria
were operationalized through three composite measures, the Extraorganizational Criteria were operationalized through five aggregate
measures:

three are factor-based and one is an overall aggregate.

These measures share their derivations with those representing the
intraorganizational measures.

An additional index was developed from

the items of Instrument 2 in order to assess a type of organizationalenvironmental interaction not evidenced through factor analysis.
Analysis of Variance
Table XXVII summarizes the analyses of variance relating
Community to the extraorganizational variables.

The results of these

analyses are more fully presented in Appendix II.
It is apparent that Community does not reflect statistically
significant associations with any of the five measures of extraorganizational decision making criteria.

Only one association, that

relating Community to Outside Input, registers a probability level
of better than p<.lO.
Analysis of variance, then, does not in itself produce results
which are supportive of the study's second hypothesis, relating
different performance orientations to the different communities.
Analysis of Covariance
As with the analyses of intraorganizational criteria reported
earlier, this stage of analysis assesses the degree to which community
differences explain variance in the five measures of Extraorganizational Decision Making Criteria, while controlling individually for

TABLE XXVII
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN BY EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Instrumental
Coordination

Expressive
Coordination

Outside
Input

6.87

6.66

3.24

7.51

21.04

San Bernardino

.36

.42

.38

.31

1.09

Tacoma

.16

.06

.01

-.74

-.52

Las Vegas

1.08

.68

.23

-.11

1.65

Tucson

-.52

.30

.15

-.18

-.40

Boulder

-.54

-.94

-.67

.85

-.63

Salt Lake Ci ty

-.58

-.61

-.20

.03

-1.17

Grand Mean

p

<

.159

.160

.096

Exclusion

.345

External
Orientation

.353

.-.
U'I

""
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each of the six organizational variables.
analyses of covariance were implemented.

In all, 30 separate
The full results of these

analyses are reflected in Appendix II, and are summarized in Tables
XXVIII - XXXIII.
In general, it can be said the community is a more effective
predictor of extraorganizational criteria than of intraorganizational
criteria.

Where Community did not reflect an association with an

intraorganizational criterion sufficiently strong to generate an
alpha of less than .10, in 11 cases among the extraorganizational
criteria associations reflect this probability level and in three
cases statistical significance exceeds p<.05.
Expressive Coordination constitutes the criterion where the
association appears to be strongest, for Community registers two
statistically significant associations with this measures (with
Organizational Goal, F=2.618, df=5,139, p<.027; and with Interorganizational Uncertainty, F=2.716, df=5,124 1 p<.024).
The third significant association is evidenced between Community
and Outside Input, with Organizational Goal as the covariate (F=2.4ll,
df=5,139, p<.039).

In addition, three non-significant associations

are indicated between Community and Outside Input (with Organizational
Resources, F=l.970, df=5,l33, p<.087; with State and Federal
Uncertainty, F=1.987, df=5,124, p<.085; and with Interorganizational
Uncertainty, F=2.085, df=5,124, p<.078).
Two additional extraorganizational criterion measures are linked
to Community through associations reflecting alpha levels between .05
and .10.

TABLE XXVIII
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: COVARIATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXTRAORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING CRITERIA, p<.lO

Covariate Contribution,
Community As
Independent Variable
Organizational
Resources

F =
df =
P <

Organizational
Goals

F =
df =
P <

Local Public
Turbulence

F =
df =
p <

State & Federal
Turbulence

F =
df =
p <

Clients
Turbulence

F =
d£ =
P <

Interorganizationa1
Turbulence

F =
df =
p <
-

---

Instrumental
Coordination

----------

Expressive
Coordination

6.206
1,124
.014
-

Exclusion

Outside
Input

External
Orientation

4.151
1,124
.044

-----

I-'

U1

0'1

TABLE XXIX
INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION: GRAND MEAN AND
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covariates

With
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizational
Goal

with
Local
Public
Uncertainty

6.87

6.93

6.93

6.88

San Bernardino

.36

.30

.30

Tacoma

.16

.31

Las Vegas

1.08

Tucson

With
State &
Federal
Uncertainty

With
Client
Uncertaintv

With
Interorganizational
Uncertaintv

7.01

6.87

6.98

.38

.30

.46

.33

.11

.37

.18

.09

.10

1.17

1. 29

.91

1.09

1.08

1.16

-.52

-.58

-.58

-.73

-.54

-.52

-.43

Boulder

-.54

-.60

-.60

-.43

-.34

-.54

-.75

Salt Lake City

-.58

-.58

-.64

-.68

-.83

-.58

-.78

GRAND MEAN
DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN

P <
F

df

=
=

.159

.087

.075

.229

.190

.157

.116

1.620

1. 973

2.053

1.400

1.515

1. 627

1.811

5,139

5,133

5,139

5,119

5,124

5,134

5,124

.....
U1

-...J

TABLE XXX
EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION: GRAND f.1EAN AND
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covar1ates

With
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizational
Goal

with
Local
Public
Uncertainty

6.66

6.66

6.79

6.73

San Bernardino

.42

.41

.28

Tacoma

.06

.10

Las Vegas

.68

Tucson

With
State &
Federal
Uncertainty

With
Client
Uncertainty

With
Interorganizational
Uncertainty

6.69

6.61

6.83

.47

.28

.51

.28

-.07

.23

-.07

-.15

-.43

.74

1. 34

.43

.81

.72

1.35

.30

.29

.17

.02

.27

.35

.32

Boulder

-.94

-.95

-1.07

-.73

-.82

-.90

-.89

Sal t Lake City

-.61

-.66

-.75

-.63

-.69

-.57

-.88

GRAND MEAN
DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN

P
F
df

<

=
=

.147

.160

.027

.424

.218

.124

.023

1.664

1.618

2.618

.995

1.430

1. 768

2.716

5,139

5,133

5,139

5,119

5,124

5,134

5,124
I-'

U1

<Xl

TABLE XXXI
EXCLUSION: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY
DEVIATION BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covariates

with
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizationa!
Goal

With
Local
Public
Uncertainty

With
State &
Federal
Uncertaintv

with
Client
Uncertaintv

With
Interorganizational
Uncertaintv

7.51

7.51

7.60

7.51

7.57

7.49

7.68

.31

.31

.22

.29

.28

.35

.02

Tacoma

-.74

-.81

-.83

-.46

-.55

-.89

-.66

Las Vegas

-.11

-.18

.38

-.17

-.15

-.09

.25

Tucson

-.18

-.18

-.27

-.13

-.11

-.16

.10

Boulder

.85

.85

.76

.49

.90

.87

.67

Salt Lake City

.03

.06

-.06

.04

-.07

.05

-.13

.345

.340

.360

.759

.581

.207

.607

1.134

1.144

1.106

.523

.760

1.462

.723

5,139

5,133

5,139

5,124

5,134

5,124

GRAND MEAN

I

I

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN
San Bernardino

P

<

=
df =
F

5,119
-----

---

-----

-----

I-'
VI
\0

TABLE XXXII
OUTSIDE INPUT: GRAND MEAN AND COMMUNITY
DEVIATION BY COVARIATE

With
No
Covariates

With
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizational
Goal

With
Local
Public
Uncertainty

3.24

3.28

3.30

3.27

San Bernardino

.38

.34

.33

.39

Tacoma

.01

.08

-.05

Las Vegas

.23

.27

.15

Boulder
Sal t Lake City

GRAND MEAN

with
State &
Federal
Uncertaintv

with
Client
Uncertaintv

With
Interorganizational
Uncertaintv

3.25

3.36

.38

.38

.32

.10

-.03

.06

-.08

.49

.20

.25

.22

.46

.11

.10

.13

.... 22

.14

.19

-.67

-.71

-.72

-.61

-.70

-.68

-.66

-.20

-.20

-.25

-.37

-.39

-.21

-.46

3.30

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN

Tucson

p <

F
'-

df
- - - -

=
=

-

.096

.087

.039

.160

.085

.105

.072

1.912

1. 970

2.411

1.621

1. 987

1.861

2.085

5,119

5,124

5,134

5,124

5,139
---

5,133
---

-

5,139
---

-

----

-

-

-----

I

i

-

I-'
0'1

o

TABLE XXXIII
EXTERNAL ORIENTATION: GRAND MEAN AND
COMMUNITY DEVIATION BY COVARIATE
With
Local
Public
Uncertainty

With
state &
Federal
Uncertainty

with
Interorganizational
Uncertainty

with
Organizational
Resources

With
Organizational
Goal

21.04

21.32

21.04

21.12

21. 27

20.97

21.50

San Bernardino

1.09

1.02

.81

1.14

.86

1.32

.63

Tacoma

-.52

-.40

.80

.14

-.44

-.95

-1.00

Las Vegas

1.65

1.72

3.01

1.17

1. 76

1.72

2.75

Tucson

-.40

-.47

-.68

-.84

-.38

-.33

-.02

Boulder

-.63

-.69

-.91

-.67

-.27

-.56

-.97

-1.17

-1.19

-1.44

-1.27

-1. 59

-1.10

-1.80

With
No
Covariates
GRAND MEAN

With
Client
Uncertainty

DEVIATIONS FROM
GRAND MEAN

Salt Lake City
p <

.353

.341

.072

.431

.351

.253

.078

F =

1.119

1.142

2.080

.983

1.124

1.337

2.036

df =

5,139

5,133

5,139

5,119

5,124

5,134

5,124

I-'
0'1

I-'
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Instrumental Coordination is linked to Community through
associations involving two covariates (with Organizational Resources,
F=1.973, df=5,133, p<.087; and with Organizational Goal, F=2.053,
df=5,139, p<.075).
External Orientation is similarly linked to Community through
associations involving two covariates (with Organizational Goal,
F=2.080, df=5,139, p<.072; and with Interorganizational Uncertainty,
F=2.036, df=5,124, p<.078).
Overall, two observations are pertinent with respect to these
findings.

First, Community evidences a pattern of associations with

various of the extraorganizational criteria which support the study's
second hypothesis, calling for
respect to these measures.
calling for greater

intercommunity differences with

Second, the study's third hypothesis,

intercommunity distinctions among the extra-

organizational criteria than among the intraorganizational measures,
would appear supported through the analyses presented to now.
The covariates themselves present a different pattern.

Where,

in the analyses with the intraorganizational criteria as dependent
variables, the organizational variables were involved in seven
reportable associations, they reflect only two such associations with
the extraorganizational measures.
Both associations involve Interorganizational Uncertainty, first
with Expressive Coordination (F=6.206, df=l,124, p<.014) and second
with External Orientation (F=4.l5l, df=1,124, p<.044).
It would appear from these analyses that the organizational
variables, unlike Community, are much more effective in predicting
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variation among the Intraorganizational Criteria than among the
Extraorganizational measures.
Multiple Regression Analysis
In accordance with the procedures followed in the analyses of
the Intraorganizational Criteria, the final analytical step in the
examination of the Extraorganizational Criteria involves multiple
regression analysis.

As before, all organizational variables were

applied to the analysis prior to the addition of the focal variable,
Community, through stepwise techniques (Nie et al., 1975).

Results

of these analyses are fully reported in Appendix II.
The operationalization and treatment of all variables and of
the analyses themselves are identical to the practices described
earlier for the intraorganizational measures.
1.

Instrumental Coordination.

Tables XXXIV and XXXV summarize

the mUltiple regression analysis of expressive coordination.
It is apparent that none of the organizational variables entered
into the equation evidence statistically significant associations
with Instrumental Coordination.

Indeed, only two produced statistical

significance measures more favorable than p<.20, as is reflected in
Table LV, Appendix II.
Community

also reflects a non-significant association (p<.127).

The F test for this association is stronger than any yet encountered
in the multiple regression analyses.
As

noted above, none of the organizational variables evidence an

association with Instrumental Coordination, indicating that
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TABLE XXXIV
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, INSTRUMENTAL
COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE27

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker
----------------------- ---------Direct ----------------

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty
State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Unceltainty
!E~~2~~~~~!_Y~E~~~!~_

Community28

6

--

.127

270nly Community and independent variables with last step p<.lO
are included.
28community was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XXXV

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING
COMl1UNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN029
INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION

Community

Tacoma

Beta

-.02

Las Vegas

.17

Tucson

-.10

Boulder

-.13

Salt Lake City

-.13

p < .127

F

df

= 1. 761
= 10,104

29Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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organizations of all types represented in the organizational variables
share common orientations toward this decision making criterion.

This

universality of orientation toward the substantive coordination of
organizational endeavors stands in contrast to differences evidenced
in earlier analyses between organizations with different goals and
between organizations in different states of environmental turbulence.
This absence of differences is noteworthy, for it suggests that
at least with respect to this criterion coordinated agencies share
their orientations with coordinating organizations.

This commonality

would bode well for such organizations as Area Agencies on Aging
which are charged with systematizing the operations and service
offerings of direct service agencies.

First, it allows for the early

establishment of common orientations with agencies potentially to be
included in a service network.

It has been noted that this is one

means of generating coordination in a service provision network
(O'Brien and Wetle, 1978).

Second, it promotes the potential inclusion

of additional agencies to existing networks through the demonstrability
of the network's contribution to operational coordination.
It is additionally noteworthy that no class of environmental
turbulence was found to reflect an association with Instrumental
Coordination.

Where one type of environmental uncertainty was found

to share associations with each measure of intraorganizational criteria,
no such association is evident in this analysis.

As such, organiza-

tional orientation to Instrumental Coordination is demonstrated to be
largely unassociated with the turbulence measures employed in this
dissertation, within the ranges encountered in this data.
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Organizational orientation to Instrumental Coordination, then,
is unresponsive to variations in the organizational characteristics
and environmental uncertainties addressed in this study.
There is a reasonably good indication, however, that Community
affects this class of organizational orientation.

Community surfaces

as the strongest predictor of organizational emphasis on Instrumental
Coordination, though the association is significant at a level of
butp<.127.
association.

There is considerable theoretical support for this type of
That communities can be differentiated on the basis of

identifying characteristics has been posited by a number of authors
(Logan, 1976; MacIver, 1970j J. Bernard, 1962), as cited in the
dissertation's third chapter.

That these distinctions may be expected

to reflect in organizational operations within locales has been
suggested as well (Dewey, 1954; Coleman, 1957; Warren, 1963).
In all, it would appear that organizational orientation to
Instrumental Coordination reflects very little variation born of
organizational characteristics, nor or uncertainty among local input
and output components, the interorganizational field, or state and
federal agencies.

More important in explaining these differences is

the locale within which organizations are located.
2.

Expressive Coordination.

The multiple regression analysis

of Expressive Coordination is summarized in Tables XXXVI and XXXVII.
As with Instrumental Coordination, the organizational variables
as a group are not good predictors of organizational orientation
toward Expressive Coordination.

While one measure does evidence a

statistically significant association, the remaining six variables
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TABLE XXXVI
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, EXPRESSIVE
COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE30

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goals

Broker
------Direct
Service

---------------

--------------- f------------

Local Public
Uncertainty
State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
Independent Variable
----------7--31-----Corrnnunlty

1

7

-.244

--

.010

.081

300nly Community and independent variables with last step
p<.lO included.
31conununity was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XXXVI I
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN032
EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION

Community

Beta

Tacoma

-.07

Las Vegas

.17

Tucson

.00

Boulder

.09

Salt Lake City

P

-.14

< .081

F = 2.023

df = 11,103

32Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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fail to surpass probability levels of p<.20.
The one variable which is demonstrated to be associated with
Expressive Coordination is Interorganizational Uncertainty (p<.Ol).
A negative association is indicated between this independent variable
and Expressive Coordination, indicating that lower levels of local
turbulence among members of the service industry are normally accompanied by increased organizational orientations toward the strengthening of interorganizational linkages.
Community proves to be more strongly associated with Expressive
Coordination than has been found to be the case with any previously
discussed dependent variable (p<.081).
Expressive Coordination, like Instrumental Coordination, reflects
a relatively high degree of association with Community.

Unlike

Instrumental Coordination, however, Expressive Coordination is found
to be additionally associated with one measure of environmental
turbulence, Interorganizational Uncertainty.
This latter result reflects the high degree to which the
horizontal integration of service agencies is founded on symbolic
foundations.

As was noted earlier, much of the effort surrounding the

development of these networks involves the aggregation of previously
existing organizations into new interorganizational systems which
themselves are oriented to a given target population.

Participating

agencies continue to perform their original function; through their
participation in the network, however, they orient to new clients and
communicate with other agencies in terms of new issues.

In this

context, symbolic support of and by other agencies is likely to be of

171
considerable importance in terms of client referrals and, perhaps more
importantly, in terms of legitimization.

This type of support is

expressive, and is frequently cited by practitioners in the field.
That expressive support declines in periods of high interorganizational
uncertainty seems a realistic result in this context.
This result is also consistent with those elements of the
organizational literature which suggest inverse relationships between
uncertainty in the organizational network and organizational interaction with other agencies.

Frequently based on Exchange Theory,

these authors (Benson, 1975; Mindlin and Aldrich, 1975) note that as
interorganizational turbulence increases, organizational attention
increasingly turns inward, implying heightened emphasis on the security
of the organization itself in a competitive environment.

This phase

of the literature, however, is primarily oriented to that class of
organizational criteria which are treated in this dissertation through
the intraorganizational decision making criteria.

In this respect,

only one measure of the Intraorganizational Criteria, Internal
Orientation, was found to display such a relationship.

Among the

Extraorganizational Criteria, the measure reflecting the greatest
"action orientation" to interorganizational coordinative endeavors,
Instrumental Coordination, was found largely unassociated with Interorganizational Uncertainty.

This finding would suggest that functional

emphasis on coordinative endeavors by affected organizations exists
relatively independently of turbulence within the organizational
network; what are associated are the expressive, more symbolic aspects
of support for coordinative endeavor.

Together I these results would
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seem to suggest that--at least within the ranges represented in this
data--organizational reactions to interorganizational turbulence may
well be more narrowly defined than is often posited.

Orientations to

such criteria as are reflected in Agency Enhancement and Autonomy are
largely unrelated, though other internal issues, possibly domain, are
accorded more attention.

Interorganizational endeavors as actually

manifested in organizational emphasis on coordinative action are
similarly unaffected, although the degree to which such endeavors are
symbolically supported diminishes.
As was the case with Instrumental Coordination, Expressive
Coordination reflects a degree of association with Community.

Again,

the existence of this association is consistent with the contributions
of many authors in that field.

Coleman (1957), for example, has noted

that not only will issues generating conflict vary between locales,
but so will the means by which conflict is resolved.

Fllrther, once

successful conflict resolution is achieved, the means employed in the
first, precedent-setting case will tend to be employed in later
instances.

Particularly to the extent that coordination entails

conflict (O'Brien and Wetle, 1975), much of Coleman's analysis can be
applied directly to the arena of human service provision.

As noted

elsewhere, the work of Dewey (1954), MacIver (1970), and J. Bernard
(1962) are generally supportive of this result as well.
3.

Exclusion.

Summarized in Tables XXXVIII and XXXIX, the

patterns evidenced in the analysis of Exclusion are at odds with those
encountered in the analyses of extraorganizational criteria reported
to now.

The most apparent difference lies in the fact that the
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TABLE XXXVIII
OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,
EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE33

S~mRY

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker

--~-------------------~--------------------------Dlrect

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty

2

.190

.072

1

-.188

.055

State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
!~~~~~~~~~~-~~£~~~~~
Community 34

8

.229

330nly Community and independent variables with last step
p<.lO are included.
34community was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XXXIX
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN035
EXCLUSION

Community

Beta

Tacoma

-.19

Las Vegas
Tucson

.05
-.10

Boulder

.09

Salt Lake City

-.04

p < .229

F

= 1.403

df = 12,102

35Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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organizational variables evidence themselves to a greater extent in
this analysis than in the preceding two.

Additionally, Community

plays a more limited role with respect to this dependent variable.
The organizational variables evidencing reportable associations
with Exclusion are Local Public Uncertainty and Client Uncertainty.
While neither relation is statistically significant (p<.072 and .055,
respectively), their presence in the formulation leads to an
interesting picture of the local service industry.

The association

between Local Public Uncertainty and Exclusion is direct, indicting
that heightened tendencies toward exclusionary strategies accompany
increased community turbulence.

Just the opposite relation is

evidenced with respect to client uncertainty, where increased turbulence
is inversely associated with exclusionary policies.
Community-related distinctions would appear to play a lesser role
with respect to Exclusion than is encountered with respect to the other
Extraorganizational Criteria (p<.229).
Perhaps the most interesting of the analyses conducted among the
Extraorganizational Criteria is that involving Exclusion.

Two organi-

zational variables were found to be associated with Exclusion: Client
Uncertainty was found to be inversely associated, while Local Public
Uncertainty was found to be directly related.
These associations are consistent with Waldman's (1972) dichotomy
of environments according to elements' relations to the flow of support
to and from organizations.

In the context of the local environment,

Local Public Uncertainty is clearly descriptive of instability among
agencies' input components; conversely, Clients Uncertainty is
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associated with the output component.

That the two reflect opposite

associations with organizations' use of exclusionary tactics with
other agencies is supportive of Waldman's notation of their more
generally opposite relationships with service agencies.
The direct association between Exclusion and Local Public
Uncertainty is generally reflective of exchange theorists' suggestions
that organizations make use of selected environmental support in their
dealings with other agencies (Benson,

1975~

Mindlin and Aldrich, 1975).

By mobilizing support outside the system, the agency's potential for
generating influence within the system is enhanced.

The nature of the

support generated outside the service industry, however, is important.
Benson posits that the effectiveness of such support varies with its
scale and with the status of its members.

In very general terms, this

description portrays the general characteristics associated with the
input component, as reflected in Local Public Uncertainty.
That Exclusion is negatively associated with Client Uncertainty
suggests that agencies tend on the whole to support one another in
the face of uncertainty in the output components.

The exact implica-

tions of this result are not identifiable in this data set.

It is

possible, for example, that agencies join together in order to provide
system-wide responses of a conciliatory

nature~

would be easier in times of client unrest.

if so, AAA's job

Alternatively, agencies

may join to present a united front against the "foe," with quite
different implications.
the fact that

r~sponses

What is sure from this analysis, however, is
to changing client demands is demonstrably

different from those precipitated by demands from the non-client
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population.
4.

Outside Input.

As reflected in Table XL, no organizational

variable is associated with Outside Input to a sufficient degree to
generate a probability level better than p<.lO.
Community, as shown in Table XLI, accounts for insufficient
variance to achieve statistical significance measures of p<.lO.
Outside Input, a measure of the extent to which agencies
emphasize inputs from community entities outside the service market,
evidences no associations with any of the organizational variables.
As was the case with Instrumental Coordination, this absence of
associations generally suggests that to the extent that determinants
of this openness exist, they are not associated with commonly
recognized characteristics of organizations.
Of particular interest is the fact that no measures of
organizational-environmental association were found to evidence
associations with Outside Input.

Benson (1975) suggests that various

components of the environment may well be recruitable by organizations
for mobilization against other organizations during episodes of interorganizational conflict.

Because certain environmental elements are

capable of greater influence than others, most notably input components
over output components (as noted above), Benson suggests that agencies
may court members of the former for support in difficult times.

Since

one means of recruitment available to agencies in this industry is
through the advisory function, it could be suggested that Outside
Input and Local Public Uncertainty, if no other source of environmental uncertainty, might be associated.

This association is simply
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TABLE XL
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,
OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE36

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker
-------Direct -----------------------------r------------

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty
State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
!~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~!~
comrnunity37

7

.131

360nly Community and independent variables with last step
p<.lO are included.
37cornmunity was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XLI
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN038
OUTSIDE INPUT

Community

Beta

Tacoma

-.12

Las Vegas

.02

Tucson

-.08

Boulder

-.28

Salt Lake City

-.17

p < .131

F

df

= 1. 746
= 10,104

38Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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not evident in this data, nor are others relating to funding sources,
clients, or other agencies.
Community is shown to be a non-significant predictor of Outside
Input, evidencing an association with a significant level of p<.131.
This association is of insufficient strength to provide explicit
support for expectations of intercity differences in organizational
openness to extraindustry direction.
5.

External Orientation.

Again as indicated in Table XLII,

External Orientation is indicated through the analysis to be relatively
independent of the organizational variables.

The one exception to the

more general case is Interorganizational Uncertainty, where the
association is indicated to be inverse; less interorganizational
turmoil is associated with greater external orientation.

This finding

is consistent with discussions advanced earlier with respect to
Expressive Coordination.
Community evidences a non-significant association with External
Orientation (p<.076), indicating that different locales are oriented
in varying degrees to this criterion.

This pattern is reflected in

Table XLIII.
External Orientation evidences an association with only one
organizational variable; a negative relation with Interorganizational
Uncertainty.
In the same way that Internal Orientation, the overall
aggregative measure of orientation to intraorganizational well-being,
shares associations found to exist with various of its component
measures, this overall measure of extraorganizational emphasis can be
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TABLE XLII
SU~mRY

I

OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS, EXTERNAL
ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 39

Step
Entered

Covariates

Last Step
Beta

P

Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goal

Broker
------Direct ------------ ---------------- -----------

Service

Local Public
Uncertainty
State & Federal
Uncertainty
Client
Uncertainty
Interorganizational
Uncertainty
!~~~2~~~~~~_~~£!~~!~
Corrununi ty 40

1

-.201

.036

7

--

.076

390nly Community and independent variables with last step
p<.lO are included.
40community was programmed to be the last variable entered into
the analysis.
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TABLE XLIII
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS,BETA VALUES RELATING
COMMUNITIES TO SAN BERNARDIN041
EXTERNAL ORIENTATION

Community

Beta

Tacoma

-.13

Las Vegas

.18

Tucson

-.09

Boulder

-.09

Salt Lake City

-.15

p < .076

F
df

= 2.057
= 11,103

41Through dummy techniques, betas for each community signify
its deviation from associations identified in San Bernardino.
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expected to reflect the associations of narrower measures subsumed
within.

To a large extent this is likely the case here, reflecting

the association found to relate Interorganizational Uncertainty with
Expressive Coordination.
There is reason, however, to suspect that a more substantial
significance is involved.

Analysis involving the aggregate measure

of emphasis on intraorganizational goals, Internal Orientation, found
that this focus of interest was inversely associated with Interorganizational Uncertainty.

This result was ascribed in earlier

discussion to domain-related issues which reflect one aspect of
organizations' functional associations with other organizations.
Missing, however, was any complementary increase in emphasis on such
intraorganizational performance measures as are represented by Agency
Enhancement or Autonomy.

In this result, inversely linking Internal

Orientation with Interorganizational Uncertainty, is evident a similar
orientation favoring conservatism in interorganizational endeavors in
the context of greater risk in the organizational field.

Emerging

from these results is a suggestion that interorganizational contacts
involve a more complex mix of motivations than is widely recognized in
the organizational literature.

Rather than serving only the long-run

well-being of the organization through direct or indirect impacts on
the flow of requisite resources, it would appear that interorganizational interaction may well be pursued for purposes entirely
independent of individual organizations' perceptions of what might be
good for them alone.
further investigation.

This is an interesting possibility, and merits
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A Word About Community
Community is associated with the extraorganizationa1 decision
making criteria to a greater and more consistent extent than was found
to be the case through the intraorganizationa1 analyses.

While no

extraorganizationa1 association was found to be statistically
significant as such, four of the five associations evidenced less
than a one in seven probability of being attributable to chance.
These generally supportive probability levels, and the fact that four
of the five associations establish a pattern of association with
Community, lend indirect support to the notion of inter-community
differences.

While these significance levels fall

shor~

of conven-

tional tests of significance, the patterns apparent in the findings
suggest that forces other than mere chance are at work in the analyses
and that judgment as to the veracity of findings should be suspended
for the moment.

This point will be further discussed in the following

chapter.
Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational Decision Making Criteria:
Summary
This section is designed to synopsize the findings of 64
separate analyses (intraorganizationa1 and extraorganizationa1)
undertaken during the first phase of the study.

Where the previous

pages of this chapter are oriented to brief discussions of the
separate analyses, the pages to follow will be oriented to broader
discussions of the patterns evidenced throughout the analyses.

These

will be analyzed with respect to conclusions and policy implications
in the next chapter.
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It will be recalled that the analyses undertaken in this
dissertation were oriented to the pursuit of a single research
question:

"Do the criteria by which organizations assess the benefits

of entering into interagency agreements vary by city?"

The research

question was addressed through three hypotheses, as follow.
It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in the
intraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements.
It is hypothesized that differences exist between cities in the
extraorganizational criteria by which human service organizations
assess the benefits of entering into interagency agreements.
It is hypothesized that the inter-community differences found to
exist for extraorganizational criteria will exceed those found to
exist for intraorganizational criteria.
Intraorganizational Criteria:

Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis was tested through the analyses implemented
using intraorganizational criteria measures as dependent variables.
In general, Community is not a strong predictor of organizational
orientation to the intraorganizational criteria.
The analyses of variance with Community as the independent
variable and the

intraorganizational criterion measures as the

dependent variables failed to reflect any associations remotely
approaching statistical significance.

This is not supportive of the

first hypothesis.
Analyses of covariance produced similar results, as reflected in
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Appendix II.

In no case did the probability levels reflecting the

associations between community and the three measures of intraorganizational decision making criteria better p<.IO.

Apparent in

the tables, however, is a pattern of differentials between the
associations linking Community with the various intraorganizational
measures which are employed as covariates.

Those probability levels

associated with Agency Enhancement are consistently smaller than
those involving Autonomy and Internal Orientation.

While this may

be of interest to later investigations, it does not alter the basic
fact that the results of the covariance analyses do not lend support
to the study's initial hypothesis.
The multiple regression analyses allowed the effects of
community to be measured after parceling out the variance of all
selected organizational variables.

The results of these anlyses are

consistent with those of the analyses of variance and covariance:
they do not reflect

intercommunity variation in organizational

orientations to the intraorganizational criteria.
Overall, the results of the analyses point to the inescapable
conclusion that the first hypothesis of the study is not supported
throughout the data; organizational assessments of the intraorganizational benefits attached to entering into interagency agreements do not vary by city.
Extraorganizational Criteria:

HYpothesis 2

In a manner similar to that described above, the second
hypothesis was tested through analyses employing extraorganizational
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criterion measures as dependent variables.
The results of the analyses of variance show community to be a
more adequate predictor of extraorganizational orientations than was
found to be the case with the intraorganizational criteria, although
no analysis produced results consistent with commonly accepted
measures of statistical significance.

These results are reported in

Appendix II.
Better than similar figures obtained through the analysis of
the intraorganizational criteria, these analyses lend marginal support
to the study's second hypothesis.
The analyses of covariance assessed the associations relating
the extraorganizational decision making criteria to Community, while
controlling for the organizational variables.

These analyses are

reported in Appendix II.
Overall, the findings are inconclusive.

Three associations were

found to be statistically significant, while seven more reflected
probability levels between .05 and .10.

While not overwhelmingly

supportive of the study's second hypothesis, these figures do surpass
the results of the intraorganizational analyses.
As with the intraorganizational criteria, a separate step-wise
mUltiple regression analysis was implemented for each measure of
extraorganizational orientation, as reported in Appendix II.
The results of the multiple regression analyses are the most
supportive of the dissertation's second hypothesis, although none of
these analyses evidenced a statistically significant association
between Community and the Extraorganizational Criteria (with

188
Instrumental Coordination, p<.127; with Expressive Coordination,
p<.081; with Exclusion, p<.229; with Outside Input, p<.131; with
External Orientation, p<.076).

Having noted the non-significance of

these associations, it is appropriate to also note that in light of
the fact that these results are not entirely negative.

This disserta-

tion constitut'es the first attempt at operationalizing the Extraorganizational Criteria and at their analysis, and it is reasonable
to expect that improvements could be realized in both activities.

In

this light, the fact that general support was realized in the
associations between Community and four of the five Extraorganizational
Criterion measures would seem to call for further work in the concepts
entailed in this study, a point which will be discussed further in
the following chapter.
Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational Criteria:
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis, predicting greater

intercommunity

differences among the extraorganizational criteria than among the
intraorganizational criteria is supported.
Three general approaches are employed to demonstrate the
differences in the magnitude of Community contributions to variance
for each of the eight dependent variables.

First, the plotting of

beta values for each of the towns with respect to each of the
variables gives a visual indication of differences in intercommunity
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orientations to each dependent measure.

42

Second, differences in the

community contribution to each dependent measure may be alternatively
stated in terms of the variance associated with beta values, as
derived from organizational responses in each city and calculated
through the eight regression analyses.

Finally, differences in the

community contributions may be assessed in terms of the probability
levels associated with the community contribution to each analysis.
Figure 4 provides a graphic trace of each city's beta value,
reflecting how agencies in each city differ from those of San
Bernardino in their orientation to each dependent measure.

In

general, the greater the difference between the highest and lowest
cities' values, and the greater the dispersion between values, the
greater will be the contribution of the Community variable to the
explanation of variance in the dependent variable.

It can be seen in

Figure 4 that by both indexes--spread between polar values and
dispersion between values--differences between cities with respect
to each extraorganizational dependent variable are greater than
differences reflected among the intraorganizational criteria.

This

is supportive of the dissertation's third hypothesis.
A more precise means of assessing the inter-city differences
addressed above lies in comparing the standard deviations associated
42

It will be recalled that for the purposes of multiple
regression analysis, the community variable was dummied. As a result,
beta values associated with each of the five cities named measures
that city's deviation from San Bernardino's measure with respect to
each dependent variable. Were San Bernardino to be plotted in
Figure 4, its plots would lie on each of the eight zero points.
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with the five cities' beta values for each dependent variable.

Each

figure reflects overall inter-city differences as they relate to each
of the eight dependent variables.

Figure 5 provides a graphic com-

parison of these standard deviations.

As noted above, the standard

deviation of beta weights associated with each of the extraorganizational criterion measures is greater than those associated with each
of the intraorganizational criteria, a finding supportive of the
dissertation's third hypothesis.

A third method of comparing Community

contributions to the various decision making criteria lies in comparing
the statistical significance of the Community contribution to each.
Figure 6 provides a graphic comparison of these measures.

Here,

the statistical significance associated with each of the relationships
between Community and the decision making criteria are plotted:

the

smaller the numerical value of the significance level, and the shorter
the bar in Figure 6, the stronger the association.

The three measures

of Intraorganizational Criteria are positioned to the left of the
figure, while the five Extraorganizational Criteria are to the right.
The differences are dramatic.
As reflected in the multiple regression analyses, Community
shares no association with the Intraorganizational Criterion Measure
which is statistically significant beyond p<.lO.
Among the Extraorganizational Criterion Measures, however, no
association with Community is less statistically significant than
p<.230, and two associations exceed measures of p<.lO.
As is dramatized by the distinct differences between the lengths
of each set of bars in the figure, Community shows much stronger
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interrelations with the extraorganizational criteria than with the
intraorganizational criteria.

The differences are clear not only with

respect to paired comparisons of individual measures, but also with
rexpect to the overall comparison.
third hypothesis of Phase 1:

This is clearly supportive of the

Community Variation.

In sum, the analyses conducted in Part 1:

Community Variation

provide the following support for the phase's three hypotheses.
1.

No support is provided for the first hypothesis.

In no case

does Community account for sufficient variance to general statistical
significance.
2.

Greater support is provided for the second hypothesis.

Two

of the five associations between Community and the extraorganizational
criteria are statistically significant at levels between p<.OS and
p<.lO, while the three remaining associations generate alpha levels
above .10.

While not meeting commonly accepted probability levels

(p<.05), the pattern established by these measures is generally
consistent with the parameters of acceptability discussed by Hays
(1973), and certainly support further investigation of the topic.
3.

Full support is provided for the third hypothesis.

The

associations between Community and all extraorganizational measures are
considerably stronger than between Community and all the intraorganizational measures.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE
INTRODUCTION

The primary significance of this concluding chapter is the
exploration of the dissertation's analytical results for more general
findings, and their application to actual or potential situations
which might be identified both in theory and in the "real world."
This broad goal will be addressed in four sections.

The first will

briefly review the work which was reported in the dissertation's first
five chapters.

The second section will discuss the analytical findings

reported in Chapter V:

first, with respect to issues pertaining to

organizational theory and operation and, second, with respect to issues
which might be expected to impact on the analytical findings for
reasons other than those which might derive from theoretical sources.
The third section will draw this chapter's discussion into a concise
statement of the dissertation's conclusions.

Finally, the fourth

section will address implications of the dissertation's findings:
first, with respect to the theoretical issues which prompted the
development of the research question and, second, with respect to the
policies and practices employed in the delivery of human services to
clients.
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REVIEW
As was noted in the fourth chapter, the dissertation research
reported in this document was designed to address the following
research question:

Do the criteria by which organizations assess the

benefits of entering into interagency agreements vary by city?
The pursuit of this research question demanded first, that a
model of organizational decision making behavior which incorporates
extraorganizatonal criteria be identified and, second, that the model
be tested through empirical analysis.
The dissertation's first two chapters were devoted to developing
a model for use in this research application.

It will be recalled

that the first chapter was devoted to the explication of four general
theoretical bases developed for use in organizational analysis.
Employing the microeconomic model (also termed the "Classical Theory
of the Firm") as a basis, other models were described in terms of
their further contributions to the understanding of organizational
behavior.

Economic contributions were described largely in terms of

their emphasis on "utility-maximizing behavior," and for their
generalizations of the concept of organizational goal to include those
of parties other than owners.

That body of organizational theory

arising out of the other social sciences was described in terms of its
implications for organizational goals.

To the profit posited by

economists was added the goal-related concepts of power, autonomy,
integration, domain, status, and ideology.

As a framework for

examining the interactions arising out of these orientations, the
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Organizational Interaction Model (Wetle, 1976) was advanced as a
concise explication of a more diverse literature on exchange.

Finally,

the Primitive Economy Model (O'Brien, 1976a, 1976b) was introduced as
a natural extension of the preceding models, capable of incorporating
extraorganizational goals into an organizational decision making
model.
The Primitive Economy Model was formulated in terms of a general
organizational utility function, as were those contributions previously
discussed, in order to provide a general statement of the model's
components and in order to stress the similarities and differences
which relate it to other approaches to organizational analysis.

This

utility function, (14), constitutes a very general statement which in
its current state offers a conceptual basis for use in testing the
Primitive Economy Model through the Model's principal corollary, the
Differential Mix Hypothesis.

Simply stated, the Differential Mix

Hypothesis states that similar organizations pursue similar combinations of goals, and so will tend to behave similarly.
of

In the context

interindustrial comparisons, for example, the Differential Mix

Hypothesis would lead to expectations of different goal mixes between
groups of organizations identified by their industrial context.

In

terms of this dissertation, where organizations within an industry-the human service industry--are identified in terms of locale, the
Differential Mix Hypothesis suggests differences born of locale.

In

terms of formula (14), which constitutes a formulation of the PEM as
noted above, the Differential Mix Hypothesis suggests that firms of a
given type, however defined, will tend on the whole to reflect similar
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patterns of valuation (as represented by the VIi and VEj terms) among
the various goals available for organizational pursuit.

To

the extent

that this position is found to be valid, it constitutes a means of
verifying systems of organizational classification.
As noted above, organizations in this dissertation were classified according to locale.

Because organizations--particularly

organizations of the type encountered in the human service industry-receive much of their operational direction from their environments,
and because operational environments in the human services industry
are largely local in scope and therefore subject to local differentiation, it was hypothesized that organizations operating in different
locales would reflect different operational orientations or goals.
Three hypotheses were employed in the testing of the research
question.
The first posited different organizational orientations toward
intraorganizational goals in different cities.

(Intraorganizational

goals are those by which organizations assess success in terms of
conditions associated directly with the organization itself.) Analytical
results yielded no support for the first hypothesis, reflecting rather
that locale is not a pertinent factor in the emphasis lent by organizations to intraorganizational classes of goals.
The second hypothesis suggested that organizational emphases on
extraorganizational goals vary by city, extraorganizational goals
being those by which success is identified with respect to entities
outside the organization.

Results indicated that locale is much more

influential in accounting for variance among the extraorganizational
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criteria than among

intraorga~izational

measures.

While no analytical

results produced probability levels exceeding p<.05,

four of the five

analytical results are generally consistent with other standards as
they relate to exploratory research (Hays, 1973).
The third hypothesis, calling for greater inter-city differences
among the extraorganizational criteria than among the intraorganizational was deemed fully supported by the analyses.
intercity

All measures of

differences among the extraorganizational criteria were

found to exceed all intercity

difference measures among the intra-

organizational criteria.
DISCUSSION

To this point, discussion has been limited to one of the two
classes of organizational decision making criteria.

While useful, the

original goal of the dissertation was to additionally develop a model
within which both classes of criteria could be incorporated, a goal
necessitating a general discussion of the findings employing both
series of analyses.

Accordingly, the pages which follow will address

simultaneously the intraorganizational as well as the extraorganizational decision making criteria in order to assess the worth of the
two when considered together.
At the most fundamental level, the dissertation employed the
Primitive Economy Model as a general statement of how an organizational
entity might address two distinct classes of goals.

Limitation of the

model to two classes of goals, as opposed to three or more, was a
decision made in order to simplify the initial analysis of

200

extraorganizational goals as a newly recognized class of influences.
While simplifying the analytical process, this approach left
unaddressed many of the criteria addressed inthe initial chapter
including such motivators as managerial goals, and a number of the
organizational goals.

The exclusion of these measures from the

analyses undertaken in this research undoubtedly affected the findings
of the research, but allowed the assessment of two broad classes of
goals with a relatively efficient interviewing instrument.
to the limitations born

Subject

of this necessary decision, the analyses

presented in the preceding pages allowed for a relatively crude initial
application of the Primitive Economy Model employing goals which
roughly represent internal motivations as perceived by non-profit
organizations, as well as those more directly identified as extraorganizational.
Interesting is the fact that the two classes of goals were shown
to be responsive to different classes of influence.
the most important finding of the study.

This is probably

Where intraorganizational

criteria were found to be responsive primarily to organizational
characteristics and not at all to community influences, the extraorganizational criteria were found to be less subject to influence by
organizational variables and considerably more responsive to contextual
influences identified as being associated with the organizations'
community contexts.

This set of findings suggests a number of ideas

concerning organizational behavior as it is encountered in the human
services industry.
First and foremost, it appears from the findings that
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organizational decision making is more complex than is generally
acknowledged.

Not only were two independent general types of criteria

found to be employed in the assessment of benefits associated with
organizational decision making, but each was found to respond to
different classes of influence.
On the one hand lie the intraorganizational criteria.

These

include the general notion of profit (broadened to include beneficial
trades of commodities other than money), growth, staff welfare,
autonomy, and time preference as applied to returns on investment.
These criteria were found to be resistant to local variations in their
valuation, but were found to covary

with such organizational variables

as organizational goal (function, and position in network), and
environmental uncertainty as identified in the local public, at the
state and federal levels, and within the interorganizational network.
On the other hand are the extraorganizational criteria.

Existing

independently of the intraorganizational measures addressed above,
these measures of success were found to vary considerably by locale,
and to additionally reflect influence born of organizational characteristics.
The simultaneous existence of the two classes of goals and the
two classes of influence suggests that the simultaneous acknowledgement,
if not the actual treatment, of both classes of phenomena involves a
sophisticated and complex decision making process and a discerning eye
for influences.
This general pattern of findings would tend to lend support to
the Primitive Economy Model, at least to the extent that the limited
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application of the model in this dissertation would allow.

It will be

recalled that the PEM suggests that organizations respond simultaneously to goals which are unique to the organizations themselves, and
to goals which are associated most directly with entities outside the
organization.

Moreover, the model suggests that the two classes of

goals are independent of one another.
vindicated in this application.

Both general stipulations were

First, it was found that organiza-

tional identification of valuation patterns pertaining to intraorganizational goals was not linearly associated with their treatment of
extraorganizational goals, as is explained in Appendix I.

This lack

of association was additionally supported through the distinctions
which separate the influences impacting upon each class of goal, as
identified in Chapter IV and above.

Finally, it was found thdt the

actual locus of influence impacting upon each type of goal is different:
intraorganizational goals tend on the whole to be affected by forces
outside the locale, while extraorganizational orientations tend to be
associated with local influences.
The Differential Mix Hypothesis, a derivative of the Primitive
Economy Model suggesting that organizations may be typed according to
their mixes of goals, also gained support in this dissertation.

Typing

organizations by locale, it was found that organizational orientations
toward extraorganizational measures of success do indeed reflect
differences by city:
location.

in this respect, organizations may be typed by

With respect to intraorganizational criteria, however,

location does not constitute an effective means of classifying
organizations.

This conclusion is derived from the fact that Community
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shares little variance with these measures of organizational success.
Over and above the discussion of the implications of the dissertation's findings, it is appropriate to address the findings themselves.
By and large, the analytical results of this study are clouded by
significance levels which fall short in varying degree of commonly
accepted parameters.

While due note has been made in the textual

discussions of the analytical results, it is appropriate to discuss
possible reasons why the associations did not meet these criteria.
A clear explanation centers on the null hypothesis:

it is

entirely possible that the analyses do not meet commonly accepted
parameters of statistical significance simply because the theoretical
development of the dissertation's hypotheses is faulty, and because the
Primitive Economy Model itself is an ineffective model of organizational behavior.
Unfortunately, the findings themselves do not offer sufficient
grounds to fully refute the null hypothesis in the traditional way;
measures of statistical significance do not permit it.

There are a

number of reasons, however, to question whether the dissertation's
premises should be dismissed, and these will be discussed in the pages
to follow.

They include observations relating to sampling, to the

application of the model, and to the methodological approaches employed

in analysis.
1.

Exploratory Nature of the Dissertation.

Perhaps the greatest

single impediment to this study is the fact that this constitutes the
first empirical application of the Primitive Economy Model and of the
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Differential Mix Hypothesls.
This in itself constitutes a potential weakness in the anlytical
work simply because it connotes no prior work in those areas where the
model offers novel insights; no author has previously addressed extraorganizational decision making criteria in this type of an empirical
application.

Because this is the model's first application it is

reasonable to assume that mistakes may well have been made or, in the
absence of mistakes, that various steps in the execution of the
research design may have been less effective than could have been the
case.

At least two steps in the conduct of the research could well

have suffered as a result.

Instrument deveZopment.

The dependent variables for the

dissertation, it will be recalled, were developed from two instruments
designed explicitly to yield measures of intra- and extraorganizational
goals.

These were not haphazardly developed.

In each case, items

were developed in order to plumb a range of carefully selected types
of goals which would reflect not only organizational orientations, but
also those of the market in which they operate and those of other
entities with whom service agencies transact business as identified in
prior work (O'Brien and Wetle, 1978).

These efforts notwithstanding,

the fact that many of the issues addressed through the instruments-particularly those relating to the extraorganizational criteria--had
not been addressed in earlier empirical work undoubtedly affected the
veracity of the measures actually employed in the instruments, and this
condition would ultimately reflect in the analyses employing these
measures as dependent variables.
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Dependent variable deveZopment.

The potential for weakness

in the various individual measures were critical in the decision to
employ composite measures as dependent variables.

It is widely recog-

nized that factor analysis allows the development of indexes which
represent variables only indirectly reflected in data through measures
explicitly included in data gathering instruments.

Through the

selective inclusion of these explicit measures into a composite
representation of the indirectly represented variable, it is possible
to operationalize that concept.

There are several benefits associated

with this approach to variable development, including the recognition
of variables potentially more fundamental to a researchable issue than
was initially thought to be the case, and the ability to gain more
widely-based measures of a concept than would be possible through
single measures.

Unfortunately, there are also potential costs in

precision which accompany the development of factor-based composite
measures.

The first point of potential loss involves the selection of

variables for inclusion in a composite index; some arbitrary decision
is ultimately necessary.

While a number of approaches have been

documented in the literature, one which is widely employed and which
was used in this application involves the selection of measures with
factor loadings exceeding .30; often accompanying this approach is a
parallel decision to assign measures with loadings over .30 on two or
more factors to that factor upon which it loads most highly.

While

this approach serves the ends of parsimony and univocity, it does not
necessarily maximize precision in the operationalization of the
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factor-derived variable.

Three potential limitations bear upon this

problem.

First, the contributions of measures with loadings under .30

are lost.

While the contributions of these measures would likely be

small, they nonetheless represent contributions and in their absence
they detract from the composite variable's precision.

Second,

variables loading more highly than .30 on two factors are lost to the
factor upon which the lesser loading occurred.

This problem in assign-

ment occurred in the operationalization of Expressive Coordination,
doubtless with costs for that measure's precision.
The third point of potential loss in precision involves the
manner in which the variance of these measures included in a factor
are treated in the process of aggregation.

As noted in Chapter III,

a number of approaches exist for addressing this treatment, each
offering relative advantages and disadvantages.

The approach employed

in this dissertation was found to offer mid-range performance with
respect to four standards of performance (univocity, validity,
reliability, correlatedness), while others offered more advantageous
performance among certain standards of performance at the expense of
others.

Having acknowledged these issues, it is appropriate to note

that the method selected--the simple summing of all measures-overstates the contribution of each individual measure to total
variance and therefore introduces error variance which will adversely
impact the precision with which the composite measure is operationalized.

As

with the other

po~nts

mentioned above, analytical

precision must ultimately reflect this condition.
Each of these three points represents a calculated risk.

While
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each frequently accompanies the analytical application of early models,
they nonetheless are likely reflected in tests of statistical significance.
2.

Model Operationalization.

The Primitive Economy Model,

which forms the conceptual basis for this dissertation's development
and execution, was developed in the first and second chapters as a
utility function.

As

such, it was presented essentially as a statement

of organizational goal mix and, through the valuation terms, as a goal
hierarchy.

In this form, problems associated with the comparable

operationalization of largely incomparable goals were minimized, and
the concept of cost was designed out of the problem.
necessary precautions

tak~n

These were

to avoid problems which have defied

adequate solution in a wide range of applications (for example, see
Clawson and Knetsch, 1966).

In spite of this necessity, however, this

skeletal treatment of the Primitive Economy Model almost certainly
diminishes the degree to which differences in goal orientation can be
assessed.
3.

Methodological Issues.

While the discussion presented above

bears a number of methodological implications, a number of other forces
more closely associated with design-related issues also warrant
discussion.

SeZection of cities.

As noted in Chapter III, the selection of

cities was governed by a number of parameters designed to enhance
certain types of variance and to diminish others.

The use of six

cities and those cities' specific selection were in part determined
through budgetary constraints.

While the ability to employ comparable
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data gathered virtually simultaneously in six cities constitutes an
opportunity of the highest order--particularly for the manner of
research employed in this dissertation--it is still appropriate to note
that six is not a large number and that the hypotheses advanced in this
study could possibly have been better assessed through the employment
of a greater number of cities, or through greater geographic dispersion
among the six, with particular emphasis on the latter.

As noted

earlier, communities tend to exist in open systems of social units
extending in steadily increasing scales to the national and world
levels.

The fact that all cities selected for this study are located

in the western third of the nation, in this context, undoubtedly
diminishes the differences apparent between locales by effectively
reducing the differences arising out of regional differences.

On the

one hand, this regional concentration lends greater weight to those
differences identified as being associated with intercity distinctions
and therefore largely local in scale.

On the other hand, national

policy connotes implementation in locales within all regions of the
country, and so differences manifested at the local level from
regional influences are appropriate matters of study.
likely enhance the degree of interlocal

They would also

difference identified in a

study such as this.

ContextuaZ anaZysis.

Contextual analysis, as described earlier,

comprises an analytical approach which allows the researcher to
assess influences born of environmental sources affecting focal units
of analysis.

While its use in prior studies (Wright, 1977; Meyer,

1970; Farkas, 1974; Heyck and Klecka, 1973) is well reported, a
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consistent characteristic of these studies involves general weakness of
findings as evidenced in relatively low measures of statistical signisignificance.

In large measure, it is reasonable to suggest that

contextual influences, such as those identified in education (Meyer,
1970), constitute subtle forces which are difficult to define and
measure.

This assessment would seem to be appropriate to the research

reported in this document, where community-related influences generated
associations among the extraorganizational decision making criteria
which, in terms of probability levels, are relatively weak.
The preceding discussion is oriented to a brief explication of
the findings of the research reported in this dissertation, and to the
provision of possible explanations for relatively weak results which
could compete with the null hypothesis.

The most powerful argument in

this respect, however, lies in patterns reflected in the findings
themselves.

While this issue was largely addressed in preceding

discussion, it bears brief reconsideration here as well.

Two classes

of findings are appropriate to note.
First, the findings of the dissertation as they relate to
relevant literatures are consistent with expectations advanced in
those literaturesi this class of associations lend a measure of
indirect external validation to this work.

Particularly relevant in

this respect are a number of points relating to the organizational
exchange literature.

Waldman's (1972) input and output components

are frequently apparent in the results of these analyses, and
associations between organizations and relevant environmental entities
tend on the whole to mirror expectations born of that literature.
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Second, patterns apparent in the findings themselves tend to
reinforce inclinations away from the null hypothesis.

Particularly

apparent in this regard is the difference in strengths of associations
linking community with the intraorganizational criteria and with the
extraorganizational criteria.

Were these associations strictly

spurious in nature, it is doubtful that degrees of strength between
Community and the two classes of criteria would have differed so
markedly.

It will be recalled that associations between Community and

the intraorganizational criteria were found to reflect probability
levels ranging from p<.684 to p<.867, while those reflecting extraorganizational criteria varied from p<.076 to p<.229, with three
reflecting p<.lOO.

While none of the individual significance measures

meet normal criteria, the patterns in which the findings are encountered
makes difficult the wholesale rejection of the dissertation's findings.
In his discussion of significance levels, William L. Hays (1973)
warns that the unquestioning application of tests of statistical
significance can lead to the dismissal of valuable findings.

In so

doing, he notes the following.
Stripped of the language of decision theory and of concern
with personal probabilities, all that a significant result
implies is that one has observed something relatively unlikely
given the hypothetical situation, but relatively more likely
given some alternative situation. Everything else is a matter
of what one does with this information. Statistical significance is a statement about the likelihood of the observed
result, nothing else. It does not guarantee that something
important, or even meaningful, has been found (p. 384).
He goes on to point out that investigators should be aware that
meaningful findings can easily be dismissed through their failures to
meet conventional measures of statistical significance.

He says that,
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conventions about significant results should not be turned
into canons of good scientific practice. Even more
emphatically, a convention must not be made a superstition.
It is interesting to speculate how many of the early
discoveries in physical science would have been statistically
significant in the experiments where they were first observed.
Even in the crude and poorly controlled experiment, some
departures from expe~:tation stand out simply because they are
interesting and suggest things to us that we might not be able
to explain. These are matters that warrant looking into
further regardless of what the conventional rule says to
decide. Statistics cannot do the scientist's basic job-looking and wondering and looking again (po 385).
It is suggested that the findings and conclusions of this dissertation are consistent with these caveats.

Alone, conventional measures

of statistical significance preclude the acknowlegement of community
differences in the orientations of agencies to the interests of the
communities in which they operate.

The patterns evident

in the data,

however, suggest that these differences are differentially active among
the two classes of organizational goals studies.

These consistent

differences, combined with supportive expectations derived from the
literature, suggest that there may indeed be substantive associations
in the data which, for a number of reasons, fail to meet conventional
measures of statistical significance.
Mindful of these issues, the most general finding of the dissertation may be advanced as follows:

general support has been found for

the notion that organizations do orient to extraorganizational as well
as intraorganizational issues in the conduct of their affairs.
Moreover, the patterns evident in the goals identified as more
important than others to organizations were found to differentially
vary between cities.

While no variation was discerned between locales

with respect to intraorganizational decision making criteria,
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considerable variation was identified among the extraorganizational
decision making criteria.

This pattern of results suggests the

rejection of the study's first hypothesis--that inter-local differences
would be found in organizations' orientations to intraorganizational
goals.

Results further suggest that the dissertation's second and

third hypotheses--that interlocal differences would be identified
among the extraorganizational criteria l and that these differences
would exceed those found among the intraorganizational criteria--not
be rejected.
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding pages in this chapter are generally oriented to a
brief recounting of the theoretical development of the Primitive
Economy Model, and to a general discussion of analytical findings.

The

section immediately preceding discussed various strengths and weaknesses in the initial application of the Primitive Economy Model as
undertaken in this research endeavor.

This section will attempt in

the broadest possible terms to summarize the conclusions of the
research reported in this dissertation.

Discussion will be limited to

broad conclusions as distilled from the analyses reported earlier, and
will be followed by a discussion of theoretical and policy implications
which might be derived from the conclusions presented here.
As noted earlier, one of the most important conclusions to
emanate from this dissertation relates to organizational decision
making, which is indicated here to be a more complex process than is
widely acknowledged to be the case.

The literature reviewed in the
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early phases of the dissertation was designed to trace the development
of current organizational theory, which in large measure constitutes a
treatment of organizational goals.
that discussion.

Two issues were apparent throughout

First, the degree of specificity required in a model

of organizational decision making is largely a product of the planned
uses of the model.

until relatively recently, the microeconomic model

of the firm, the simplest model discussed, was more than sufficient to
meet the demands placed upon it, and there continue to exist a range
of uses for which it is admirably suited.

Nonetheless, there also

exist a range of uses for which its simplicity ill suits it for use.
It is for these uses that the various models discussed later, including
the Primitive Economy Model, are potentially better equipped.
point leads to a second observation:

This

organizational decision making is

oriented to a range of goals and, when examined closely, demands a
complex model.

Employing only those models discussed in the first

chapter, it is reasonable to posit an organizational utility function
embracing a dozen or more goals, most of which are not consistent with
one another.

This observation alone suggests a managerial capacity for

decision making which is very highly developed, even in models
embracing only intraorganizational goals.

The addition of goals which

are best associated with extraorganizational parties and conditions
lends even greater complexity to the model, and suggests the existence
of a valuational mechanism for relating goals of considerable dissimilarity.
Just as important is the fact that stimulants of organizational
activity appear to be multi-faceted and, on the whole, relatively
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limited in the type of response they generate.

Indeed, in terms of the

policy implications to be discussed shortly, this may be the most
important finding to ernanage from the study.

In this regard, a certain

class of variables tends to covary with organizational orientations
toward various measures of their own welfare.

The function of the

organization, for example, is clearly associated with its orientation
toward funding and other, similar issues, such as instability among
extralocal

governmental bodies.

Similarly, instability among the

local population as a whole tends to heighten organizational orientations toward autonomy.

While instability among local agencies

diminishes organizational orientations toward its own welfare, interlocal distinctions do not impact upon these orientations.

However,

phenomena active at the local level, such as local public and interorganizational turbulence, do.

Orientations toward expressive indica-

tions of interorganizational support are inversely associated with
turbulence in that arena.

Finally, interlocal distinctions appear to

be important in orientations to the extraorganizational benefits
arising out of concerted organizational activity.

In general, the

impacts of those influences identified as impacting upon organizational
goals appear to be quite specific.
Finally, within the context identified by the previous discussion,
it appears that organizations in different communities do in fact
differ in their orientations to certain classes of goals, and so very

likely differ in their behaviors.

This issue, addressed explicitly in

the study's research question, constitutes the analytical focus of the
dissertation and, more generally, bears important implications for the
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administration and delivery of human services.
IMPLICATIONS
Theoretical Implications
As

was noted earlier, the findings of the dissertation bear

directly on two relevant literature:

community theory and organiza-

tional theory.
While not accorded a prominent role in the theoretical development of this dissertation's analytical approach, an important element
of the project's design involved expectations of orientational
differences between organizations in different cities.

That these

differences were identified only among one of two classes of organizational goals is noteworthy and generally consistent with expectations
born of this literature.

The identification of such differences among

extraorganizational goals connotes differences in the goals and values
of organizations' environments as identified by location.

This finding

implies the existence of social cohesion and of uniqueness within
communities, both of which are characteristics of communities identified
in the literature.

In this sense, the findings of this study provide a

new source of empirical verification for those theoretical explications.
That community was not identified as a determinant of intraorganizational orientations is probably not so much a denial of communityrelated influences as it is an indication of how far community-related
influences can be expected to extend.

Stated alternatively, this

pattern of findings would lend credence to a general tendency among
organizations to engage in endeavors which at least up to a point serve
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their own interests.
Closely related to these points is the role of environments as
determinants of organizational behavior.

Five environmental components

were addressed in the analyses reported earlier, including four
measures of turbulence, and Community.

That each was found to exhibit

unique patterns of association with various organizational orientations
is supportive both of contentions that environments share operative
associations with organizations, and that environments may best be
conceptualized not as integral, but rather as collections of heterogeneous sub-components.

Again, this finding is consistent with the

literature.
This dissertation employed as its integrating model a relatively
recent contribution to organizational theory, the Primitive Economy
Model (O'Brien, 197Gb), and its corollary, the Differential Mix
Hypothesis.

Each warrants discussion.

The Primitive Economy Model in itself constitutes a theoretical
development of considerable magnitude in that it provides a basis for
incorporating the two classes of goal into a common statement.

As

such, it suggests new approaches to the concepts of exchange and
reciprocity which have not gained common favor among those who analyze
organizations.

These fundamental considerations aside, however, the

Primitive Economy Model is a logical extension of the work advanced by
others and described in the first chapter.

First, it incorporates the

work of economists and others who suggest a range of goals relating to
the economic well-being of the organization and of parties associated
with the organization.

Second, the Primitive Economy Model
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incorporates into the context established by economists the work of
organizational theorists addressing environmental issues.

Together,

these characteristics of the model promise the analysis of organizational issues at a level of considerably greater specificity and
precision than would otherwise be possible.

Above all, the model is

adaptable to a wide range of research contexts.

While those environ-

mental components of greatest interest in this particular application
of the Primitive Economy Model were local in nature, a myriad of others
are amenable to the model as well:

environments could be identified

in terms of funding sources, markets, regulatory bodies, industries,
regional locations, and a host of others as dictated by the nature of
potential research.

Similarly, the nature of extraorganizational

benefits and beneficiaries can be adapted to suit the needs of the
researcher.

While acknowledging that the Primitive Economy Model

could only be applied in partial form in this dissertation, it is
nonetheless appropriate to claim support for the model within those
limitations.
The Differential Mix Hypothesis constitutes the means by which

the Primitive Economy Model was adapted to this research application.
Like the model from which it was developed, this analytical tool is
amenable to a broad range of uses and research settings.

Moreover, the

model is consistent with existing approaches to organizational analysis.
Probably the most readily identifiable value of the Differential Mix
Hypothesis lies in its potential for verifying taxonomies developed
from theoretical grounds.

To the extent that classificatory schemes

are posited to reflect potential differences in behavior or goal, this
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tool provides a device by which such differences may be specified and
tested.
Policy Implications
It will be recalled that the research undertaken in this dissertation is based on a rather specific class of organizations and,
further, that the cities within which sampling occurred exhibit a
restricted range of populations.

Because these findings of necessity

reflect decisions made in the sampling process, it is necessary to
explicitly limit the implications drawn from the research to the population of organizations from which the sample was derived.

Two such

restrictions apply.
1.

Organizations.

The organizational sample upon which analyses

are based and findings derived is almost solely comprised of human
service agencies.

While these agencies display a broad range of

characteristics pertaining to function, location, relation to federal
funding sources, and others, they nonetheless are distinguishable from
most other organizational types through the relatively complete
separation of their input components from those benefitting from their
operation.

Where commercial firms typically derive their income from

precisely those parties--their customers--employing their products,
service agencies generally orient to transfer programs whereby
resources from one element of a constituency are passed to members of
another constituent population.
2.

Cities.

This is an important distinction.

It will be recalled from Chapter IV that for a

number of reasons the sites addressed in this survey were limited to
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mid-sized cities.

Smaller cities were deleted in order to avoid

simplicity in interorganizational networks, while larger cities were
avoided in order to obviate unwanted complexity in organizations'
operational environments.

Implicit in this sampling stipulation is an

awareness that realities in both operational settings--large and small
cities--likely differ from those of mid-sized locales, and these
differences necessarily limit the direct application of the dissertation's findings.
Within these parameters, the dissertation's findings suggest
three policy implications of merit.
First and foremost, the tendency for local organizations to
orient to different extraorganizational goals in different locales
suggests that coordinating programs designed to be implemented throughout states, regions, and the nation must embrace a degree of flexibility
in order to "fit" with operational realities in various locales.
Accordingly, goals identified by extralocal entities undertaking such
strategies should be kept general, allowing for a range of diversity in
the development of specific implementation strategies at the local
level.

In a real sense, this point is largely a vindication of the

approach employed by the Administration on Aging in its organization of
aging services networks in locales around the country.

By mandating a

general condition--the creation of agency networks so as to provide a
range of services to elderly

clients-~the

AoA left room for the local

tailoring of programs as demanded by local conditions and needs.
Second, it appears from this dissertation's findings that
extralocal funding is not a major factor in the orientation of firms
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toward their communities.

Virtually all firms contacted in the survey

were dependent in some measure upon federal or state sources for their
funding, yet the findings suggest differences in extraorganizational
goal hierarchies between locales.

This finding is sUbstantiated in

the lack of associations evidenced between agencies' reliance on
federal funding and their orientations toward the eight decision making
criteria.

In short, federal monies do not appear to be influential in

establishing the nature of organizational-environmental linkages at the
local level; rather, it would appear that organizations do in fact
develop in response to local conditions and that external support
follows as agencies mature, as their early funding sources are lost,
or as support is sought for new, locally-initiated organizations.

This

observation is not intended to suggest that federal funding is not
instrumental in developing new services for clients.

It was not

unusual during interviews with agency directors, for example, to
encounter agencies which would extend their services to new classes of
clients were resources available.

In these cases, funding availability

would benefit new classes of clients with services which would be new
to them.

In virtually all cases, however, the services themselves and

the motivation for their initial introduction

were locally derived.

Indeed, the identity of target populations was found to vary considerably from locale to locale.

In sum, the role of locale in the

development of human services is both important and pervasive.
Third, to the extent that monetary and other classes of intraorganizational inducements are effective in promoting desired ends
among service agencies, this effectiveness is likely to be universally
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realized in spite of intercity differences.

Agencies in all cities

studied were equally attuned to intraorganizational measures of success.
This is not an inconsequential finding, for a great deal of policy can
be implemented within the parameters of locally-defined organizational
responsibilities and goals.

Agencies, for example, can provide needed,

existing services to new classes of clients, and interorganizational
systems can be established or combined for a broad range of ends.

In

each case and in many others, a clearly defined desired end and
requisite resources can lead to very clear and desired responses at the
local level.
In the final analysis, the findings of this dissertation research
suggest that local service provision is best seen as a cooperative
endeavor undertaken by local and extralocal organizations acting in
concert, each providing a set of mutually compatible resources in
responding to a problem.

Local entities can identify problems, act

appropriately, and provide staffing and direction. Extralocal agencies-th~

federal government, the United Jewish Appeal, the Salvation Army,

the Red Cross, and countless others--provide funds and, perhaps,
technologies and operational procedures.

In large measure, each is

reliant upon the other, and each is a determinant of the other's
ability and success.
In the final analysis, the research presented in this doCument
offers support to the theoretical foundations upon which it is based.
Findings suggest that economic considerations tend to be universal
among agencies, as is posited in the economic literature.

Other

findings suggest, however, that organizations respond to influences
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other than the purely intraorganizational, and that in so doing they
address issues relating to their operational environments.

In many

cases, characteristics of environmental influence were found to yield
relatively constant reactions regardless of community setting, though
it was also shown that the simple fact of geographic location also
influences certain aspects of organizational operation.

In all, this

research suggests that the operational reality of human services
organizations is a complex of goals, environmental forces, and
linkages which, if fully understood, would allow considerable finetuning of existing and potential service networks.

It is hoped that

the dissertation, in exploring this array of forces, added a degree
of insight to that end.
In all, the research reported in this document shares with most
other investigations the disquieting quality of producing more
questions than it answered.

This ubiquitous quality would seem to

suggest that perhaps the real value of academic inquiry lies not in
providing answers to questions, but rather in compounding our perceived
ignorance by adding to the scales

again~t

which it is measured.
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APPENDIX I

TESTS OF MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2
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A critical assumption in this application of the Primitive
Economy Model lies in the independence of intraorganizational decision
criteria from the extraorganizational decision criteria.
As represented in formula (14), the two are envisioned as
separate considerations in the decision making process, independent of
one another except through their functional relations to the decision
making process and outcome.

They are derived from different sources,

and compel organizations to assess their operational options both with
respect to the direct net rewards accruing to the organization itself
and to entities outside the organization.

Accordingly, the independence

of the two types of criteria constitute a cornerstone of the Primitive
Economy Model.
A quite different conceptualization, not supportive of the
Primitive Economy Model, could also be intuitively derived.

Here,

extraorganizational considerations are important only to the extent
that they enhance the likelihood of attaining intraorganizational
goals.

An example could be cited in the sponsorship for public

relations purposes of public broadcasting programming by numerous
firms.
The instruments and variables developed both in the original
study and in this dissertation were developed to assess the former
model, implicitly citing the mutual independence of the two sets of
criteria.

It is, therefore, appropriate to test the various operation-

alizations of the two sets of criteria in order to assess their
demonstrated independence.
Two such tests were undertaken.

The first compares
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intercorrelations between the 24 items comprising Instruments 1 and 2
(see Chapter IV), the second involves the factor analysis of all 24
items, and the third assesses intercorrelations between the eight
composite variables employed in the dissertation's analyses as operationalizations of the two types of criteria.
The results of these tests are reported below.
1.

Correlational Analysis.

The first analytical test of the two

instruments' mutual independence involved the inspection of the correlation matrix relating the 24 items from both instruments.
sets of comparisons were performed.

Three

First, the number of correlations

exceeding an absolute value of .30 were counted; if the two instruments
are in fact unrelated, there should be a higher incidence of correlations greater than .30 between paired items from the same instruments
than between pairs representing both.

Second, the median correlation

was determined for pairs within each of the instruments, and for pairs
representing bothi here the median values representing pairs within
instruments should exceed that found for pairs between the two.
Finally, the highest correlations for pairs within and between
instruments were determined; again, this value should be higher for
pairs derived from the same instrument than for pairs derived from both.
Table XLIV summarizes these comparisons.
Of the 144 pairs of items representing both instruments, none
reflected a correlation equalling or exceeding .30.

This compares with

10 of 66 pairs from Instrument 1, and with 14 of 66 pairs from
Instrument 2 which exceed .30.

This comparison is interpreted as

supportive of the two instruments' independence.
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Median correlation values support the same interpretation.
Correlations relating items within Instrument 1 reflect a median of
.16968, while those reflecting pairs derived from Instrument 2 present
a median of .16683.

Paired items from both instruments, however, have

a median value of .07749.
TABLE XLIV
SELECTED DESCRIPTORS OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PAIRED ITEMS
FROM INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2
Number of
Correlations
<.30

Pairs of Items
From
Instrument 1

10 of 66

o of

Pairs of Items
From Both
Instruments
Pairs of Items
From
Instrument 2

144

14 of 66

Median
Correlation
.16968

.077 49

.16683

Overall, however, these analyses do lend credence to the assumption being tested.

Both of the comparisons, involving the number of

correlations exceeding .30 and median correlations, provide clear
support for the assumption.
2.

Factor Analysis.

As a different test of independence between

the two instruments, a factor analysis was undertaken employing all 24
items from the two instruments.

In this analysis, it was hypothesized

that factors developed would all fall within one of the two checklists.
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To the extent that no factor was comprised of items from both instruments, their mutual independence would be supported.
Table XLV presents the results of the analysis.

Eight factors

were generated before the program's default option terminated the
analysis.

As can be seen in the table, only on the eighth factor did

items from both instruments load above .30 load on the same factor.
In each of the first seven factors, all items loading higher than .30
on a factor represent the same instrument.
Like that of the correlation analysis, this result is deemed
supportive of the mutual independence of the two instruments.
3.

Correlational Analysis of Composite Variables.

While the two

analyses described above are deemed supportive of the assumption in
question, it was deemed wise to assess the degree to which the composite
variables derived from the items which display mutual freedom of
variance.
Accordingly, Pearson's Product-Moment Correlations measuring the
strength of relation between paired variables representing Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational criteria were developed.
correlations are reported in Table XLVI.

As can be seen, the highest

correlation relating External Orientation to Autonomy is .263.
median correlation is .137.

These

The

As with the others, this analysis was

deemed supportive of the mutual independence of the two instruments.
In sum, the three results described above were all deemed
supportive of the mutual independence of the Intraorganizational and
Extraorganizational Decision Making criteria.

Accordingly, the analyses

comprising the testing of the dissertation's thesis, and the

TABLE XLV
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INSTRUMENTS 1 AND 2

Instrument
Item

Factor
1

Instrument 1(
12.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
----

Interagenc~

loadin~

.252
.075
.230
.039
-.014
.063
.053
-.273
.161
-.069
.014
.068

.181
.056
.251
.157
.178
-.044
.181
.221
.348*
.569*
.497*
.675*

Agreements and the

(Link Agencies)
(Avoid Struggle)
(Exclude Uncooperative)
(Promote Cooperation)
(Avoid Agency Building)
(Avoid Self-Serving Orgs)
(Example of Fair Play)
(community Leaders)
(Increase Regard)
(Avoid Undependable Orgs)
(Strengthen Capacity)
(Client Input)

*factor

2

Factor
3

Factor
4

Factor
5

Factor
6

Factor
7

Factor
8

Agreements

(Increase Services)
(Avoid Entanglements)
(Here and Now Basis)
(Avoid publicity)
(Staff Interests)
(Maintain Goals)
(Bread and Butter)
(Increase Departments)
(Stress Clear Agreements)
(Hard Bargain)
(Wishes of Board)
(Maximize Return)

Instrument 2(
1-

Interagenc~

Factor

-.143
.630*
.361*
.029
.163
.443*
.109
-.088
.442*
.161
.040
-.010

.132
-.016
.170
.449*
.440*
.048
.701*
.405*
.134
.267
.035
.238

-.017
.007
.067
.005
.026
.011
-.154
.149
.072
-.071
.123
-.069

-.187
.043
-.033
.026
.233
-.089
-.136
.065
.159
.131
.072
-.125

.395*
-.070
.007
-.021
.417*
.128
-.059
.101
-.298
.105
.112
-.025

-.079
.225
.645*
.014
.209
.470*
.159
.057
.106
.560*
.046
.0]8

.027
.298
.001
.129
.083
.119
.081
-.055
.016
.134
-.016
.062

-.047
-.167
.220
.013
-.236
.048
-.205
-.003
.083
-.034
.001
.055

.729*
.293
.120
.470*
.145
-.039
.135
.083
.209
-.125
-.029
.086

.053
.259
-.128
.185
.128
.157
.046
.699*
.303*
.048
.020
.031

.030
.036
-.099
.043
.401*
.078
.071
.006
.137
.206
-.034
.076

Communit~

.259
.162
-.039
.597*
.193
.130
.651*
.193
.571*
.157
.524*
.546*

greater than .300._

.169
.030
.126
.183
-.019
.089
-.021
.116
.070
.021
.037
-.046

.030
.160
-.089
-.006
.116
.054
.102
.056
-.072
.054
.160
-.124

I
-~

-

----

--

----

-----

N

W

ex>

TABLE XLVI
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES
I

Intraorqani zational
Criteria

I

I

r

~.

.-t

ro

e

........0

ro ro

N ....
.......
e

..

CII

ro ...

-

.-t

ro

e

.......
0

ro

III

....eN .......
CII
ro ....

171·...
... ...

.2734
.001
145

r=
p=
n=

.8569
.001
145

.6347
.001
145

Expressive
r=
Coordination (D) p=
n=

-.0304
.358
145

.2231
.003
145

.1089
.096
145

Instrumental
r=
Coordination (E) p=
n=

.0135
.436
145

.1793
.015
145

.1178
.079
145

.4815
.001
147

Exel us ion (F)

r=
p=
n=

.1365
.051
145

.1441
.042
145

.2109
.005
145

.1901
.011
147

.1909
.010
147

r=

.0200
.406
145

.1050
.104
145

.0413
.311
145

.6212
.001
147

.5776
.001
147

.1382
.048
147

r=

.0579
.245
145

.2633
.001
145

.2111
.005
145

.7673
.001
147

.7711
.001
147

.6353
.001
147

.6149
.001
147

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

(e)

ou

~

G

r=
p=
n=

ro

.......

II

Autonomy (B)

Internal
Or ientation

...

e

r=
p=
n=

ou

......e

(j

Extraorganizational
Criteria
E
F

Agency
Enhancement (AI

171·...
...

ro

A

I

Outside
Input (G)
External
Orientation (II)

p=
n=
p=
n=

II

H
N
W
\0
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interpretations of the analyses' results, will reflect the tested
assumption of this independence.

APPENDIX II

ANALYSES

242
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

Intraorganizational Decision Making Criteria
A.

Analyses of Variance (TABLE XLVII) •

B.

Analyses of Covariance.

C.

244

......

245

l.

Agency Enhancement as Dependent Variable (TABLE
(TABLE XLVIII).

245

2.

Autonomy as Dependent Variable (TABLE XLIX)

246

3.

Internal Orientation as Dependent Variable

........

(TABLE L)

•

•

• •

•

•

• •

•••

•

247

•

Multiple Regression Analysis. • •

248

1.

Agency Enhancement as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LI). • • • • • • • • • •
• • • •

248

2.

Autonomy as Dependent Variable (TABLE LII).

249

3.

Internal Orientation as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LIII). • • • . •

250

II. Extraorganizational Decision Making Criteria
A.

Analyses of Variance (TABLE LIV) ••

251

B.

Analyses of Covariance. . ••

252

1.

Instrumental Coordination as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LV). . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • ••

252

2.

Expressive Coordination as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LVI) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •

253

3.

Exclusion as Dependent Variable (TABLE LVII).

254

4.

Outside Input as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LVIII) • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

255

5.

External Orientation as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LIX)

•

• •

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

256

243

Page
C.

Multiple Regression Analysis.

257

1.

Instrumental Coordination as Dependent Variable

2.

Expressive Coordination as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LXI) • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • •

258

3.

Exclusion as Dependent Variable (TABLE LXII) •

259

4.

Outside Input as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LXIII) • • • • • • • • • • • • . • .

260

5.

External Orientation as Dependent Variable
(TABLE LXIV). • • • • • • • . • . • • • • •

261

(TABLE LX).

• •

• •

•

• • •

• • •

• • • • • • • • ••

257

244

TABLE XLVII
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE, INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CRITERIA BY COMMUNITY

INTRAORGANIZATIONAL
CRITERIA
Source of Variance

SS

df

1-1S

F

1.096

.365

.666

.650

.485

.787

P

Agency Enhancement
Between Communities

98.678

5

19.736

2502.542

139

18.004

22.160

5

4.432

924.756

139

6.653

Between Communities

107.639

5

21.528

Within Communities

6169.565

139

44.365

Within Communities
Time Preference
Between Communities
Within Communities
Internal Orientation
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TABLE XLVIII
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, AGENCY ENHANCEMENT
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of variance

....

9.635

1

9.635

.523

.471

102.341

5

20.468

1.111

.358

2450.442

133

18.424

Organizational Goal

187.413

2

93.707

5.645

.004

Broker Agencies

139.886

1

139.886

8.426

.004

5.526

1

5.526

.333

.565

139.500

5

27.900

1.681

.143

2274.307

137

16.601

Local Public Uncertainty

34.958

1

34.958

2.016

.158

Community

70.618

5

14.124

.814

.542

2063.966

119

17.344

107.892

1

107.892

7.081

.009

85.760

:;

17.152

1.126

.350

1889.441

124

15.238

1.931

1

1.931

.106

.745

97.416

5

19.483

1.069

.381

2443.365

134

18.234

Interorganizational Uncertainty

56.597

1

56.597

3.391

.068

Community

82.333

5

16.467

.987

.429

2036.012

122

16.689

Colllllunity
Residual
Orsanizational Goal

Direct Service Agencies
Community
Residual
3.

Local Public uncertaintz:

Residual
4.

State and Federal Uncertaintz:
State and Federal uncertainty
Cormnunity
Residual

5.

Client uncertaintz:
Client Uncertainty
Community
Residual

6.

F

Orsanizational Resources
Organizational Resources

2.

ss

Interorsanizational uncertaintz:

Residual
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TABLE XLIX
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

4.

P

1

13.939

2.136

.146

Community

17.749

5

3.550

.544

.743

867.954

133

6.526

Organizational Goal

55.046

2

27.523

4.322

.015

Broker Agencies

24.381

1

24.381

3.829

.052

1.107

1

1.107

.174

.677

ColIII\unity

19.503

5

3.901

.613

.690

Residual

872.367

137

10.650

Local Public Uncertainty

14.315

1

14.315

2.096

.150

Community

21.876

5

4.375

.641

.669

Residual

812.669

119

6.032

8.255

1

8.255

1.287

.259

Community

14.379

5

2.876

.448

.814

Resiciual

795.442

124

6.415

8.832

1

8.832

1. 318

.253

Community

15.912

5

3.182

.475

.795

Residual

898.142

134

6.703

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty

10.005

1

10.005

1.551

.215

CollDllunity

19.514

5

3.903

.605

.696

Residual

787.114

122

6.452

Orsanizatiooal Goal

Local Public Uncertaint:z:

State and Federal uncertaint:z:

Client Uncertaint:z:
Client Uncertainty

6.

F

13.939

State and Federal Uncertainty

5.

MS

Organizational Resources

Direct Service Agencies

3.

df

Orsanizationa1 Resources

Residual
2.

ss

Interorganizatiooa1 uncertaint:z:
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TABLE L
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, INTERNAL ORIENTATION
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

ss

df

MS

F

54.661

1

54.661

1. 228

.270

126.075

5

25.215

.566

.726

5920.308

133

44.514

Organizational Goal

357.686

2

178.843

4.273

.016

Broker Agencies

219.205

1

219.205

5.237

.024

.295

1

.295

.007

.933

Conununity

185.393

5

37.079

.886

.492

Residual

5734.124

137

41.855

157.521

1

157.521

3.626

.059

75.353

5

15.071

.347

.883

3087.662

119

25.947

149.404

1

149.404

3.606

.060

56.001

5

11.200

.270

.929

5137.590

124

41. 432

Client Uncertainty

24.799

1

24.799

.554

.458

Community

91.931

5

18.386

.411

.840

5993.828

134

44.730

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty 191.317

1

191.317

4.848

.030

Community

102.486

5

20.497

.519

.761

Residual

4814.202

122

39.461

Orgnizational Resources
Organizational Resources
Canmunity
Residual

2.

Organizational Goal

Direct Service Agencies

3.

Local Public Uncertaint:z:
Local Public Uncertainty
Community
Residual

4.

State and Federal Uncertaint:i
State and Federal Uncertainty
Conununity
Residual

5.

Client Uncertaint:z:

Residual
6.

P

Interor~anizationa1

Uncertaint:t:

I

TABLE LI
NULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step Variable

AGENCY ENHANCEMENT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Overall
F At
Each Step

df

Significance of
stepwise
F

Beta At
Last Step

F At
Last step

Significance
Of F

.312

6.527

.012

8.495

1,113

.004

-.278

7.349

.008

9.309

2,112

.000

1

Broker Agencies

2

State dnd Federal
Uncertainty

3

Interorganizationa1
Uncertainty

.127

1.927

.168

7.067

3,111

.000

4

Organizational
Resources

.104

1.078

.302

5.592

4,110

.000

5

Direct Service
Agencies

.083

.451

.503

4.537

5,109

.001

6

Clients
Uncertainty

.021

.051

.822

3.768

6,108

.002

7

Local Public
Uncertainty

.032

.089

.766

3.207

7,107

.004

8

community

.621

.684

2.097

12,102

.023

N

"'ex>"

TABLE LII
t>1ULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step Variable

AUTONOMY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Overall
F At
Each Step

df

Significance of
stepwise
F

Beta At
Last Step

F At
Last Step

Significance
Of F

.168

1.615

.207

6.826

1,113

.010

-.179

2.924

.090

4.327

2,112

.015

1

Broker Agencies

2

Local Publ ic
Uncertainty

3

State and Federal
Uncertainty

.111

1.079

.301

3.398

3,111

.020

4

Clients
Uncertainty

.079

.658

.419

2.843

4,110

.028

5

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

.094

.970

.327

2.400

5,109

.042

6

Direct Service
Agencies

-.043

.107

.744

2.000

6,108

.072

7

Organizational
Resources

-.005

.002

.961

1. 708

7,107

.115

8

Conununity

.482

.789

1.173

2,112

.312

N

"'"

\0

TABLE LIII
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step Variable

INTERNAL ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Overall
F At
Each Step

df

Significance of
stepwise
F

Beta At
Last Step

F At
Last step

Significance
Of F

.227

3.117

.080

6.822

1,113

.010

-.195

3.498

.064

6.139

2,112

.003

1

Broker Agencies

2

State and Federal
Uncertainty

3

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

.174

3.504

.064

5.375

3,111

.002

4

Organizational
Uncertainty

.099

.941

.334

4.467

4,110

.002

5

Local Public
Uncertainty

-.127

1. 552

.216

3.779

5,109

.003

6

Clients
Uncertainty

.059

.385

.537

3.220

6,108

.006

7

Direct Service
Agencies

.015

.014

.978

2.737

7,107

.012

8

Community

.372

.867

1. 704

2,112

.076

N

lJ1

o
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TABLE LIV
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE,

EXTRAORGfu~IZATIONAL

CRITERIA BY COMMUNITY

INTRAORGANI ZATIONAL
CRITERIA
Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

F

P

1. 620

.159

1. 664

.147

1.134

.345

1. 912

.096

1.119

.353

Instrumental Coordination
Between Communities

49.403

5

9.881

847.663

139

6.098

Between Communities

44.320

5

8.864

Within Communities

740.439

139

5.327

34.391

5

6.878

843.181

139

6.066

16.193

5

3.239

235.414

139

1.694

Between Communities

142.409

5

28.482

Within Communities

3539.289

139

25.463

Within Communities
Expres3ive Coordination

Exclusion
Between Communities
Within Communities
Outside Input
Between Communities
Within Communities
External Orientation

252
TABLE LV
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1-

ss

3.848

.626

.430

Community

60.625

5

12.125

1. 973

.087

Residual

817.306

133

6.145

1.212

2

.606

.096

.909

Broker Agencies

.381

1

.381

.060

.807

Direct Service Agencies

.089

1

.089

.014

.906

Community

65.614

5

13.033

2.053

.075

Residual

882.297

139

9.482

Organizational Goal

Local Public uncertaint::
1.242

1.242

.193

.661

44.955

5

8.991

1. 400

.229

764.323

119

6.423

1.165

1

1.165

.180

.672

49.071

5

9.814

1.515

.190

803.168

124

6.477

.089

1

.089

.014

.905

50.525

5

10 .105

1.627

.157

832.385

134

6.212

Interorganizational Uncertainty 4.210

1

4.210

.657

.419

Community

58.050

5

11.610

1.811

.116

795.114

124

6.412

Residual
State and Federal Uncertaint::
State and Federal Uncertainty
Community
Residual
Client Uncertaint::
Client Uncertainty
Community
Residual
6.

.

1

Community

5.

p

1

Local Public Uncertainty

4.

F

3.848

Organizational Goal

3.

loIS

Organizational Resources
Organizational Resources

2.

df

Interorganizational uncertaint::

Residual
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TABLE LVI
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

ss

df

2.778

1

2.778

.510

.476

Community

44.060

5

8.812

1.618

.160

Residual

724.383

133

5.446

Organizational Goal

6.882

2

3.441

.540

.584

Broker Agencies

6.095

1

6.095

.956

.330

Direct Service Agencies

5.157

1

5.157

.809

.370

Community

83.447

5

16.689

2.618

.027

Residual

886.134

139

6.375

Local Public Uncertainty

10.661

1

10.661

1.906

.170

Community

27.696

5

5.539

.995

.424

Residual

662.519

119

5.567

.712

1

.712

.133

.716

Community

38.248

5

7.650

1.430

.218

Residual

663.208

124

5.348

3.805

1

3.805

.721

.397

Community

46.644

5

9.329

1. 768

.124

Residual

707.097

134

5.277

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty

38.116

1

38.116

6.206

.014

Community

83.521

5

16.704

2.716

.023

Residual

762.618

124

6.510

Or~anizationa1

3.

4.

or~anizationa1

Local Public uncertaint;L

State and Federal Uncertaint;L

Client Uncertaint;L
Client Uncertainty

6.

p

Goal

State and Federal Uncertainty

5.

F

Resources

Organizational Resources

2.

MS

Interorsanizationa1 uncertaint;L
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TABLE LVII
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

df

1. 725

1

1. 725

.287

.593

Community

34.330

5

6.866

1.144

.340

Residual

798.278

133

6.002

10.939

2

5.470

.831

.438

6.389

1

6.389

.970

.326

Direct Service Agencies

10.633

1

10.633

1.615

.206

Community

36.416

5

7.283

1.106

.360

Residual

915.245

139

6.584

Local Public Uncertainty

10.029

1

10.029

1.601

.208

Community

16.376

5

3.275

.523

.759

Residual

745.325

119

6.263

6.085

1

6.085

.978

.325

23.626

5

4.725

.760

.581

771.370

124

6.221

Client Uncertainty

16.504

1

16.504

2.731

.101

Community

44.172

5

8.834

1.462

.207

Residual

809.910

134

6.044

8.496

1

8.496

1.305

.255

Community

23.549

5

4.710

.723

.607

Residual

807.218

124

6.510

Broker Agencies

4.

Local public uncertaint:L

State and Federal

Uncertalnt~

State and Federal Uncertainty
Community
Residual
5.

6.

F

Orsanizational Goal
Organizational Goal

3.

~1S

Orsanizational Resources
Organizational Resources

2.

--»-

ss

Client Uncertaint:L

Interorsanizationa1

Uncertaint~

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty
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TABLE LVIII
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

ss

3.

.056

.033

.857

Community

16.899

5

3.380

1.970

.087

Residual

228.197

133

1. 716

Organizational Goal

.655

2

.328

.17<;

.839

Broker Agencies

.000

1

.000

.000

.999

Direct Service Agencies

.382

1

.382

.206

.651

Community

22.407

5

4.481

2.411

.039

Residual

258.361

139

1.895

.109

1

.109

.062

.804

Community

14.397

5

2.879

1.621

.160

Residual

211. 344

119

1.776

.153

1

.153

.090

.765

16.930

5

3.386

1.987

.085

211.302

124

1. 704

.058

1

.058

.033

.855

44.172

5

8.834

1.462

.105

809.910

134

6.044

.780

1

.780

.409

.524

Community

19.872

5

3.974

2.085

.072

Residual

236.418

124

1.907

Or5!anizationa1 Goal

Local Public Uncertaint:L

State and Federal uncertaint:L

COlllllunity
Residual
Client Uncertaint:L
Client Uncertainty
Community
Residual
6.

P

1

State and Federal Uncertainty

5.

F

.056

Local Public Uncertainty

4.

MS

Or5!anizational Resources
Organizational Resources

2.

df

In~eror5!ani~ationa1

uncertaint:L

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty
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TABLE LIX
ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE, EXTERNAL ORIENTATION
AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Covariate
Source of Variance
1.

ss

sf

2.587

1

2.587

.100

.752

Community

147.683

5

29.537

1.142

.341

Residual

3439.090

133

25.858

Organizational Goal

34.637

2

17.319

.573

.565

Broker Agencies

19.178

1

19.178

.635

.427

Direct Service Agencies

33.986

1

33.986

1.125

.291

Community

314.118

5

62.824

2.080

.072

Residual

4199.251

139

30.210

3.

28.197

1

28.197

1.087

.299

Community

127.478

5

25.496

.983

.431

Residual

3087.662

119

25.947

4.978

1

4.978

.183

.670

Community

152.803

5

30.561

1.124

.351

Residual

3372.176

124

27.195

3.288

1

3.288

.129

.720

Community

170.281

5

34.056

1.337

.253

Residual

3414.242

134

25.479

Interorganizational Uncertainty 124.199

1

124.119

4.151

.044

Community

304.529

5

60.906

2.036

.078

3710.239

124

29.921

Local Public Uncertaint:t

State and Federal Uncertaint:t
State and Federal Uncertainty

5.

Client Uncertainty
Client Uncertainty

6.

p

Orsanizational Goal

Local Public Uncertainty

4.

F

Organizational Resources
Organizational Resources

2.

MS

Interorganizationa1 Uncertainty

Residual

TABLE LX
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step

Variable

INSTRUMENTAL COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Significance
Of F

Overall
F At
Each Step

Significance of
stepwise
F

Beta At
Last Step

F At
Last Step

.143

1.814

.181

.681

1,113

.411

df

1

Organizational
Resources

2

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

-.075

.594

.443

.650

2,112

.524

3

State and Federal
Uncertainty

-.036

.111

.740

.519

3,111

.670

4

Broker Agencies

-.063

.220

.640

.419

4,110

.795

5

Local Public
Uncertainty

-.004

.001

.972

.340

5,109

.888

6

Community

1. 761

.127

1. 056

10,104

.403

7

Clients
Uncertainty

-.016

.025

.876

.953

11,103

.493

8

Direct Service
Agencies

-.018

.018

.893

.867

12,102

.582

N
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TABLE LXI
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step

Variable

EXPRESSIVE COORDINATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Significance of
stepwise
F

F AT
Last Step

Significance
Of F

Overall
F At
Each Step

-.244

6.920

.010

5.097

1,113

.026

Beta At
Last Step

df

1

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

2

Local Public
Uncertainty

.132

1.932

.168

3.465

2,112

.035

3

Broker Agencies

.160

1.572

.213

2.559

3,111

.059

4

Direct Service
Agencies

.116

.836

.363

2.146

4,110

.080

5

Organizational
Resources

.014

.021

.884

1.810

5,109

.117

6

Clients
Uncertainty

.047

.245

.622

1.554

6,108

.168

7

Community

2.023

.081

1.807

11,103

.062

N
VI
CD

TABLE LXII
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step

Variable

Beta At
Last Step

EXCLUSION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE

F At
Last Step

Significance
Of F

Overall
F At
Each Step

df

Significance of
Stepwise
F

1

Clients
uncertainty

-.188

3.753

.055

2.478

1,113

.118

2

Local Public
Uncertainty

.190

3.317

.072

2.283

2,112

.107

3

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

-.120

1.580

.212

1.856

3,111

.141

4

Organizational
Resources

.051

.242

.624

1.577

4,110

.185

5

Direct Service
Agencies

.154

1.419

.236

1.328

5,109

.258

6

Broker Agencies

.139

1.127

.291

1.303

6,108

.262

7

State and Federal
Uncertainty

.061

.327

.569

1.135

7,106

.347

8

Community

1. 403

.229

1.259

12,102

.255

N

U1
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TABLE LXIII
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step

Variable

Beta At
Last Step

F At
Last Step

OUTSIDE INPUT AS DEPENDENT VARIABL£

Significance
Of F

Overall
F At
Each Step

df

Significance of
Stepwise
F

1

Interorganizational
Uncertainty

-.064

.446

.506

.344

1,113

.559

2

Direct Service
Agencies

-.063

.424

.516

.348

2,112

.707

3

Clients
Uncertainty

-.043

.189

.665

.264

3,111

.851

4

Local Public
Uncertainty

.019

.031

.861

.211

4,110

.932

5

State and Federal
Uncertainty

-.018

.028

.867

.185

5,109

.968

6

Community

1. 746

.131

.969

10,104

.475

7

Organizational
Resources

.199

.656

.892

11,103

.551

.047

N
0'1

o

TABLE LXIV
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:

Step

Variable

EXTERNAL ORIENTATION AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Significance of
Stepwise
F

F At
Last Step

Significance
Of F

Overall
F At
Each step

-.201

4.511

.036

3.496

1,113

.064

Beta At
Last Step

df

1

Interorganizationa1
Uncertainty

2

Local Public
Uncertainty

.147

1. 998

.161

2.222

2,112

.113

3

Clients
Uncertainty

-.072

.564

.454

1.558

3,111

.204

4

Organizational
Resources

.082

.627

.430

1. 220

4,110

.306

5

Direct Service
Agencies

.116

.817

.368

1.008

5,109

.417

6

Broker Agencies

.109

.703

.404

.999

6,108

.430

7

Community

2.057

.076

1. 507

11,103

.140

8

State and Federal
Uncertainty

.013

.911

1.369

12,102

.193

.012

N
0\
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APPENDIX III

INSTRUMENTS

263

For purposes of the next series of questions, we would like to
give you a hypothetical problem to consider.
Assume that legislation is passed enacting Human Services Revenue
Sharing. The program will be implemented by the designation of a local
government agency to broker and monitor the pass through and use of
the services funds. The actual service monies will be awarded through
contracts with various local service agencies such as the one you work
for.
Assume that your agency is approached to participate in the
program. To do so will result in certain modifications in your
program and in your funding picture. In order to participate, your
agency must negotiate a contract setting down the terms of this interagency agreement.
We are specifically interested in what factors you would
consider in attempting both to decide whether or not to seek to
participate in the program and, later, assuming you were interested,
in how you would set your priorities relative to the specifics
involved in the contract.
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INSTRUMENT 1:
A.

INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS

Relative to your agency, please check the extent to which each of the following
would constitute an important criterion in your assessment of the merits of this
type of agreement.

~~

~~

~

~

~

2.

to avoid entanglements that diminish your
agency's independence and self direction

3.

to negotiate terms on a here-and-now basis since
future obligations may be hard to count on

4.

to avoid maing the terms of such arrangements
a public matter

5.

to advance the professional interests of your
staff in any new programs

6.

to avoid new activities that do not match
your agency goals

7.

to concentrate on the bread and butter issues lik e
maximizing your share of the contract money

B.

to use such opportunities to increase the size
of your agency staff and departments

9.

to stress clear agreements which avoid longrun
entanglements with other organizations

10. to protect your agency by driving a hard bargain
11. to further the wishes of your board
12. to maximize the return from the agreement
to your agency
13. to avoid the opportunity altogether because it
is likely to be more trouble than it is worth

~

~

~

~
~
1

to use such opportunities to increase the range
of services your organization offers

7
~

~

~

1.

~

~

~

IN CONSIDERING SUCH AGREEMENTS,
IT IS IMPORTANT • •

\~~

2

3

4

5
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INSTRUMENT 2:

INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS AND THE COMMUNITY

STILL KEEPING IN MIND THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION ON THE PREVIOUS PAGE •••

B.

Relative to the community, please check the extent to which each of the following
would constitute an important criterion in your assessment of the merits of this
type of agreement.

\~

Ill..

~

~

IN CONSIDERING SUCH AGREEMENTS,
IT IS IMPORTANT • • •

1.

to use the opportunity to link many
community agencies for close coordination

2.

to avoid allowing the program to become a
competitive struggle among many organizations

3.

to exclude agencies which have been
uncooperative with past community efforts

4.

to promote a sense of cooperation
among agencies in the community

5.

to minimize the share of the resources whi~h
go for agency building and administration

6.

to avoid participation if the distribution process is
likely to be dominated by a few self serving agenc ies

7.

to set an example of fair play in
conducting the negotiations

8.

to stimulate competition among
agencies for better distribution of funds

9.

to seek consultation with community
leaders before settling on specific terms

~
;.to

~

10. to increase the positive regard
of agencies for one another
11. to discourage the award of funds to agencies with a
reputation of not following through with their agr eements
12. to use the funds for strengthening the capacity
for human services delivery in the community
13.

to assure open input from client representatives

t

('

~~

...

~

~

t\

('

~

1

-.;.

~

~

~

('

2

'1'...

3

4

..

~
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